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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In recent philosophy one of the most important
developments has been the controversy among various
philosophers about the place, nature, and importance
of religion and its relation to philosophy. Douglas
Clyde Macintosh, now professor emeritus and until 1942
professor of theology and philosophy of religion in
Yale University, has been active in this controversy
and has interpreted and defended religion. From the
point of view of a critical realist he has developed
his objections to other philosophical systems. The
purpose of this dissertation is to examine his criticism
of personalism.
1. The problem
Much of this criticism appears directly and explicitly
in Macintosh’s writings. This is especially true of his
attack on the epistemological position of personalism.
The fundamental arguments in his criticism of epistemological
dualism and his own views as a critical realistic monist
appear in his two major volumes on epistemology. The
Problem of Knowledge (1915), and The Problem of Religious
Knowledge (1940). He develops his critical realism also
'*5 ml
*
in several of his articles. His criticism of the
epistemology of personalism rests on certain points
of direct attack and on the underlying ideas of his
own epistemological position. As an epistemological
realist Macintosh criticizes the agnosticism of dualism
and the dogmatism of both realistic absolute epistemological
monism and idealistic epistemological monism.
In Macintosh’s criticism of personalism, the realistic
attack is not merely epistemological. It also has certain
significant Implications for metaphysics snd religion.
Macintosh’s investigation of the relation of religion and
theology to metaphysics began with the study for his
dissertation on The Reaction Against Metaphysics in Theology ,
published in 1911. His epistemological writings also
present many propositions Important for his metaphysics
and for his criticism of the metaphysics of personalism.
He develops his own metaphysics in the chapter on reality
in The Reasonableness of Christianity . He indicates some
of the points in his criticism of personalistic metaphysics
in the chapter on metaphysics in The Pilgrimage of Faith
in the World of Modern Thought , the Stephanos Nirmalendu
Ghosh Lectures at the University of Calcutta, delivered
in 1928 and published in 1931.
Macintosh has been an active leader in philosophy,
theology, and religion. Especially in his writings he
has emphasized religious problems and the meaning of
'.
.
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oth«r phases of culture for religion. Many of his
articles and several cfhis books deal directly with
religion. The relation of his thought to personalism
appears either explicitly or implicitly in almost all
of his writings. His application of his religion to
social problems is not dir©ctly related to his criticism
of personalism, although it makes use of his general
religious and philosophical thought.
While Macintosh criticizes the religious and
metaphysical as well as the epistemological views of
personalism, it is in his critical realism that he
attempts to unite his thought and state his philosophical
views. For an evaluation of his criticism of personalism
one must investigate the relation of the basic principles
of critical monistic realism to the epistemological, the
metaphysical, and the religious views of personalism.
2. Previous related treatments
A complete study has never been made of Macintosh's
criticism of personalism, although the controversy
between him and the personalists has continued over a
period of several years. Certain points, for example,
the meaning of "monism" in his epistemology, 1 his
treatment of theology as an empirical science, 2 and his
criticism of one personalistic solution of the problem
T7 Knudson, POP, 101-102. { Abbreviations are
interpreted in the bibliograohy.
)
2. Knudson, DOG, 127, 131.
••
•
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of evil,
3
have been examined; but critical realism and
personalism both require a more extensive investigation
of the relations between their positions. A significant
contribution to this relatively unexplored area was
made recently. ^ Bertocci's critical investigations will
not soon be surpassed, although they are limited to
expounding and criticizing Macintosh’s epistemology.
A more exhaustive study of Macintosh's criticism of
personalism in particular is one of the needs of present
philosophy.
Personalism has been examined by critical realists
whose philosophical views are similar to Macintosh's. 3
A personalistic examination of Macintosh's criticism
of personalism, however, is needed to sharpen further
certain issues between these two great schools of
American philosophy.
3.
Organization of this study
The first tssk in this dissertation, which is
directed toward this goal, is to locate Macintosh's
thought in relation to certain points in the historical
development of realism. The following chanter, "Development
of Realism," is designed to do this. Macintosh's realism,
however, differs from other systems of realism. In order
3. Brightman, POR, 266-267, and Art. (1932) 2 .
4. See Bertocci, Art. (1943), and Art. (1944). Melzer's
dissertation, ECM, contains an exposition of Macintosh
thought and some critical comments about it.
5. See, for example, Ross, PPE.
..
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to bring out certain distinctive features of his thought.
Chapter III is devoted to his doctrine of values, his
doctrine of the self, the significance of religion for
his realism and of realism for his religion, and a state-
ment of the present influence of his thought.
She next important problem is the contrast between
personalistic and realistic epistemology. Its empirical
method and its epistemological dualism make personalistic
epistemology important in this relation. A study of
these two characteristics of personalistic epistemology
and an investigation of the monistic epistemology of
Macintosh's realism prepare for an evaluation of the
explicit points in Macintosh's criticism of personalistic
epistemology.
xhe last major part of this dissertation deals with
certain metaphysical and religious problems related to
Macintosh's criticism of personalism. An idealistic
metaphysics is a special target for a realistic critic
of personalism, out what is involved in this critic's
attack? Macintosh and personalists come closer together
in their ideas of a personal uod than at any other point,
nere the special problem is the relation of their ideas
of uod to their epistemological and metaphysical views.
*he differences between their views on the problem of
evil emphasize the differences between the metaphysical
views of Macintosh and personalists, as well as the
-.
.
.
.
.
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differences between empirical and more rationalistic
personalist s. .these investigations show the distinctive
characteristics of empirical personalism and bring the
study of Macintosh's criticism of personalism to its
summary and conclusions*
'r K
1
.
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uHAPTiSR II
DEVELOPMENT OP REALISM
The purpose of this chapter is to show the relation
of Macintosh's thought to certain points in the historical
development of realism. "Realism" and "realistic" are
used with various meanings, in literary and popular
usage they often refer to what is not imaginary or
illusory. Calhoun describes this meaning of realism*
... the temper of one who is critical and level-
headed, rather than wishful and heedless or
visionary in his dealings with life; accustomed
to distinguish between fact and fancy, and
seeking to be guided, as far as possible, by
disciplined inference from fact ... ^
Although this popular meaning creeps into the thought
of many philosophers, metaphysical realism means that
the nature of being is not qualitatively like idea,
and epistemological realism means that the object of
knowledge Is not dependent on its being known. In the
history of philosophy metaphysical realism appears as
an antithesis to Idealism. The basic meaning of
philosophical realism in metaphysics is that the nature
of being is not qualitatively like idea.
Realism has appeared in various forms In the history
of philosophy. An acute conflict over realism, in the
1. In Macintosh (ed.), RR, 195.
*»
•
•
4
tJ.
.
sense of belief in the objective reality of universals,
occupied a center of philosophical controversy during
the heyday of scholasticism. This realism was closely
associated with a devout interest in religion and the
doctrines of the Church; and such realism still survives.
With the subsequent development of the sciences another
stream of interest in realism began. It is illustrated
by Scottish realism, neo- and critical realism, and
modern naturalism. Macintosh’s religious philosophy
is an example of realism based both on a sincere and
profound interest in religion and on an appreciation
of the scientific method and insights. The relation
of Macintosh's thought to the historical development
of realism may be seen by examining certain points
about these great expressions of realism.
1. Realism of universals
In the Middle Ages one of the problems of philosophy
was the controversy over nominalism and realism. Are
universals merely names, or are they objectively real?
Boethius saw the problem in his day and expressed his
view in his commentary on .Porphyry:
... genera and species are In individuals, but
they are thought universals; and species must
be considered to be nothing other than the
thought collected from the substantial likeness
of individuals unlike in number, and genus
the thought collected from the likeness of
species.
2
2. See McKeon (ed.), SMP, I, 97
..
.
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During the Middle Ages the controversy became acute.
Scholasticism and the realism of that period were
strongly influenced by the predominant impact of the
thought of Plato and Aristotle upon medieval philosophy.
The Platonic realists, for example, asserted extreme
real ism- -universals are real prior to things, unlversalla
sunt re all a ante res . Although John Scotus Erigena has
been called "a momentary spark of light in the medieval
darkness," 1 Anselm was the outstanding proponent of
Platonic realism. Aristotelian realism is a more moderate
realism. It developed especially after the rediscovery of
Aristotle facilitated by Arabian philosophy. Aristotelian
realism takes the form universalis sunt realla in rebus .
This formula finds expression in the idea of the essence
of things held by thinkers like Thomas Aquinas and John
Duns Scotus. Opposed to both Platonic and Aristotelian
realism was the view that universals are merely names.
Nominalism, universalia sunt realia post res and hence
universalis sunt nomina , was taught and used to interpret
the Trinity by Roscellinus and advocated by William
of Occam, famous for "Occam’s razor "--ent ia non sunt
multiplicands praeter necessit atem .
This controversy, which sets the stage for the
philosophy of the enlightenment, illustrates a peculiar
kind of realism, a realism of universals, which is based
3. Thilly, HOP, 166
...
.
.
on the influence of Plato and Aristotle and on the
relation of reason to the doctrine of the Church, by
which the reality of objects of faith was maintained.
Although Roscellinus used nominalism to interpret the
doctrine of the Trinity, the orthodox dogma was that
based on Platonic realism; universal s, like the Trinity
were not merely names but were objectively real. The
predominant influence of Platonic-Aristotelian thought
and interest in the religious and Church dogmas of the
period were significant factors in this realism of
universal s,
2. Anti-idealistic realism
Another form of realism is the common-sense
philosophy of the Scottish school. Thomas Reid, its
most important representative, attempted "to return to
the naTve convictions of the plain man, " ^ His thought
has been regarded as "a reaction against the idealism
of berkeley and the skepticism of Hume."
5
In the
conclusion of his Inquiry into the Human Mind Reid
advises:
... admit the existence of what we see and
feel as a first principle, as well as the
existence of things whereof we are conscious
... take our notions of the qualities of
body, from the testimony of our senses ...
and our notions of our sensations, from the
testimony of consciousness. 5
4. Macintosh, POK, 213.
5. ihilly, HOP, 363.
6. Reid, WOR, I, 433.
r_
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This Scottish reslism illustrates an attempt to be
scientific. It shows the basis of realism in immediate
certainty of common sense, provided here by sensation
and serving as a criterion of truth. A later "critical"
realist, like Reid interested in both religion and
science
,
( regards the usage of common language, so
"remarkably followed" by Reid, as proving "in the end
a will-o *-the-wisp, leading our philosopher whither
no discreet thinker will care to follow him. " ®
Anti-idealistic realism in recent philosophy deserves
further attention. It is illustrated by the neo-realism
of JSdwin B. Holt, Walter T. Marvin, William Pepperell
Montague, Ralph Barton Perry, Walter B. Pitkin, and
Edward Gleason Spaulding, and the critical realism of
Durant Drake, Arthur 0. Lovejoy, dames Bissett rratt,
Arthur K. Rogers, George Santayana, Roy Wood Sellars,
and C. A. Strong. Modern anti-idealistic realism also
includes naturalism in metaphysics—in short, any theory
of reality which denies that it is of the quality of
idea.
The development of this anti-idealistic realism is
closely related to modern science. Neo-realists recognize
7. See discussion by Bewkes in Bixler and others,
NRa, 11. Cf. also Macintosh's statement that
science is "simply common sense become sufficiently
critical for the more specialized purposes,"
Macintosh, POK, 325.
8. Macintosh, POK, 21b. Cf. keeping "closer ... to
the conservative, critical revision of common
sense ... characteristic of scientific ways of
thinking," ibid., 329.
.•
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that the progress of the natural sciences has influenced
their metaphysical views directly and profoundly,
9
The
development of anti-idealistic realism in its relation
to science is evident. Larrabee, in tracing the
development of one type of anti-idealistic realism in
America, observes that at one period in its history
science was without any close relation to the prevailing
philosophical tendencies. Anti-idealistic realism became
an historical synthesis of science and philosophy. Deism
was the previous initial antithetical reaction to the
development of the natural sciences in many areas; the
collapse of supernaturalism provided the framework for
the heyday of this anti-idealistic realism.
But the development of this realism is more
significantly related to interest in science. Realists
believe that the empirical method of science is realistic.
One of the outstanding characteristics of neo- and critical
realism and especially of the modern development of
naturalism is the stress on the empirical method.
Krikorian, for example, asserts that the naturalistic
method "in seeking an understanding of the world is the
empirical method of science as against allegedly superior
9 . See Marvin in Holt and others, NR, 84. Cf. also
Larrabee in Krikorian (ed.), NHS, 325, and Perry’s
assertion that ’’natural ism derives credit from
the triumphs of science, idealism from the loyaltie
and hopes of religion," Perry, FtT, 39.
10. See his article, "Naturalism in America," in
Krikorian (ed.), NHS, 319-353.
.•
•.
'
'
'
.
,
. .
•
t
• • • .
methods, " 11 and regards ‘'the universal applicability
of the experimental method'* as basic in his
naturalistic method* But the empirical method does
not require an anti-idealistic philosophy. The emoirical
method may be used by idealists as well as by realists
and naturalists.^3
The basic meaning of the empirical method in
naturalism is illustrated by the requirement that mind
be analyzed as behavior, because "behavior is the only
aspect of mind which is open to experimental examination."
Contrast with this the method of the empirical personalist
who describe experience as consisting of our entire
conscious life.-*-3 Empirical personalists do not
minimize the place and the importance of scientific
developments; they only refuse to limit all consciousness
to and define all experience as the results of any one
or even all of the natural sciences. They merely require
that the discoveries of every and of all science be
related to and interpreted in connection with the rest
of science and of all conscious awareness, rather than
erected as a standard by which all must be measured. In
this respect empirical personalists require the same kind
of critical testing of the sciences that Hegel demands of
11. Krikorian (ed.), NHS, vii.
12. Ibid., 242.
13. For a more detailed discussion of the empirical
method in personalism see Chapter IV, infra.
14. Krikorian in Krikorian (ed.), NHS, 252.
15. See, for example, Brightman, POR, 1.
.*
.
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religion, for example, in his subordination of it to
philosophy, especially in the first part of his Vorlesungun
flber die Philosophie der Religion *
The empirical emphasis in anti-idealistic realism
results from sn attempt to avoid the pitfalls of abstract
idealism. A naturalist, for example, claims "a willingness
even an eagerness, to face all the facts in any situation
with a minimum of distortion by personal desires or
prejudices." Herein he gains a distinct advantage
over an abstract, rationalistic idealism. But this
insistence on impartial and critical consideration of
actual experience is a trumpet call already sounded and
obeyed by empirical personalist s . The validity of
"realism" in this sense is derived principally from the
meaning which characterizes its use in popular literature,
as critical and guided by facts. This, however, is as
much a trait of empirical personalism as it is of
metaphysical realism.
In fact, personalist ic idealists are better equipped
than metaphysical realists to avoid the dangers of being
"unrealistic" in this sense. The naturalist, for example,
accepts natural science and regards it metaphysically:
"there is no supernature, no transcendental world. Beyond
nature there is more nature." He says that nature is
enough, as if applying Occam’s razor to all else. But
16. Larrabee in Krikorian (ed.), NHS, ,319.
17. Krikorian in ibid., 243.
•,
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on what basis does he make this assertion?
Although there is great difference among the
realists, the failure to take the idealistic step to
a position which recognizes the validity of natural
sciences without confining metaphysics to their data
alone apoears to rest, at least partially, on psychological
factors, from which the realist alleges a "realistic
"
escape. The relation of psychological factors and
conditions to logical truth is not yet completely end
clearly determined, but this fact does not excuse a
confusion of them* Santayana, for example, says that
realism is "the union of two instinctive assumptions
£that knowledge is transitive and that it is relevantjj,
necessary to the validity of knowledge." By referring
to anything as instinctive one does not condemn it; but
unless it is more than instinctive, it still lacks
verification. Much anti-idealistic realism rests on this
basis in its failure to justify its acceptance of natural
science as final and in its limitation of itself to a
realistic metaphysics.^
One of the soecial problems that metaphysical
realists face is the status of values. Among realists
18. In Drake and others, ECR, 168. Cf . sustaining
"our instinctive faith," Trueblood, LOB, 58;
common man as "undoubtedly ... a philosophical
realist," Trueblood, KOG, 12-13; and Bewkes's
idea that a sound "instinct" is to "begin with
simple realism," in Bixler and others, NRE, 10.
19. Cf. Macintosh’s statement that "the instinctive
realistic belief of mankind is ... a realistic
epistemological monism," Macintosh, POK, 52; also
cited in Bertocci, Art. (1943), 165.
".
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there is wide difference of opinion about the relation of
values, especially of religious values, to their
methodology. However, all anti-idealistic realists
either openly discard or rule out by neglect or redefine
the distinctively religious values and ideals and such
concepts as purpose, especially the whole conscious
person as freely and purposively striving toward self-imposed
ideals, to fit their underlying realism. Lepley, one
outstanding naturalist, has given an admirable discussion
of value but omits practically all reference to religious
values. Another naturalist asserts that "a premature
naturalism or antiquated religion or both" have been
responsibility for much of the difficulty between
naturalism and religion. He asserts that naturalism
is not hostile to religion and that agnosticism came
"from philosophical traditions that were not attached,
except by historical accident, to the naturalistic
approach. " 22
When the further claim is made that the assertions
of naturalism "would remain intact if God were discovered
to exist, just as they remain Intact when any other
existence is discovered," 23 either the nature of God
20. Lepley, VOV. See also Brightman f s review of it
in Harvard Divinity School Bulletin , 1945.
21. Lamprecht in Krikorian (ed.), NHS, 17.
22. Ibid., 28. Cf. his review of Macintosh (ed.), RR,
in which he says that it "is only an accident
of the history of ideas that religious belief
has at times seemed to belong Deculiarly to
idealism," Art. (1953), 246.
23. Lamprecht in Krikorian (ed.), NHS, 36.
,*
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must be understood naturalistically or the position of
the metaphysical naturalists must be modified. Lsmprecht
inclines toward the former alternative. he explains
mind, purposiveness, or ''any other thing or event or
quality 1 ' in the same way in which he "would explain
cycloses or wars or northern lights." ^ God outside
of this natural world is for him one of the "deplorable
occasions for obscurantism." The religious values which
naturalists thus attempt to conserve, while perhaps
jeopardized by an abstract idealism, ere consistently
maintained in empirical personalism without being
distorted to fit a Procrustean b.ed of natural science
or any other isolated kind of experience. The naturalists
are not the only 'bpen-minded and sensitive" thinkers for
whom the religious quest "must forever remain a piece of
* unfini shed business 1 " 25—elne unendllche Aufgabe .
3. Macintosh’s religious realism
Throughout its history realism has been associated
with religion in various ways. Macintosh is a realist
whose thought significantly illustrates one relation
between religion and realism. While he is a critical
realist, his special interest in religion and the
particular form of his religious realism make his religious
thought worthy of special attention. In his realism
24. Lamprecht in Krikorian (ed.), NHS, 20.
25. Ibid., 38.
..
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there Is a combination of many of the central interests
and certain fundamental points of realism already
observed.
He is a man of deep religious appreciation and
sincere respect for the values of dynamic religious
faith. This characteristic of his thought gives his
realism a certain similarity to the interest in religion
basic in the realism of universals. Macintosh also has
high resoect for science. This makes his realism similar
to much in the later development of anti-idealistic
realism.
Macintosh's own description of what he means by
religious realism provides a good aporoach to his thought:
Religious realism ... means centrally the
view that a religious Object, such as may
appropriately be called God, exists independ-
ently of our consciousness thereof, and is
yet related to us in such a way that through
reflection on experience in general and
religious experience in particular, and
without any dependence upon the familiar
arguments of epistemological idealism, it is
possible for us to gain either (as some
would maintain) adequately verified knowledge
or (as others would be content to affirm) a
practically valuable and theoretically
permissible faith not only that that religious
Object exists but also, within whatever limits,
as to what its nature is. 2^
This statement, as well as Macintosh's description of
his own intellectual development, 2^ clearly Indicates
his rejection of epistemological idealism. His central
26~, In Macintosh (ed.), RR, v.
27. See “Toward a New Untradit ional Orthodoxy,” in
Perm (ed.), CAT, I, 277-319.
.1
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objection here, like that of many other realists, is
to the abstractness he sees in idealism, to its "unrealistic
character*
Much idealism has indeed been abstract, but no
kind of thinking is condemned by attacks on its worst
forms. In his reaction to Hegel, for example, "I could
not accept a timeless Absolute as a satisfactory substitute
for the living God of religious faith," Macintosh
discloses his failure to grasp fully the emnirical
character of Hegel's thought. The assertion that the
dialectical method in its Hegelian form "projects a
synthesis of supnosed contradictions" " further shows
Macintosh's lack of understanding of Hegel's empiricism.
Macintosh's interpretation of Hegel's reference to the
owl of Minerva which takes its flight only when the shades
of night are gathering, 30 to refer to the "decline of
religious experience and so of religious revelation in
the experiential sense" ^ is another indication of his
lack of insight into some of the central issues of Hegel's
thought. Macintosh's limited concept of reason 32 is
reflected in his criticism of what he regards an abstract
view of reason in the thought of Hegel. Macintosh's
rejection of idealism Is more fully examined later in
this dissertation,*^ but the importance of his revolt
28. Macintosh in Pern; (ed.), CAT, I, 295.
29. Macintosh, PRh, 372.
30. Hegel, GPR, 37.
31. Macintosh, PRK, 219.
32. See Chanter VI, Infra.
33. See Chanter V, infra.
.. ,
.
.
*
.
'
. .
. 4 . •
•
.
.
•
.
.
« ,
.
against idealism for his realism is not to be denied.
Macintosh’s religious realism, however, cannot be
adequately understood by considering it only as a reaction
against idealism. His appreciation of values is a positive
basis of his realism. The experience of prayer in his
34
early life, for example, illustrates the importance
of religious values for Macintosh. Yet he speaks of a
reaction against pragmatism in the interest of "the
<^5
element of truth in the older intellectualism. ” ' 1 Seeing
this problem, he wrote to G. B. Poster in 1912 as follows:
Are you interested in the new realism? I am,
I think it needs criticism, but I believe it
has an imoortant contribution to make to
theology which its representatives do not
begin to suspect. The hopeful movements in
contemporary thought seem to me to be a
scientific pragmatism, the emphasis on
mysticism, the vitalism of recent thinkers
... and the new realism.'56
Another important factor in Macintosh’s religious
realism is his interest in science. He recognizes the
procedure of science as the best guide for both metaphysics
and epistemology. 37 In his Theology as an Empirical
Science he attempts to construct a truly scientific
theory of divine reality.
While his interest in and approach to the problems
of philosophy through values reveal the most rewarding
34. Macintosh in Perm (ed.), CAT, I, 285.
35. See ibid., 302.
36. Quoted in ibid., 304n. (In all cases Italics are
retained as they apoear in the source quoted.)
37. Macintosh, POK, 69.
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avenue to the solution of the problems of metaphysics,
even Macintosh’s use of science pnd scientific verification
limits his thought, 38 much as the realistic interpretation
of the empirical method makes science mean realism to
naturalists and other realists. When Macintosh proposes
the procedure of finding ”in any realistic experiential
way whatever we can discover about any reality that has
the marks of divinity, and then see what can be done
toward thinking into unity these different aspects of
divine reality,” 39 the question must immediately be
decided whether ”realistic” is here being used in the
literary sense or whether it refers to a metaphysics
already determined that limits the scope of "experiential."
Furthermore, in his solution of the problem of religious
knowledge, 40 for example, Macintosh goes beyond the
scientifically verifiable to that which can be at the
most reasonable, practically defensible faith. Thus
ultimately a leap is made from immediate certainty to
faith.
Every experience actually is composed, however, of
both an element of that which may be verified and an
element of faith. The inclusive, coherent interpretation
of all experience requires a recognition of this fact of
faith in all experience. One must accent science for
3«. See' infra, 50
,
94 .
39. Macintosh in Ferm (ed.), CAT, I, 314.
40. See Macintosh, PRK, Chapters XX and XXI.
41. Macintosh in Ferm (ed.), CAT, I, 307.
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all that it has to offer, yet recognize both the
verifiable and the element of faith in even scientific
knowledge and refuse to limit verification to what is
conterminous with natural science. This means that
the distinctly religious experience par excellence, for
examole, is not absolutely different in verifiability
from any other experience. In other words, no monistic
epistemology requires that the nature of the object be
the basis of verification for the empirical personalists*
The test of verifiability is coherence and the inclusive
nature of experience itself. Instead of one epistemology
for scientific knowledge and another for religious
knowledge, the attempt to formulate a coherent epistemology
and metaphysics based on all experience is the hope of
the philosophical world.
Both realism and idealism have much to contribute
to this adventure. A deeper appreciation of realism--
of the realism of universals, of anti-idealistic realism,
and of Macintosh's religious realism
—
provides the basis
for both a better understanding of Macintosh's criticism
of personalism and a more adequate foundation on which
to formulate empirical personalism.
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CHAPTER III
MACINTOSH'S REALISM IN RELIGION
Macintosh's realism Is characterized by certain
distinctive features as well as similarity to other
historical forms of realism. The purpose of this
chaoter is to indicate some of the distinctive features
of Macintosh's realism.
Two concepts call for special attention, namely,
his doctrine of values and his doctrine of the self.
Distinctive features of Macintosh's thought also appear
in the discussion of two questions about the relation
of his religion and his realism, namely, what religion
does to his realism and what realism does to his religion.
A suggestion of the present Influence of his thought
brings this chanter on Macintosh's realism in religion
to a close.
1. His doctrine of values
Macintosh's entire thought shows his interest In
and attempt to explain values. However, when the meaning
of his concept of values is Investigated, a real problem
appears. He says, for example, that ultimate values may
be distinguished from instrumental values by Immediate
experience, by "direct Intuition "-- "in immediate
experience of reality we may • • • intuitively perceive
..
.
.
.
'
.
-
.
the absolute and abiding truth of a judgment," ^
Likewise by right religious adjustment one may gain
"a solid core of knowledge at the heart of his religious
thinking." ^ His idea of immediate experience and
knowledge is part of his monistic epistemology,^ and his
emphasis on the immediate experience of values illustrates
the Influence of his epistemology on his doctrine of value
Macintosh also writes frequently about eternal
(absolute) values:
... there are ideals which are eternally
valid, ideals which are valid without regard
to what the time is, for the reason that
they are valid at all times. ... Valid ideals
or values are proper ( 1. e . » either rationally
permissible or morally lmoerative) ends of
pursuit or of realization for some rationally
conscious beings ... with due regard to what
is naturally possible and to the comparative
importance or imperativeness of other valid
values or ideals.'*
The validity of these eternal values, however, cannot
depend on immediate experience; they are independently
valid at all times.
In fact, Macintosh recognizes that ideals as such
are not realities or existences but validities or
meanings; they are not what Is "but only what ought to
be." 5 He refers to the Divine, for example, as not
existing but as that which " sub s 1st
s
as an eternally
1. Macintosh, POK, 453.
2. Macintosh In WIeman and others, ITG, 258. See
also Macintosh, Art.(1933)
2
, 301, and Art . (1933) 5 ,
532.
3. See Chapter V, Infra.
4. Macintosh in Roberts and VanDusen (ed.), LT, 242.
5. Macintosh in Newton (ed.), MIG, 138.
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transcendent Ideal." 6 This Interpretation of Ideals
is very similar to the meaning of ideals as distinguished
7from values by certain personalist s. Macintosh,
however, does not make a distinction between Ideals and
values. 8 He speaks of values as he does of ideals,
referring to that which does not exist as a reality but
is "only what ought to be." His propositions of faith
for eternal life illustrate values in this sense. He
says that eternal life is "life lived for eternal
values" 9 and gives some of these propositions as
follows
:
... that there are eternal values; that these
values are potential in and imperative for
personality in general; that the eternal values
are actualized in God's character and will,
thus constituting the eternal life of God,
but that this eternal will of God is not
fully realized in the objective world as yet. 10
Here the concept is clearly of values as absolute, as
ideals in the personalistic sense.
Macintosh also refers to values as experiences, as
what have been called value-processes This emphasis
6. Macintosh in Newton (ed.), MIG, 143. Note also
Alexander's reference to ideas of deity and God
as the universe tending toward deity, so that
God "as an actual existent is always becoming
deity but never attains It," STD, II, 365.
7. See infra, 197; cf. also Brightman, FOR, 88-91.
8. See, for example, Macintosh, PRK, 8. This is shown
also by the marginal notations in his copy of
Brightman, RV. Opoosite the definition of a true
value as "what is liked , desired, or aporoved in
the light of our whole experience and our highest
Ideals (15» underlined by Macintosh as indicated)
he adds "what ought to be liked .
"
9. Macintosh, Art. (1938
J
1
,
169.
10. Macintosh in Robert and VanDusen (ed.), LT, 241.
11. See Bertocci, Art. (1944), 49.
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is supported by his empirical method and is illustrated
in his repre sentaional pragmatism. On one hand,
Macintosh criticizes intellectual! st s for overlooking
the relation of all meanings and values to purpose; on
the other hand, he objects to the attempt of hyper-
pragmatists to confine values to "the multitude of
additional special pragmatic meanings." His own
idea of experienced values is indicated, for example, in
his description of religion as "a kind of adjustment to
Reality for the realization of values." ^ By "value"
he says he means:
... that special kind of quality which things,
persons, or processes have by virtue of their
relation to some end-directed process.
^
Values which are realized or experienced are the values
which are empirically significant in Macintosh's realism.
These are the values which are really important for the
contribution his thought makes to the development of the
empirical method.
The relation between these two concepts of value,
namely that of absolute values and that of experienced
values, illustrates a central problem in Macintosh's
realism. Macintosh affirms values in both senses.
12. Macintosh, POK, 429.
13. Macintosh, PFW, 4.
14. Macintosh, Art.(1939) 5
,
42. Macintosh's idea of
value is reflected in the marginal note in his
copy of Brightman, RV, 16, that "a more realistic
or objective, and less subjective" definition of
value is needed, referring to his own POK, 328.
..
The criticism stands, however, that the emoirical and
imperfect processes can only be described as "divine -
t ending " or " ideal-realizing , " in the sense of par-
ticipating in, or being "potentially, the ideal*" 15
Experienced values are not absolute values, at least
not merely as they are experienced are they absolute
values.
Macintosh’s concept of revelation illustrates the
limited way in which he brings these two ideas of values
together. A "special general revelation," he says, is:
... the manifestation or apprehension of
absolute, or universally and permanently
valid value or values, that is to say, of
an ideal or ideals not only objectively
valid but worthy of all persons! absolute
self-dedication and devotion. 15
The relation of experienced values to ideals which are
worthy of absolute devotion, however, is still a problem.
Actually Macintosh's realism leaves unanswered the
question, "If there is a monistic intuition of perfect
values, what is the status of those values?" x
In fact, these two kinds of values are reflected
in Macintosh ’
3
ideas of fundamental and experimental
15. Bertocci, Art
.
(1944 )
,
(
47
.
16. Macintosh, Art. (1942) 25. The notation in his
copy of Brightman, RV, 237, also shows Macintosh
idea of value:
Worship is a relationship
and process.
God is a being, a Reality.
But Brightman includes both under "values."
(Value is quality).
17. Bertocci, Art. (1944), 47.
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religion. Fundamental religion is "aspiration or
devotion toward what is felt to be the supreme ideal
or value." It is the religion of absolute values.
Experimental religion, however, is the empirical experience
of "conscious dependence," experienced values. Macintosh's
idea of the relation of these two kinds of religion is
that "experimental religion at its best ... seeks and
must seek to be instrumental to fundamental religion as
end." Ideally experimental religion and experienced
values are instrumental to fundamental religion and
absolute values.
Macintosh's idea of the relation of absolute to
experienced values and of fundamental to experimental
religion illustrates the kind of unity that characterizes
his entire thought. The two concepts of value, for
example, do not contradict each other. They are logically
consistent, and Macintosh accepts them both. Yet in
Macintosh’s thought there is nothing to bring them
together into any systematic unity. For him the lack
of coherence, however, is not objectionable as long as
there is consistency. Macintosh's doctrine of values,
while bringing out certain distinctive features of his
thought, thus illustrates the same loyalty to consistency
18. Macintosh, PFW, 3. Note also his description off
fundamental religion as "devotion to the divine
Ideal," GWW, 58.
19. Macintosh, PFW, 3. See also Macintosh, Art. (1939)’^
35-36.
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and the same failure to appreciate the other aspects
of coherence v/hich appear in his epistemology • ^0
2. His doctrine of the self
Macintosh's doctrine of the self also brings out
distinctive features of his realism. Regardless of
how values are explained, a self, a conscious person, i
necessary. Without persons there can be no values:
It is vain to imagine that the "values" of
individual personality will be conserved,
if the individual himself Is to disappear
and exist no longer. 2^
Macintosh's idea of God, as well as his doctrines of
salvation and Immortality, illustrates the religious
importance of the self. He says that to reduce God to
process, for example, is "to give up the idea of God as
creatively active subject." His empirical method
requires a personal God to explain the experiences of
religious values. 23
The subject of consciousness for Macintosh is a
self which is not a mere process. He holds that the
self "persists through the process and is that which is
aware of the process." 24 Macintosh's empirical method
and his appreciation of religious values lead him to
conclude that the self cannot be adequately explained
20. See Chapter VI, infra.
21. Macintosh., Art. (1920), 571. Cf. Macintosh's
view of Immortality, Chapter IX, infra.
22. Macintosh, PRK, 577.
25. See Chapter VIII, Infra.
24. Macintosh in Wieman and other, ITG, 25.
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as a mere flux. He believes that there is "more in
ourselves at any moment than our activities at that
moment." 2® The self is "a continuing self-identical
subject which endures through all changing mental
atates." 26 It is not mere process.
Macintosh's realism is further illustrated in his
concept of memory. In memory the self is not passive
but creatively active.* It activity, however, is not
an activity which Imports the past into the present.
The activity of memory, rather, creates "representational
elements in the content of the present experience which
stand for past sense-elements." 27 Macintosh's idea
of this "representing” activity of the self illustrates
the way in which his empirical method end his attempt
to explain experiences of values carry him beyond
epistemological monism. 2® Monistically there can be
no representation, for representation requires a dualism
of the present presentation in or state of consciousness
and the idea to which it is referred by a conscious self.
If there is no dualism, there is no representation but
only presentation. Macintosh's realism is distinctive
in his explanation of memory as representation and not
merely as presentation.
When Macintosh seeks to bring together the categories
25. Macintosh, ROC, 252.
26. Macintosh, PRK, 377.
27. Macintosh, POK, 313.
28. See Chanter IV, infra.
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of activity and substance and to explain the self as
''a moderate, not too one-sided activism, " ^ however,
his idea of the self illustrates another distinctive
feature of his realism, Macintosh seeks to be a critical
realistic monist not only in his epistemology but also
in his metaphysics. He regards metaphysical dualism and
both materialistic and idealistic (or mental) monism as
inadequate and attempts to formulate a critical monism
in metaphysics.^ His description of the self as a
moderate activism reveals his unsatisfactory metaphysical
dualism.31 To the extent that his doctrine of the self
results from his empirical method and his unbiased
attempt to explain experience, however, it is both
religiously adequate and scientifically permissible.
The doctrine of the self on which Macintosh's religious
thought actually rests and which is important when freed
from his epistemological and metaphysical views is a
personal self as "a reality which is not reducible to
its states and activities." The self of Macintosh's
empirical method and religious faith is "a unitary
self," 33 although monistic epistemology and dualistic
metaphysical realism do not require or support this
doctrine of the self. The unity of the self is not a
29. Macintosh, ROC, 252.
30. See infra, 141.
31. See Chapter VII, infra.
32. Macintosh, PFW, 264.
33. See Brightman, Art. (1958), 138, and Art. (1939) ,
133-138
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datum of the immediate experience of epistemological
monism but requires reference, which is epistemologically
dualistic. A conscious unitary self also is not to be
explained adequately for the experiences of religious
values, for examole, by regarding it as the activity of
something “less than mind and more than matter*'*
3. What religion does to his realism
Other distinctive features of Macintosh’s realism
apoear in the relation of his realism to his religion.
Macintosh has described his own position as “realistic
religious epistemology and metaphysically defensible
empirical theology.” ?4 In his thought the influence
of religion on his realism is seen in his empirical
method and his idea of a personal God. There is nothing
in realism that would require either of these characteristic
of Macintosh’s thought. Yet Macintosh's empirical method
and his idea of a personal God make his religious realism
distinctive and show the influence of religion on his
realism.
Certain influences of realism on his religion also
distinguish his thought. He believes that realism is a
philosophical explanation of the objective God of his
religious faith and of the compatibility of his religion
with science. Each of these contributions of religion
and of realism to Macintosh’s religious realism merits
34. Macintosh, Art. (1940), 158.
'-
.
-
.
33
special attention; each reveals distinctive features of
Macintosh's realism in religion.
Although one may represent realism as empirical
without giving special attention to the experiences of
religious values, the particular form of empiricism in
Macintosh's religious realism is one of its distinctive
features and perhaos one of the most far-reaching
contributions of his thought to modern philosophy and
religion. For Macintosh empiricism does not mean a
confined sense-experience philosophy. His empiricism
is much like the empirical method of modern personalism.’^
Macintosh believes that empiricism requires an examination
of all kinds of experience, including experiences of
religious values, and an attempt to explain all experience
as reasonably as possible. Any theory which arbitrarily
neglects any kind of experience is dogmatic. Its conclusions
are applicable only in those areas to which the neglected
experiences have absolutely no relation. Macintosh, however,
believes that no experience is so abstract that such
dogmatism may be regarded as knowledge. In fact, his
view is that religion "does not necessarily involve
anything essentially antagonistic to science."
His view of the empirical method as including
experiences of all values is a distinctive contribution
of religion in his religious realism. Without religion,
35. See Chaoter IV, infra. Cf. Macintosh's description
of religious realism, cited supra, 18.
36. Macintosh, PFW, 4.
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realism contains nothing that requires it to be so
broadly empirical. Macintosh says that it was in order
to be better fitted to deal with intellectual problems
of religion that he resolved ''to specialize in both
rzn
natural science and philosophy." ’ He recognizes the
influence of his early interest in religion throughout
his entire thought and turns to religious realism as a
scientific interpretation of his religious faith. The
interrelation of all values and Macintosh’s idea of a
personal God as "a causal Factor also in relation to us
and our values" illustrate the importance his empirical
method has for his religion. Macintosh’s empirical method
contributed to his realism by religion, at least in large
part, is one of the distinctive features of his realism
in religion.
Another contribution of religion to Macintosh's
realism is the idea of a personal God. There is nothing
in realism as such that leads to belief in a personal
God. However, for Macintosh religion and his empirical
method support his concept of a personal God. The
relation of this idea of God to epistemological snd
metaphysical realism creates certain problems, but
the idea of a personal God is a distinctive feature of
Macintosh's realism. Much of the importance of realism
37. Macintosh in Perm (ed.), CAT, I, 290. See ibid.,
277-319, especially 289-290. Cf. also supra, 20.
38. Macintosh, PFW, 200.
39. See Chapter VIII, infra.
.
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in Macintosh's teaching career results from his
combination of realism and the idea of a personal God.
His emphasis upon right religious adjustment is related
to his idea of God as personal and as adequate for
worship. The idea of a personal God, which shows the
influence of religion on Macintosh's realism, is also
closely related to his interest in and contribution to
the development of liberal, evangelical theology. 40
4. What realism does to his religion
For Macintosh realism has also had a significant
influence on his religion. His description of his early
intellectual development shows his dissatisfaction with
idealism. In his criticism of personalism his rejection
of the mind of God as "a carry-all in which things can
exist as ideas when not so existing in the minds of men"
illustrates Macintosh's opinion that the idealistic
view of God is inadequate. Macintosh believes that
realism gives religion an objective God. He describes his
monistic realistic epistemology in religion as follows:
... a theory according to which the Divine
may be both directly experienced or in a
broad sense of the word perceived, and yet
40. See Macintosh in Roberts and VanDusen (ed.), LT,
238-254. Cf. Macintosh, Art • (1940) , and Art. (1940) 4 ,
especially 219. Cf. also his remark about Cell's
The Rediscovery of John Wesley
.
Art. (1935), 387, and^
his reference to the Methodist tradition. Art. (1939) 2
,
399.
41. See his article in Ferm (ed.), CAT, I, 277-319.
42. Macintosh, Art.(1910) 5
,
651. Cf. infra, 73.
.'
remain a Reality which does not depend for
Its existence upon it§ being thus experienced
and recognized by us. ^
He believes that realism makes his religion objectively
valid as well ss subjectively satisfying. These
distinctive features of Macintosh's realism raise
questions about the relations of subjectivity to
objectivity and of metaphysical to epistemological
realism, which are further investigated later in this
dissertation.^
Another contribution Macintosh believes his realism
makes is that it renders his religion scientific or at
least correlates religious thought with scientific
method. Theology as an Empirical Science illustrates
his attempt to give a scientific description of religiou
beliefs and practices In the form of scientific laws.
Some of these "laws” are especially well stated 8Hd are
especially valuable for practical religious living.
Notice, for example, his law of the development of
Christian characters
On condition of continued cultivation of the
right religious adjustment, especially when
it is so constant and whole-hearted as to
lead to the permanent health and healthful
activity of Christian life, and when the
individual has adequate Information for
right conduct. Cod the Holy Spirit produces
in him the Christ-like or Christian character,
with Its habitual readiness and equipment
for right action. 4^
43. Macintosh, PPW, 210.
44. See Chapters VI and VII, infra.
45. Macintosh, TES, 149-150.
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For Macintosh, scientific theology is possible only
if there is monistic realism, although it is not clear
that scientific method is necessarily or even usually
monistic in epistemology. He believes that dualistic
epistemology lacks the essential certainty which he
seeks to affirm for his scientific theology and his
religious beliefs.46 His idea of God and his scientific
description of religion, however, indicate more clearly
the importance of the empirical method than the
necessity for any realism or any monism. These
distinctive features of Macintosh's realism are
significant for his criticism of personalism because
they show how his realism is so empirical that, at
many points, his method and his results are more
personalistic than realistic.
5. His present influence
These are some of the distinctive features of
Macintosh's realism in religion, which is becoming
quite influential today. Macintosh has been
described as " the leader in the attempt to construct
a theology of religious experience." He has also
been called "one of the most highly respected and
influential of American philosophers of religion." 40
46. See, however. Chapter VI, infra.
47. Miller, Art. (1938), 472.
48. Brightman, Art. (1941), 53.
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The evidence of his influence has not yet appeared
extensively in the published writings of other scholars,
but it is nevertheless significant in both philosophy
and theology. In philosophical circles Macintosh's
extensive criticisms of other philosophical positions
cannot be overlooked by thinkers whose views differ
from his. For this reason almost no philosophical
position has completely escaped the influence of his
thought
•
Macintosh's realism in religion has also a wide
Influence in theological circles. This influence aopeers
less in the writings of theologians than in the preaching
and the religious thought that have been affected by
Macintosh's realism. His . influence in the world of
religion is indicated in print, however, for example,
by H. Richard Niebuhr’s presentation of The Meaning
of Revelation to him and Frank Chamberlain Porter, and
by the contributions Macintosh has made to various
religious journals and to volumes of religious articles,
such as Religious Realism (which he also edited) and
Liberal Theology . The Nature of Religious Experience ,
a volume of essays published and presented in honor of
his sixtieth birthday, also shows the present influence
of his realism in religion.
Macintosh's extensive influence is due to two
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principal ways in which his distinctive realism has
been expressed. He has been influential both as a
teacher and as a writer. Since he came to Yale
University in 1909 his thought has influenced a great
number of students. Although few complete disciples
of Macintosh's thought have appeared, the thinking of
almost all of his students has been significantly
affected by his teaching. The lesson he is said to
have taught so well has been described as "not any
system c£ theology but the ability to think clearly and
49logically about religious problems.
Macintosh’s present influence is due also to his
extensive writing, in the form of both books and articles
that have apoeared in various philosophical and religious
journals. One of his books. The Reasonableness of
Christianity , and his recent article on theology and
metaphysics ^0 have been translated into Uerman. Several
of his books were first presented as lectures.
Although his style sometimes obscures his meaning,
the importance of Macintosh’s thought is now being
recognized. As the significance of the various features
of his distinctive realism become more apparent, his
influence will become even more extensive. The influence
49. Miller, Art. (1938), 472.
50. See Macintosh, Art. (1939)^. Cf. Macintosh,
Art
.
(1943)
.
51. See McGilvary's review of The Problem of
Knowledge
,
Art. (1916), especially 624, which
is cited in Melzer, ECM, 1.
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of Macintosh's realism in religion today and the
extensive influence his thought will certainly have
during the next few decades make the further
investigation and evaluation of his criticism of
personalism especially imperative*

CHAPTER IV
PERSONAL ISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY
Macintosh’s thought brings two central features of
personalistic epistemology into sharp focus* One is
the concreteness and the empirical method of personalism*
It should be noted that the difference in emnhasis on
and interpretation of the empirical method by various
personalists has resulted in differences in their ideas
of God and their treatments of the problem of evil, for
example. The second central feature is personalistic
epistemological dualism. In the first feature, Macintosh
and many personalists are closely related; in the second,
there is sharp contrast.
1. The empirical method
’’Empirical ” like ’’realistic” has had mean meanings
in the history of philosophy. Its best known development
is perhaps the British empiricism of which Locke, Berkeley,
and Hume are pre-eminent exponents. For these men,
empiricism was closely associated with the emphasis on
sense-experience. Locke, for example, held that all the
material for reason and knowledge comes from experience
His ooposition to "nativism” 2 is clearly shown in the
1. See Locke, WOR, I, 32.
2. See also Stetson and Baldwin in Baldwin (ed.),
DPP, I, 321.
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chapter in his Essay on Human Understanding entitled "No
innate principles in the mind," The importance of
sense-experience in Berkeley’s empiricism, also, is
evident, ^ and Hume’s statement that "the most lively
thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation" 4
is familiar. Historians have called attention to a
more positivistic tendency of empiricism in later
British thought. 5 Mill’s description of matter as the
permanent analysis of sensations is reflected even in
his posthumous Three Essays on Religion , where, for
example, he says that matter is "a mere assumption to
account for our sensations."
Kant also used the word "empirical" ( empirisch ) and
struggled with its relation to the space-time world. 7
Eucken lists Kant's distinction between "Empirie " and
"Erfahrung " with the distinction between "Phaenomena "
and "Ersche inungen " in referring to his contribution to
the development of philosophical terminology. 8
Alexander's statement that "the m5.nd is the highest
finite empirical reality we know" y illustrates the wide
meaning "empirical " has come to have in recent philosophy.
James's pragmatism also has been "empirical" in its
emphasis on experience. His "radical empiricism" is
a postulate, 8 statement of fact, and a generalized
3. See, for example, Berkeley, WOR, I, 257.
4. Hume, EN»i, 17.
5. For example, Thilly, HOP, 516-517.
6 . 202 .
7. See, for example, Kant, KrV, A5 20-521 (B548-549).
8. Eucken, GpT, 148.
9. Alexander, STD, II, 245.
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conclusion, which result In the view that:
The directly apprehended universe needs . .
.
no extraneous trans-empirical connective
support, but possesses in its own right a
concatenated or continuous structure. ^
"Empirical" may also be used to describe the thought
of Hegel. Theodor Haering has called Hegel the "empiricist
of consciousness." ^ In this sense, an empiricist Is:
... one who explores every nook and cranny
of the spiritual life, individual and social,
logical and historical, aesthetic and religious,
relating it to every experience of physical
nature.
This use of "empirical" as referring to all conscious
awareness, without limiting it to sense-experience, to
any immediate experience, or to practical consequences
of a certain kind. Is its vital meaning for personalistic
epistemology. The relation of this empirical method
to personalism is recognized by certain contemporary
personalist s.-1- 3 The distinctly empirical has been described
as a search for "the most reasonable interpretation of
presumptive knowledge drawn from the various realms of
human experience." L ‘* This meaning, without limitation
to any previous theory or to any one realm of experience,
is illustrated by Trueblood's use of "empirical" in
10. James, MOT, xiii. See also Will in Runes (ed.),
DOP, 90.
11. In an address at Boston University on October 1,
1929. See also Haering, HWW, passim. Gf. Schilling
ERH, especially 132-139; and Brightman, Art. (1939)
^
12. Brightman, Art. (1939)2, 276.
13. For example, see Brightman, POR, 1-8, and Brightman
in Wieman and Meland, APR, 321-322.
14. Bertocci, EAG, 3.
.
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The Logic of Belief . -*-5 This use maintains the etymological
meaning of "empirical”: t>fLTr6if>L* -- experience (opposed
) s
to <xirtioLoc --without experience).
Historical, however, a sharp distinction has
appeared between empiricism and rationalism. Although
the importance of both reason and experience is recognized
in the development of modern personalism, a difference
in approach and emphasis makes the distinction between
rationalistic and empirical personalism important. This
distinction does not mean that empirical personalism is
irrational, or even non-rat ional
,
nor that rationalistic
personalism fails to consider experience.-^
The empirical method has certain important results,
which the more rationalistic or aprioristic method,
illustrated, for example, by different personalist ic
solutions of the problem of evil, lacks. The empirical
method does not mean disregarding reason. Reason is
itself a phase of experience. Reason not only may be
experienced; also it enters in all experience in the
dialectical nature of the empirical method. However,
the constant emphasis on experience in empirical personalism
produces a contreteness and a more complete checking
of theory by practice, which is often lacking in the
15. See Brightman, Art. (1942), 445.
16. Cf. Bowne ' s "transcendent al empiricism" discussed,
for example, in his PER, 104-107. Cf. also emphasis
on a "critical synthesis of empiricism and
rationalism," Macintosh, PFW, 9, and his assertion
of no "absolute apriority," POK, 564; Art . (1913 ) '- , 708.
17. See emphasis on "the aprioristic theory of knowledge,"
Knudson, POP, 96.
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more abstract results of the rationalistic or
aprioristic method.
One of the contributions personalists have made
has been their insight into the fallacy of abstraction.-1-8
Nevertheless, a suspicion of the empirical method 19 has
resulted in a less empirical approach and a more
restricted interpretation of the empirical method
which characterize the thought of certain personalists.
Their conclusions often need closer relation to
experience
•
Macintosh’s thought emphasizes the consequences
of this distinction between different kinds of
personalism. He, for example, seeks to examine
empiricism critically. Prom "its recourse to experience
for knowledge" he gains his empirical method for
theology;
... to seek verification for the hypotheses
of faith in religious experience, and to refute
the teachings of tradition in so far as they
are incompatible with the facts of experience. 29
An emphasis on experience characterizes his entire
philosophy. He intends this emphasis as an abrogation
not of reason but only of abstract rationalism and
dogmatism. In fact, he says that historic religion
has progressed toward spirituality and reasonableness
18. See Bowne, TTK, 251-259, and cf. Knudson’s
frequent reference to abstraction as "the
universal fallacy" in his lectures.
19. See, for example, Knudson's statements about
Macintosh’s empirical method in theology, supra,
20. Macintosh, PFW, 267.
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by "combining the valuational with the empirical
test.” Scientific religion he describes as
becoming "more and more rational while remaining
vitally experiential." 22 fie objects to idealism
because it proceeds "without the aid of experience." ^3
Although there may be a real question about the
logical meaning of "empirical" for Macintosh, 24 his
interpretation of empirical method shows the need he
believes all knowledge has of considering all kinds of
experience impartially, fiis hope in a sufficiently
broad apoeal to experience 25 reveals his appreciation
of religious experience in more than a narrow,
restricted sense as religious or metaphysical dogmas.
Other scholars have also wondered why theologians
have not apoealed to the kind of empirical evidence
used to support scientific beliefs, especially since
that evidence is so abundant and since such empirical
evidence "has been the real basis of belief in actual
practice." 26 The goal of scientific method in religion
is to practice "the habit of examining the data rather
than the habit of arriving at conclusions on the basis
21. Macintosh, Art . (1939
)
3
,
38.
22. Macintosh, PFW, 6.
23. Macintosh, POK, 471. Cf. his reading of fiegel
(POR, I, 229) as thinking that his age was one
"which must content itself merely with being told
there is a God," Macintosh, PFW, 36.
24. See Bertocci, Art. (1944), 47.
25. Macintosh, PFW, 149-150.
26. Trueblood, LOB, 197.
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of a priori considerations • " 27 Qnpirical personalism
rests on an impartial examination of all data; it
requires that the data be not limited to any single
kind or occasion of experience.
?!
Macintosh’s recognition of a wide range of values
is relevant to empirical personalism. He believes that
the procedure of "abstract” science is defective because
'It refrains from appealing to all possible sorts of
intuition." 2^ The empirical method of personalism
is characterized by the fact that experiences are not
limited to conscious awareness of any single kind or
kinds of experiences or of objects. ^t is unbiased;
whatever experiences are relevant to the domain under
consideration are "allowed to speak for themselves." ^0
Experiences of values, for example, show that the
categories of the space-time world alone are not
adequate to interpret all the facts Of experience, as
Kant himself recognized. Although spatial experiences
of the physical world are important, empirical personalist
require that one recognize whatever categories are most
adequate to interpret rationally awareness of all kinds
of objects. Immediate experience, including all
value-claims, has true value only when tested and
27. Trueblood, KOG, 28.
28. See Macintosh, POK, 448, and Art. (1942)
,
26.
29. Macintosh, POK, 489.
30. Brigiitman, Art. (1926), 252.
31. See iiant, KrV, A80 (B106).
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interpreted. This interpretation is true only if the
claims of all kinds of immediate experience are
recognized. Basing knowledge on the acceptance of
any one kind of value-claims in total disregard of all
other kinds overlooks the importance of the unexamined
claims. This procedure also makes the kind of immediate
experience that is accepted dogmatic and thus invalidates
it. The blind acceptance of either experiences of
existential objects or of religious experiences results
in dogmatism.
Empirical personalists strive to avoid "narrowness
in the selection of evidence," which Whitehead, for
example, called "the chief danger of philosophy."
The primary demand of the empirical method in personalism
is critical examination of all experience and impartial
testing of all value-claims. This interpretation of
empirical method requires the criterion of coherence.
Although some critical thinkers fail to give sufficient
attention to coherence, coherence is the most empirical,
as well as the most empirically adequate, criterion of
truth. 33 Stated in the form of Hegel’s dialectical
method, the criterion of coherence and the empirical
method mean that any experienced value-claim is
acceptable as a true value only when it is aufgehob en .
32. Whitehead, PAR, 512.
33. See infra, 120-121.
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"dead and risen again," tested by its relation to the
whole of experience, to all value-claims, which likewise
are tested in relation to this and every other value-claim*
Immediate experience is the touchstone of all knowledge
and truth, 54 not because it is immediate but only after
it has been tested and is concrete, when it is a part of
the whole of experience interpreted as rationally as
possible* The aim is the most reasonable understanding
of experience. 55
The empirical method of personalism does not deny
the activity of consciousness in knowing, ' but only
is an assertion that the necessity of experience for
knowledge may not be overlooked. Empirical content and
empirical variety both need consideration. Dogmatism
results unless all value-claims are recognized and tested
as critically as those claims which are accepted as
true values. The appeal to scientific method is valid
only if there is impartial consideration of all kinds
of value-claims.
The importance of coherence in the empirical method
of personalism is emphasized by Macintosh* s use of the
empirical method in theology. He describes his formulation
34. Macintosh, POK, 439-440.
35. See Brightman, Art. (1932)^, 145.
36. Cf. the recognition of the activity of mind by
Berkeley, for example, in Berkeley, WOR, I, 258.
See also Knudson, POP, 95-96, and Macintosh's
recognition of the relating activity of the
thinking subject, Macintosh, POK, 167n.
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50
of the empirical science of theology as distinguishings
... those elements of theological theory
which could be regarded as verified (as
science counts verification) from other
elements of a merely pragmatically justified
faith or of "invincible surmise," subjectively
assured and speculatively permissible, 3 '
The issue for the empirical method of personalism depends
on the meaning of verification. 38 If empirical verification
is limited to any particular kind of experience, the
results are as dogmatic as the failure or refusal to
consider all kinds of value-claims.
Empirical personalists require that verification "as
science counts verification" needs itself to be critically
tested and verified in relation to nonscient if ic experience
before it may be accepted as fully valid and true. The
evidence supported by "scientific verification," as well
as that which is subjectively assured and speculatively
permissible, needs to be coherent. It must be tested in
relation to all experience and to every other kind of
experience before the empirical personalist accepts it
as valid and true knowledge. 3y
37. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITGr, 250. Cf
.
"scientific in the same empirical sense in which
the sciences descriptive of objective reality are
scientific," Macintosh, PFW, 225-226; cf. also
Eucken's "nodlogical method," Macintosh, Art.
(1913) , 315.
38. See Brightman, POR, 116-122, 234, 485-487.
39. Note Macintosh's distinction of faith as subjective
certitude from religious revelation and religious
knowledge as "the verifying experiences and the
verified judgments," in Wieman and Meland, APR, 331.
..
This kind of verification is an essential part
of the empirical method that is the most adequately
empirical. One of the reasons for the great difference
of opinion among scientists about the meaning of
scientific method is a provincial concept of their
method of verification. For example, the astronomer
formulates theories that require verification by tests
which are quite different from the tests by which the
botanist verifies his theories. Yet each declares that
his is the scientific method. If verification means
critical testing by whatever data of experience sre
appropriate to the nature of one's problems without
overlooking the importance of any other relevant data,
there is no res son to limit scientific method to the
physical universe. In fact, psychologists have long
stressed the importance of considering the oersonal
factors (such as the investigator himself) in all
scientific research.
When these factors are taken into consideration in
the experience of "drawing upon God," for example, the
empirical method in a religious experiment is not so
different from the empirical method in the physical
sciences. However, this meaning of empirical method
is often overlooked when the data are religious:
If anyone believes that ... "drawing upon
God" ... bears sny resemblance to the
'.
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reproducible, simplified, controlled situation
characteristic of a scientific experiment,
in which the causal factor is isolated and
dealt with regardless of any will to believe
— if anyone believes this, I am reduced to
silence. ^0
But religious experiences can be excluded from empirical
data only for an adequate reason. In this case, the
distinction between what is acceptable as scientific
and what is not scientific needs to be made clearer.
An arbitrary rejection of all religious data reveals
a dogmatic partiality which scientists would never
tolerate in their scientific investigations. Facts
are facts whether sensory or religious, and no relevant
datum should be ignored.
In an emoirical personalistic epistemology all
truth claims must be considered in relation to knowledge;
no single kind can be ruled out arbitrarily. Every claim
merits attention. Religious data have as vslid claims
as scientific (sensory) data and must be considered as
a source of knowledge. The empirical method of
personalism requires at least the initial possibility
that all kinds of value-claims may be true values.
Further, it requires an acknowledgement of the empirically
observable fact of interpenetration of all values.
40. Otto in Wieman and others, ITG, 271.
41. Note how this is illustrated in Macintosh’s
idea of spiritual religion, Art.(1926) 4
, 270.
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Although his concept of experience is limited
logically by his idea of verification, 42 Macintosh’s
interest in the various values, reflected, for example,
in his stress cp "our most critical estimate of values
in general," 43 is in harmony with this emphasis of
empirical personalism. Religious experience indeed
"is not some experience wholly separated from other
44
experiences, but is like all other experience in
its nature as conscious awareness and in its systematic
relations to other experiences. The failure to recognize
the importance of experience for all religion and
philosophy and to check one’s theories constantly by
reference to all experience is a shortcoming of much
philosophy. An adequate empirical personalism strives
to guard against this fallacy.
2. Dualism in personalism
The place of experience in knowledge is warranted
in personalistic epistemology only by virtue of a
second factor which contrasts sharply with Macintosh's
monistic realism. This factor is the dualism of
personalistic epistemology.
Epistemological dualism is the theory that, in
the moment of knowing, mind or idea is "not QiumericallyJ
42. See Macintosh, PRK, 6, 187, 313, Cf. also
supra, 50, and infra, 90-91,
43. Macintosh in Runes (ed.), TCP, 198.
44. Trueblood, LOB, 198.
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m 45identical with its object, but separate and distinct
from it# An analysis of the knowledge situation reveals
that, while experience may be immediate, no experience
can be knowledge until and unless there is mediation#
In knowledge there is a dualism between what is
immediately present and what is epistemologically other
than the subject's Immediate awareness. The dualist
46
recognizes immediate exoerience, but refuses to call
it knowledge. In other words, immediate experience
Is only experience and not knowledge until It Is critically
organized and tested. This process of organizing and
testing involves reference both to the whole of
organized knowledge and to standards, neither of which
may be immediately present as any immediate experience.
For this purpose an important distinction has been
made between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge
by description. 47 The first may be monistic, but even
here there can be no knowledge until there Is testing
(which is dualistic). Knowledge by description requires
reference directly and is Immediately dualistic.
The importance of dualism for all knowledge is
also illustrated In the distinction between "Situations
Experienced" and "Situations Believed- In. " 48 A
"Situation Experienced" is immediate but not knowledge.
A "Situation Believed- in" is never immediately
45. Brightman, ITP, 78.
46. See supra and Bertocci, Art. (1945), 167.
47. See Brightman, ITP, 85-84, and Art. (1944).
48. Brightman, POR, 547-549.
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experienced but is always epistemologically dualistlc
in relation to the present consciousness of the
experiencing subject. Sven in self-knowledge the
knowing idea is not more than a part of the self
known. There is always a dualistic reference even in
that situation. The partial identity of the knowing
subject with the situation experienced requires reference
to the whole self, which is not at that time present in
experience but only a "Situation Believed-in. " The
self may indeed be directly experienced, but it can
40be known only indirectly.
As soon as any immediate experience is referred to
or related or criticized or verified, it is no longer
immediate but a "Situation Believed-in." All knowledge
is epistemologically dualistic, since it necessarily
involves such processes. For example, the testing of
truth by "acting upon the idea, being guided by it,
in adjusting one’s self to the reality in question," 50
is itself epistemologically dualistic, regardless of
how immediate it may be from a psychological standpoint.
The test of acting means reference to what is not now
immediately present as consciousness. A definition
"adequate for all possible purposes" also can never
49. See Brightman, Art. (1944), 696.
50. Macintosh, PFW, 184.
51. Macintosh, POK, 489.
.*
.
.
•
.
.
be immediately known but must always refer to what
is epistemologically other than immediate awareness
of the definition. Thus it, too, is dualistic. The
only immediacy possible is the subject’s own,
uncriticized (raw) awareness of the particular
time-span of a single experience; and this has not
reached the level of knowledge.
Epistemological dualism is based on an attempt
to understand all experience as adequately as possible
without violating the data of any exoerience. Epistemo-
logical dualists seek to determine what is "the knowledge
value" 52 0f immediate experience by considering all
the data, without prejudging whether this knowledge
value must be limited to immediacy itself. In other
words, the subjective residence of ideas does not
oreclude their objective reference, any more than
being at home precludes plans for travel. As soon as
this question is raised, however, epistemological
monism is replaced by epistemological dualism. Although
a process may be psychologically immediate, 53 the
epistemological dualism which enters as soon as any
immediate experience is evaluated or criticized is
not affected by this immediacy.
52. Bertocci, Art. (1943), 168.
53. See Knudson, POP, 102. Cf. Macintosh's view
of apperception as "nothing but an extremely
facile interpretation," Macintosh, POK, 342.
See also Melzer, ECM, 45.
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Epistemological faith Is "conviction apart from
or in excess of proof," by which knowledge is possible
through the interpretation and organization of "the
original sense." of all experience .^ Such faith is
exercised in reference both to God and to objects in
the physical world; it is necessary for any reference
whatever. The thought, however, that only objects In
the physical world can be truly objective for dualism
Is "sheer prejudice." Values, ss well as sensa ,
require the objective reference of epistemological
faith. The recognition of the subjective factor in
all knowledge does not necessarily mean a denial of
objective factors, and even those who may assert that
it does make exception to their subjectivism, at least
in "positing ... the existence of the other persons
with whom to argue the point." °
Dualism, however, requires a critical search for
the best possible interpretation of all experience.
It is an attempt to avoid both the "sheer prejudice"
of regarding only physical things as objects and the
equally dogmatic assumption that only what is subjective
can be epistemologically real, and thus worthy of
metaphysical Investigation. In fact, epistemological
54. Trueblood, LOB, 58. Cf. Santayana's "animal
faith," for example, Santayana, SAP, 107.
Cf. also Martineau's "natural trust," discussed
in Bertocci, EAG, 11-12.
55. Trueblood, LOB, 61.
56. Trueblood, KOG, 17.
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dualism, the theory that idea and object are
numerically and existentially separate, is entirely
compatible with the assertion of the. reality and
knowledge of the objective world, and even more naturally
compatible than any form of monism. There is a mutual
existential otherness of idea and object in epistemological
dualism regardless of any degree of qualitative metaphysical
likeness or psychological immediacy they may have. The
objective world exists independent of us; we "do not make
it but find it.*' The nature of this objective order
is the special problem of metaphysics; epistemological
dualism only asserts that it is there. Epistemology
declares that it is; metaphysics defines what it is.
This assertion of the existence of the objective
world independent of the mind of the knower is
epistemological realism, 58 although epistemological
realism may be either pansub j ective or panobjective.
Much of Macintosh's argument is for epistemological
realism, but his attack on personalism so relates to
his monistic epistemology and its metaphysical
implications that his thought cannot be reduced to
a simple epistemological realism. In their references
to and assertions of the fact that things do not pass
57. Knudson, POP, 103. Cf. truth of a judgment
"'found,' discovered in immediate experience,"
Macintosh, POK, 453.
58. Trueblood, LOB, 59.

59
out of existence when the knower is no longer conscious
of them and that they are "discovered not created" by
the knower, personalists and Macintosh are in perfect
agreement. As soon as Macintosh asserts his epistemo-
logical monism or permits his realism to become metaphysical,
however, the differences reappear.
The metaphysical imolications of Macintosh’s
realism in relation to personalistic metaphysics are
the subject of a later chapter in this dissertation.
One may explain the metaphysical implications of
personalistic dualism in epistemology and the
parallelism of thought and thing theistically by
regarding an intelligent Being as the source of all
reality. ^9 The idea of God and the problem of evil
make the importance of empirical personalism even
more apoarent in the later chapters of this dissertation.
The purpose of this chapter, however, has been to
emphasize two factors in personalistic epistemology,
namely, emoirical method and dualism. Macintosh
agrees with emoirical personalists in the following
respect. First, empirical method may not be limited
to sense-experience. Secondly, knowledge is rationalistic
and abstract unless closely related to experience
.
Thirdly, empirical method requires that all experiences
59. Knudson, POP, 114.
60. Note what Macintosh calls "the secret of Paul's
religious indeoendence , " for example. Art. (1910) 4
,
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and value-claims be considered. In contrast to
Macintosh, empirical personalists also hold, first,
that any experience is knowledge only when tested
and interpreted coherently with the rest of experience,
secondly, that any testing of truth requires reference
which is dualistic, thirdly, that the subjective
residence of knowledge does not preclude its
objectivity, and fourthly, that the dualist may "find 1 '
an objective independent reality which he does not
make.
These points become clearer in the examination
of Macintosh's realistic epistemology and the evaluation
of his case against dualism in the following two
chanters of this dissertation.
.'•
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CHAPTER V
MACINTOSH'S REALISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY
Macintosh's realistic epistemology is of major
importance for his criticism of personalism. An
aporeciation of the full impact of this epistemology
requires not only a statement of his monism but also
an examination of his development of it and a
consideration of certain difficulties in his monism.
Such an investigation is the purpose of this chapter.
1. Statement of his monism
In stating his position Macintosh acceots the
phraseology of the Committee on Definitions at the
American Philosophical Association meeting in 1911
and Identifies his thought with epistemological monism
and realism. 1 The ‘’characteristic " meaning of his
view is:
... that the real object and the perceived
object are at the moment of perception
numerically one, and that the real object
may exist at other moments apart from any
perception. 2
In stressing his critical position, as opoosed to an
“epistemological monism and dogmatic realism, “ he
affirms that:
1. Macintosh, POK, 13.
2. Ibid., 211.
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• • • the object oerceived is existentially or
numerically identical with the real object
at the moment of perception, although the
real object may have qualities that are not
perceived at the moment; and also that this
same object may exist unperceived, although
not necessarily with all the qualities which
it possesses when perceived **5
Thus, while part of what is independently real is not
immediately perceived and while all that is independently
perceived is not necessarily independently real,
Macintosh believes that "enough of the immediately
experiencedis independently real ... and enough of
the independently real immediately experience"
4
for his thought to be a form of epistemological monism
and realism.
He accepts the position of neo-realists about
immediate awareness of independent reality but regards
their doctrine of external relations very unsatisfactory.
He seeks to show that "for the experienced object and
the independently real object to be name rl cal ly the
same, it is not necessary that they be qualitatively ,
5
even in normal perception, absolutely identical.
In other words, the neo-realist ic assertion that
what is perceived is numerically or existentially
identical with independent reality is true because of
3. Macintosh, Art • (1913) \ 701. See also Macintosh,
POK, .310-311.
4. Macintosh, Art. (1929)
,
233.
5. Macintosh, POK, 309.
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an objective factor-- "continuity of physical energy
and of certain teleological functions other than our
own." There is also a subjective factor, Macintosh
believes, in the identity of physical objects, by which
physical objects possess certain qualities when perceived
that they do not have when not perceived. For Macintosh
this subjective factor is purpose. His doctrine of
primary and secondary and especially of tertiary
qualities is based on this concept of purpose. Yet
the epistemological position from which he attacks
personalism he asserts is monism;
... there can be affirmed (at least partially,
i. e., to some extent) a numerical oneness,
an existential identity between the object
as perceived and the object as independently
,
real. 7
2. His development cf monism
Macintosh develops this critical monism by an
extensive investigation of the other major systems
of thought. He examines enistemological dualism and
the various forms of idealistic and realistic monism,
as well as rationalism and empiricism, intellectuallsm,
intuitionism, and pragmatism. Although the following
chapter of this dissertation contains an evaluation of
Macintosh's attack on dualism, a consideration of the
6. Macintosh, Art. (1913)^, 703. See also
Macintosh, POK, 312.
7. Macintosh, PRK, 5.
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relation of his monism to epistemological dualism,
which is one of the first steps in his development
of monism, is imperative.
His principal objection to dualism is that it,
he believes, is agnostics
If what is immediately experienced is never
independent reality, and Independent reality
is therefore never immediately experienced,
how can the subject of the immediate experi-
ence ever know any independent reality? Any
absolute dualism in epistemology is fore-
doomed, it would seem, to agnosticism .
8
This "fundamental 11 conviction about the agnosticism of
9dualism is related, as Bertoccl recognizes, to
Macintosh's idea of knowledge as absolute certainty
and direct immediacy. Macintosh believes that the
logically inescapable agnosticism of dualism snd the
equally inescapable solipsism of idealistic monism
drive the philosopher to realistic epistemological
monism, because actually "we do seem to have knowledge
or else a very good substitute for it" instead of
agnosticism.^^-
The epistemological position of dualism raises
an Insoluble problem for him. Macintosh believes that
8. Macintosh, POK, 14. Cf. his statement that
dualism is "uncurably agnostic," and "leaves
its task unfinished," Macintosh, Art. (1919)
,
137. This is shown also by the two words "But
dualism" in the margin of Macintosh's copy of
Brightman, FOG, 123, where the statement is made
that "our search ... has led ... into the presence
of God.
"
9. Art. (1943), 165.
10. Macintosh, Art
.
(1913) 702*.
11. Macintost, Art. (1929)
,
225.
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such a problem indicates the underlying falsity of
dualism;
But the Insoluble epistemological problem
is surely not the true one; it must surely
be due to a confusion of thought, to a
faulty analysis of the nature of consciousness
and the knowledge-relation. ... its solution
can be accomplished only in its dissolution. 1 ^
This emphasis and the general method of Macintosh's
treatment point to the conclusion that his realistic
monism results from an attempt to discover some
alternative by which, as Bertocci says, "his assumption
that 'ideal' knowledge is attainable" may be saved from
the fate of agnostic dualism. 1 *^ In fact, Macintosh
concludes his examination of the thought of those
dualists who he believes admit their agnosticism by
declaring that the problem is "to discover some better
alternative" if "it should turn out that agnosticism
is necessarily Involved in the dualism." 14
However, his development of monism involves also
an examination of the thought of the dualists who deny
their agnosticism and even of "the new 'critical realism
endeavoring to save a fundament ally dualistic realism
from agnosticism," 15 a position which he believes
has failed in its "primary undertaking."
Although Herbert, for example, appears to have
12. Macintosh, POK, 9.
13. Art. (1943), 166.
14. Macintosh, POK, 34-35.
15. Macintosh, Art. (1929)
,
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escaped the agnostic clutches of dualism, Macintosh
sees that his initial absolute dualism of reality and
apoearance keeps him from any “legitimate escape from
agnosticism at all." Schopenhauer likewise
attempted to escape the agnosticism of this epistemological
dualism “founded on confusion and defended by fall8cy,“ ^
but Macintosh believes that Schopenhauer’s assertion of
all reality as will lapses into dogmatism, Volkelt’s
view of “an irreducible minimum of valid representation
of the transsub j ect ive “ demonstrates to Macintosh the
unsatisfactoriness of Volkelt ' s dualistic epistemology,
which thus was “not 'without presuppositions
Macintosh believes that Kuelpe also left the real
problem of epistemological dualism unanswered and
assumed that objective reality “is represented in
consciousness, without having ever been presented
there, “ ^ Macintosh believes Russell was swinging
from absolute dualism to absolute epistemological
monism because “he saw no other way of escape from
an almost total agnosticism with reference to the
physical world," 20
In the thought of Troeltsch Macintosh sees an
emphasis much like his own doctrine of religious
15. Macintosh, POK, 44.
17. Ibid., 59.
18. Ibid., 66.
19. Ibid., 70.
20. Ibid., 243.
•.
.
knowledge, in which divine reality is directly and
immediately experienced. Macintosh’s critical
intuitionism, however, requires him to recognize among
the things presented "a factor which makes for
righteousness in and through us, according as we
relate ourselves thereto in a certain discoverable
way.” 22
Macintosh brings out a fundamental part of his
own realism also in evaluating Lovejoy's arguments.
He believes that Lovejoy’s arguments are valid in
relation to “the absolute epistemological monism of
the new realists," but defends his own critical position
that "the experienced object and the independently
existing thing may be numerically identical , even if
to some extent qual it at lvely different . " The question
of the relation of mediacy and mediation in knowledge
is raised by Macintosh's charge that the principal
weakness in Lovejoy's thought is that he overlooks
the possibility that mediate knowledge may be possible
only because there is immediate knowledge. This is
a crucial point in Macintosh's epistemology that
brings up a special problem about mediacy and
immediacy.
21. Macintosh, Art. (1919) 278.
22. Ibid., 289.
23. Macintosh, POK, 56.
24. Ibid., 56.
25. Cf. infra, 77-78 and Chapter VI.
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Another important point in the development of
Macintosh’s realistic monism is the relation of
epistemology to metaphysics. He properly recognizes
that epistemology must hesitate to prescribe any
conclusions to metaphysics, that is, any conclusions
about the nature of reality, for metaphysical conclusions
do no "so manifestly lie within the province of a theory
of knowledge," 26 although epistemology may decide on
the possibility of metaphysics. In the thought of
Ladd he sees the metaphysical implications of a
dualistic epistemology illustrated. Ladd's repudiation
of the agnosticism of epistemological dualism, however,
Macintosh believes, "foredooms his theory inevitably ...
to a dogmatism as absolute but as unnecessary as that
dualism whose undesirable consequences it attempts to
remedy." In fact, Macintosh believes that the
metaphysics of dualism must necessarily be thus dogmatic.
He concludes that the apolication of an epistemological
monism based on verification by immediate experience
means that "the only metaphysics possible for the
epistemological dualist is dogmatics." But he
finds dogmatism, any view of reality not based on
experience (immediate experience, for him), is as
26. Macintosh, POK, 7.
27. Ibid., 8.
28. Ibid., 71. Cf. also his statement that there
"is no pathway to absolute idealism save that
^
of speculative dogmatism," Macintosh, Art. (1910)'
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objectionable as agnosticism.
In the development of his monism one of his
principal objections to epistemological idealism is
that idealism is dogmatic. After describing
epistemological idealism as holding that "the real
object cannot exist at other moments than the moment
of perception, or of some other conscious experience,"
or Independently of such experience, 29 Macintosh casts
mystical idealism aside as self-refuting .^9 He also
charges that psychological idealism-- "things are ideas
in the mind, or in consciousness ... they depend for
their existence upon their being In the mind, or ...
In the conscious relation to some subject"— Is pure
dogma. 0 Applying this psychological idealism to
religion he understands it to mean that "God, the
Divine Reality ... is nothing more than the subjective
idea of God in consciousness." He sees this
subjective Idealism illustrated by the Identification
of God with the God- idea created by mere wishful
thinking, which may be either injurious (Feuerbach)
or beneficial (Lange) illusions, or which may
exercise a regulative, moralizing, consolidating
influence (Leuba). Religion may be "a free form of
human Idealism" valuable for sustaining aspiration
29. Macintosh, POK, 13.
30. Ibid., 80.
31. Ibid., 94.
32. Macintosh, PRK, 47.
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and hope (Bender)
,
with dogmas primarily concerned
with conduct instead of pure reflective knowledge
(LeRoy) or God just regarded as if, al s ob t he were
the father of men (Vaihinger). Psychological idealism
in religion also includes, Macintosh believes, religious
humanism and psychiatric interpretations of religion
by thinkers like Freud, Adler, and Jung. 55
In his monistic realism Macintosh understands
logical idealism as related to dogmatic psychological
idealism. He regards logical idealism as the universally
acceptable contents of consciousness:
... finding reality in what is not merely
private feeling, but in that which, while made
up of particular experiences, is shot through
and through with universally acceptable and
even necessary ideas, it claims to be objective,
rather than merely subjective. 54
The height of dogmatism for Macintosh is the synthesis
of logical and psychological idealism. He compares it
to telling one lie to support another, for he believes
both psychological and logical idealism are based on
a mistaken analysis which makes skepticism logically
inevitable. 55
He divides objective idealism into concrete and
abstract idealism depending on the actual presence of
the reality in some experience. He separates concrete
33. See Macintosh, PRK, Chapters IV- IX.
34. Macintosh, POK, 127. Cf., however, Macintosh’s
correctives of possible "undue subjective" of
faith, in Wieman and others, ITG, 178.
35. Macintosh, POK, 128.
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idealism also into monistic and pluralistic idealism.
If the idea (all reality) is present in one all-
inclusive experience, the idealism is monistic; if it
is divided "among many mutually exclusive and ultimately
real experiences," it is pluralistic and may be called
personal idealism.^
The original dogma of psychological idealism he
believes makes absolute or monistic idealism defective,
Macintosh finds the "typical procedure" demonstrated
in Watson's substitution of "subjective universality,
universality-in-subjectivity, for true objectivity,"
resulting in "a virtual denial that we ourselves as
rzn
finite individuals have any real existence,"
Macintosh believes that Bradley's thought reveals the
"untenability of monistic or absolute idealism on
rational grounds," Bradley's thought also Illustrates,
Macintosh believes, an unending regress, because
Bradley failed to eliminate "the fallacious idealism
from his premises," Macintosh sees in Hocking'
s
thought also the absolute idealistic Interpretation of
the physical world, which he believes results from an
39
original, unnecessary dogma.
^
Macintosh believes that pluralistic or personal
idealism shows the disintegration of logical-psychological
36. Macintosh, POK, 128.
37. Ibid., 140.
38. Ibid., 152.
39. Ibid., 164-165.
..
'
.
.
• .
*
.
idealism into mere psychological idealism, 40 hence,
at least social, if not individual subjectivity, 4 *^
From the point of view of the individual, however, he
sees that pluralistic idealism results from an emphasis
on non-solipsistic subjectivism and absolute idealism
from a non-pluralistic subjectivism, 4 ^ Macintosh sums
up his application of monism to these two forms of
objective idealism in a way that makes the defects of
both "sufficiently obvious" (for the critical realist):
... while singularistic idealism saved the
idea of a single world or universe at the
expense of reducing all minds to one,
pluralistic idealism manages to save the
reality of many minds only by positing as
many totally distinct worlds, as many
universes, as there are minds aware of a
world. 45
he objects to the pluralism of personalism or
personalistic idealism because he believes that without
any reality other than persons one can conclude only
that "either there must be only one person or else the
universe can not be a single world," 44 Macintosh sees
in Lotze, for examole, e tendency toward a realistic
doctrine, although the physical world is regarded as
idealistic "in .relation to the whole number of selves
and ’self-like’ beings." 45 Macintosh’s recognition
of a 'laealistic" epistemology from the point of view
40. Macintosh, POK, 181-182.
41. Ibid., 128-129.
42. Ibid., 183
•
43. Macintosh, Art
.
(1929)***
,
226.
44. Ibid., 227.
45. Macintosh, POK, 184.
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of the individual and this idealistic interpretaion
of the physical world "in relation to the whole number
of selves and 'self-like 1 beings" illustrates Macintosh
confusing interpretation of all idealism as if it were
epistemological idealism and his failure to consider
metaphysical idealism seriously. This confusion shows
a problem in his development of critical monistic
realism illustrated by his interpretation of a
similarity between Leibniz and Lotzes
Like the philosophy of Lotze ... the system
of Leibniz seems at once a dualistic realism
(in relation to the individual) and an
idealistic epistemological monism with
reference to the physical (in relation to^g
the more or less fully conscious monads).
Macintosh's presentation of personal idealism as a
stage in the disintegration of absolute idealism into
subjective, psychological idealism 47 reaches its
climax in his suggestion that one of the alternatives
open to personal idealism is the idea of God "as a
carry-all for things as ideas." Macintosh also
criticizes the idealistic interpretation of cause in
relation to God and rejects it because it "presupDOses
the validity of idealism, and must share in the
insecurity of its foundation." 4® But the personalistic
idea of God needs not be compared with Macintosh's
46. Macintosh, POK, 184-185.
47. See ibid., especially 187-192.
48. Macintosh, Art. (1915) 2
,
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thought here; that is done in Chapter VIII of this
dissertation.
Macintosh, however, believes that there is in
idealism a natural tendency toward realism. He sees
it especially in the Platonic Ideas of what he calls
logical idealism. 49 Although for Plato reality was
Idea, Macintosh finds a tendency of logical idealism
to become logical realism in the doctrine that Ideas
are independent realities, and '‘not a construct of
human thought, but its discovery." 50 He describes
this as abstracting from an abstraction;
... when the abstractness of logical idealism
is abstracted from, the basis is laid for the
doctrine that some (or all) logical ideas are
objective realities; indeed, such a disguised
practically amounts
By the comparison of his critical monism to the various
forms of dogmatic, abstract idealism Macintosh believes
that he shows the weaknesses and defects of idealism.
He also compares his monism to realism and
criticizes its dogmatism. He describes dogmatic realism
as the monism which cancels conscious or perceptual
content of knowledge of an object by interpreting
"the real object to be nothing in addition to the
independent reality." ^2 Macintosh believes Reid's
position tends toward his own view of consciousness
49. See supra, 70. Cf. also infra, 104
50. Macintosh, POK, 84.
51. Ibid., 202.
52. Ibid., 72.
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as “psychical activity , “ 55 but he thinks Reid's
attempt to follow the common language led him astray, 54
Since new realism may result from apolying the Drinciples
of psychological idealism to the subject as well as to
all other objects, Macintosh believes new realism may
be described as “the supposed cure of the intellectual
disease of psychological idealism by its homeopathic
treatment , “ 55 He believes Dewey is not a realist but
only “a disguised psychological idealist," whose
doctrine thst "the object l^s what we seem to find it"
reveals the "trail of the sub j ectivistic--or
,
we might
even say, solipsistic, serpent." ' Boodin's pragmatic
realism is regarded as “a more bona fide realism" than
Dewey’s, but Macintosh believes that Boodin's doctrine
of the status of secondary qualities is an example of
"the incompatibility of realism with pragmatism as a
theory of reality .
"
In his attempt to be critical, Macintosh objects
to the natural realistic doctrine of secondary qualities
C Q
as a “mere dogma, untenable on critical grounds." He
charges that both English and American neo-realists are
dogmatic also in their interpretations of consciousness,
55.
Macintosh, POK, 214.
54. See supra, 11*
55. Macintosh, POK, 220.
56. Ibid., 226.
57. Ibid., 227.
58. Ibid., 247.
59. Macintosh, Art. (1914) 31.
.'
'
•
'
'
*
’
.
J •• ,c>
-
'
;
:
*
1
.
.
~o~.(
.
-
.
o .
. -
.
.
although the English were strongly influenced by
spiritualistic philosophy and the Americansby
fiO
naturalistic and materialistic philosophies.
The problems of neo-realism illustrate for
Macintosh the importance of a careful examination of
perception, even of "exceptional and difficult" cases,
which should not be treated with but scant attention.
He criticizes neo-realists as dogmatic about the extent
that they believe independent reality is presented in
knowledge, he recognizes the importance of the
experience of independently existing physical objects, 62
but is critical of the "extent" to which the qualities
of these objects exist independently.
Macintosh believes the neo-realists are dogmatic,
not critical, also about the externality of all relations
and that their views are very unsatisfactory because
they "fail to mention any adequate criterion by which
... a particular relation is ... external." By
being critical he hopes to avoid both the dogmatism
of natural realism and the "sophisticated absurdity"
of subjective idealism. The facts of the varying
sense qualities, of illusions, and of similar contents
of perception 00 make a critical realistic monism
60. Macintosh, Art.(1913) 2
,
.309. See also
Macintosh, POK, 291-292.
61. Macintosh, Art. (1927)2, 158.
62. Macintosh, Art.( 1913 ) 2 , ,310.
63. Macintosh, POK, 302.
64. Ibid., 167. See also Macintosh, Art.(1914) 1
,
30.
65. Macintosh', POK, 250-251.
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necessary, Macintosh believes. In answer to these
demands he offers his views.
3. Some difficulties in his view
One of the central characteristics of Macintosh’s
critical realistic monism is his idea of the primacy
of immediate knowledge. In his development of monism
he raises the question, ’’May it not be that there is
mediate knowledge, because, and only because, there
is first immediate knowledge? 1 ' 66 He illustrates his
point by calling attention to one's power to predict
the stages of a process when the first part of it is
experienced
:
Indeed, In countless Instances we come to be
able to predict the later stages of a process
of which we have Immediately experienced but
the beginning. Again, we are often practically
certain that a process of which we have
immediately experienced only the beginning
and the end has been essentially identical
with what at other times we have had under
our immediate observation throughout its
entire course.^7
These illustrations, however, are not epistemologically
monistic. Prediction is reference to experience which
is not now immediately present. Macintosh’s illustration
also depends on reference to consequences of a previous
experience, which were not present even at the time
of that experience, any more than the consequences of
66. Macintosh, POK, 311.
67. Macintosh, Art.(1913) 3
,
702. Cf. Macintosh,
POK, 439.
..
the present experience are now immediately present.
In fact, both prediction and consequences are dualistic
in their reference beyond present immediate consciousness
This Illustration is a better example of the necessary
dualism of all knowledge than of the primacy of
immediate knowledge and eoistemological monism. Immediat
experience is not knowledge. It is more reasonable to
say that only by mediation Is any knowledge possible
than that “the immediate knowledge has made the mediate
knowledge possible. “ 68
Macintosh, however, seeks to salvage truths from
both absolute Idealism and neo-realism to establish
his own critical realistic monism. With the
neo-realist 1c doctrine that the perceived object is
existentially identical with Independent reality in
perception he combines the dualistic affirmation that
reality has certain qualities only when perceived.
Macintosh holds that these are the sense-qualities.
Thus he affirms some qualities of a physical object as
“independently real and others as dependent upon Its
..
69being sensed.
Macintosh’s doctrine of qualities as primary,
secondary, and tertiary— those qualities "placed In
the object, not by sense, but by purposive
.
through
68. Macintosh, Art
.
(1913) 702, and Macintosh,
POK, 311.
69. Macintosh, Art • (1914) , 36.
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purely psychical, activity of the subject” 70— is also
quite significant. Macintosh seeks to be critical
in his classification of the qualities of material
thingsi
... as primary , involved in the transformations
of physical energy which takes place in space
and time independently of human experience;
secondary
,
belonging to things as experienced
through the senses; and t e rt 1 ary , the cognized
meanings belonging to things as known, judged
about . •*•
Relations for Macintosh also are of three kinds,
corresponding to primary, secondary, and tertiary
qualities. Primary relations are independent of
their being sensed; secondary exist through being
sensed; and tertiary are established by thought and for
its purpose.
Macintosh's meaning of "tertiary,” which was first
used by Santayana, does not coincide with "value,"
for not all tertiary qualities for Macintosh are values.
In fact, he even divides values into primary, secondary,
and tertiary, depending on whether they are independent
of consciousness, dependent on feeling consciousness, or
dependent on thought alone. Macintosh means by
"empirical intuition," for example, "an immediate
awareness of independently existing objects, qualities,
relations, and values." His description reflects
70. Macintosh, POK, 328.
71. Macintosh, Art.(1910) 5
,
653.
72. See, for example, Santayana, LOR, I, 142-144.
73. Macintosh, POK, 328.
74. Macintosh, Art. (1914)^, 33-34.
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a very wide meaning of "value." for him values must
include those experiences which are independent of
voluntary thought as well as those which depend
wholly on thought.
This classification can apoly only to the existence
of values. However, Macintosh needs to explain the
relation of the existence and the experience of values
more clearly than he does. How is a self to recognize
as its own those values which obtain "independently of
consciousness," and what more can one experience of
tertiary values than is dependent on feeling consciousness?
Is there something qualitatively different involved?
Do values "which depend upon thought alone" surpass
the values of thought which are experienced by
consciousness? On the other hand, how can any
experience be a value without some reference to
thought? These problems recall the previous discussion
75
of Macintosh’s doctrine of values and set it in
direct relation to the problems of his development
of monism.
Another significant problem in Macintosh’s thought
is the relative importance and place of epistemology.
The neo-realists minimize it, although Macintosh
recognizes that "all the while their own philosophical
V 6discussions are mainly epistemological." Idealism,
75. See Chapter III, supra.
76. Macintosh, POK, 334.
..
'
.
however, he believes makes epistemology a permanent
propaedeutic after the manner of the quack physican:
... it first administers a drug which makes
the patient’s ailment chronic, thus making
its own further services seem permanently
indispensable. 77
Macintosh’s critical epistemology is supposed to
help the thinker through the crisis in developing
his philosophy, and then relegate the problem to the
past. But in epistemology one must remember, as
Bertocci points out, that ”what the ultimate nature
of primary qualities are is incidental. A confusion
of metaphysics and epistemology creates serious problems.
Macintosh seeks to hold a nonagnostic, undogmatic
monistic epistemology that he believes continues "the
practical certainty characteristic of the point of view
of common sense and common science." 79 The inadequate
examination of the concept of certainty in epistemology
also has far-reaching consequences for his metaphysics. 80
Another difficulty is the relation of monism to
oragmatism. Macintosh realizes that although the
standard of usefulness should be accepted, if the
meaning of truth has any practical value "obviously
not every sort or degree of nracticsl value can be
taken as an indication of truth. " At the same time
77. Macintosh, POK, 334.
78. Art. (1943), 170. Cf. Knudson, POP, 100.
79. Macintosh, POK, 335.
80. See Chapters VI and VII.
•81. Macintosh, POK, 431.
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he claims that representation, for exaimle, can
justify itself only in the direct presentation, but
if certainty and direct presentation are the essential
qualities of truth and knowledge, how is there any
difference between different sorts or degrees of
practical value?
Furthermore, mere immediacy offers no criterion
by which to determine what reoresentat ions are
"sufficient to mediate satisfactorily whatever purpose
or purposes ought to be recognized in making the judgment . 8
2
If intuition frequently has, or may have, "more certainty
than truth" and practice sometimes has "more truth than
certainty," the identification of truth and certainty
cannot be complete. If one attempts to be critical,
also, he must be a dualist; he is no longer a monist.
Yet Macintosh asserts that "the measure of reassurance"
from a theory of reality compatible with the validity
of soiritual values has some "philosophical significance."
What he strives for is an intellectually adequate or
logical certainty, which may be described, he believes,
as "intellectual readiness for definitive action," 85
but his thought logically leaves even the knowledge
of the existence of God subject to the nature of the
82. Macintosh, POK, 445.
83. Ibid., 454.
84. Macintosh in Runes (ed.), TCP, 203.
85. Macintosh, POK, 494.
..
results it produces. ^6
These difficulties illustrate some of the problems
raised by Macintosh’s realistic monism and its
application, especially to epistemological dualism,
various forms of idealistic monism, and less critical
kinds of realistic monism. The examination of the
epistemology of Macintosh’s realism reaches its climax
and completion in the following chapter of this
dissertation, which is an evaluation of Macintosh’s
case against dualism.
86. See Bertocci, Art. (1944), 54
.
CHAPTER VI
MACINTOSH'S CASE AGAINST DUALISM
Macintosh's case against epistemological dualism
may be evaluated by considering three problem logically
raised by his monistic epistemology: Is the certainty
lacking in dualism necessary? Is idealism subjective?
Is dualism irrational? Macintosh's attack on personalistic
epistemology rests on an affirmative answer to each of
these questions. The purpose of this chapter is to
examine and evaluate these affirmations.
1. Is the certainty lacking In dualism necessary?
The importance of certainty in Macintosh's thought
has already been emphasized. The present task Is to
examine critically the question "Is the certainty
lacking In dualism necessary?" Macintosh's affirmative
answer is the basis of the assertion that epistemological
dualism leads to agnosticism and that his own monistic
realism Is more acceptable because It offers certainty.
Macintosh has recently described knowledge as
"adequate and adequately critical (i. e. logical)
certitude." ^ In the further statement that knowledge
is "subjective certitude critical enough to become
1. Macintosh in Runes (ed.), TCP, 212. See also
Macintosh, PRK, 1.
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objective certainty’1 2 Macintosh’s problem is clearly
what makes certitude critical. As in his earlier
investigation of certainty where logical certainty is
emphasized as '’sufficiently critical psychological
certainty" provided that "’sufficiently critical’ be
taken seriously enough, 1 ^ here also Macintosh moves,
by means of criticizing subjective certitude, from
certitude, which is always merely subjective, to
certainty, the objective quality desired. Throughout
his thought, and especially in his criticism of dualism,
this is an essential step. Tt immediately raises a
question, however, about his basic epistemological
monism. "Critical" implies both a criterion and the
application of this criterion to that which in the
moment of criticism cannot be epistemologically identical
even with the idea of the object. In criticism
immediate identity with the object itself is still
more impossible. Even the criterion (or criteria) of
the critical epistemological monist must refer to a
duality--the criticism and the idea criticized.
This dualism is implied in Macintosh's criticisms
of extreme monistic realism, of monistic mysticism in
religion, in his distinction betv/een imaginal intuition
and perceptual intuition, and in his demand that the
2. Macintosh, PRK, 1. Cf. the "subjective certitude
of intuition is not to be taken as infallible. It
ought to be tested, as far as possible, by its
value and by the facts," Macintosh in Wieman and
Meland, APR, 331.
3. Macintosh, POK, 460.
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4former be checked by the latter.
Macintosh finds mysticism at its best in the
mystical experience which is cultivated for "greater
subjective certitude and impressiveness ... in what
can already or otherwise claim to be amply verified
and thus virtually known." 5 Here mysticism is
continuous with worship for him. However, he disagrees
with noncritical monism in religion. He wishes to
check its vagaries
6
and to distinguish- his own
religious certitude from the certitude "of the more
oronounced and distinctive type of mysticism. He
believes that the degree of subjective certitude cannot
make the mystic's assurance knowledge. Knowledge
requires "empirical verification in the world of normal
inner and outer human experience." ® He believes that
the entire content of extreme monistic realism in religion
is neither to be accented uncritically as valid knowledge
nor to be completely rejected. When a critical monistic
realist argues or distinguishes, however, he logically
leaves the epistemological identity of idea and object
and the kind of certainty on which Macintosh bases his
objection to dualism.
Other difficulties in the immediate certainty of
4. Macintosh, PRK, 33.
5
. Xb id., 58*
6. Macintosh, Art. (1907)^, 605.
7. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 179.
8. Macintosh, PRK, 38.
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Macintosh's epist emological monism emerge in his
thought about knowledge both of physical things in
snace and of other ' stives . Since there can never be
an immediate experience of the mental processes of
other persons, for example, monistic knowledge here
can be "no greater than our best (dualistic) inference
from behavior." 9 Macintosh’s admission that "certain
elements of appreciation and of interpretation" ^ are
needed and that mediate knowledge is "a part of the
machinery of apperception" ^ respresents a step beyond
the immediate certainty of epistemological monism, for
these "elements" at least imply that which is not
completely present in the identity of the knowing
process. Although Macintosh seeks to keep the amount
of necessary mediation as small as possible, any and
all mediation is dualistic and gives no more certainty
than any other dualism.
Macintosh objects to the dualism which makes a
perceptual intuition of reality impossible, however,
because "there could be no certain knowledge that it
was the truth." J The relation of this certainty to
immediate experience is central in Macintosh’s thought,
he emphasizes experiment as the sole source of truth ^
because he thinks it gives this certainty, although he
9.
Bertocci, Art. (1944), 52.
10. Macintosh, PRK, 8.
11. Macintosh, ?0K, 550.
12. Ibid., 460. See also Bertocci, Art. (1945), 165.
15. See supra, 45-46, and Macintosh, POK, 482.
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admits that there may be intuitions which are not
truth. There is no doubt of either the crucial place
of certainty in Macintosh’s thought or his charge that
epistemological dualism lacks certainty.
But the certainty which dualism makes impossible,
Macintosh insists, is that which springs from "immediate
knowledge of independent reality in normal perception." ^
This, however, is not the kind of certainty on which
his attempt to construct a "critical monism" is based,
for "immediate knowledge of independent reality in
normal perception" has nothing to do with "a readiness
to act irrevocably, given the appropriate situation." 15
Such certainty may appear to continue "the practical
certainty characteristic of the point of view of common
sense and common science, " but close examination
reveals that the certainty of monistic epistemology
based on immediate experience end "(... intellectually
adequate) certainty (i. e. intellectual readiness for
definitive action)" have no necessary relation to
each other. Man’s decisive action for any ideal (of
which immediate experience is impossible because it is
an ideal referring to what does not yet exist) is
evidence for the necessary distinction between these
14. Macintosh, Art.(l913) 3
,
702.
15. Macintosh, POK, 459.
16. Ibid., 335.
17. Ibid., 494.
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two kinds of certainty. The practical certainty which
is basic for moral living is not limited to any
epistemological theory nor to "immediate knowledge
of independent reality in normal percent ion.
"
Indeed, practical immediacy is "not the immediacy
and directness which is suoposed to forestall
18
agnosticism." Agnosticism as a theory of knowledge
has no logical relation to this practical certainty.
The certainty which Macintosh sees as related to
agnosticism and dualism Is not logically changed by
19being shared. Only practical certainty is strengthened
in this way.
Although Macintosh criticizes dualistic epistemology
for lacking the certainty of immediate experience, the
kind of certainty essential in his philosophy is the
certainty which is practical instead of that which is
epistemologically immediate. Practical certainty makes
dynamic action possible. In addition, Macintosh believes
the certainty which is sufficient for all purposes
should be considered. One of the two kinds of logical
certainty he recognizes is the certainty illustrated by
judgments "fully verified in immediate perceptual
experience." The other kind Is illustrated by judgments
In which "such direct perceptual verification is, for
18. Bertocci
,
Ar.(1943), 171.
19. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 178.
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some good and sufficient reason, unnecessary, “ ^
The central place of practical certainty in Macintosh's
thought indicates that even for him immediate certainty
is less important than his criticism of dualistic
epistemology suggests.
His ideas of verification and of representational
pragmatism bring these two kinds of certainty into
sharp contrast. The pragmatic criterion is, he believes,
“constantly superior to the mystical, “ Macintosh's
idea of verification is illustrated in his praise of
Bergson's positive emphasis on “the necessity of
immediacy, rt Macintosh proceeds to assert, however,
that “prooerly selected concepts, properly used, in
addition to immediacy, mean an enrichment of knowledge,
"
It should be observed that as soon as a critical monist
speaks of “properly selected concepts" and admits a
distinction between truth and “the spontaneous
judgments which emerge out of immediate experience," 25
he is no longer an epistemological monist basing
knowledge on immediate certainty. If completely
verifying perceptions are “often either temporarily
or permanently unattainable by human beings, or else
not important enough to be sought at the necessary
20. Macintosh, POK, 460,
21. Macintosh, Art.(1910) 4
,
22. Macintosh, POK, 404.
23. Ibid., 454.
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the intuitional certaintyexpense of something else,
of immediate experience has been replaced by something
else.
Macintosh's recognition of the importance of
practical certainty and of the impossibility of complete,
certain verification leads one directly to his idea of
representational pragmatism. Macintosh's idea of
"essential" pragmatism is that the real test of truth
is "a test of working." This test make speculation
oroblematic until its results are "verified in the
experiences of life." Macintosh’s essential
pragmatism resembles Kant ? s pragmatic faith-- "a belief,
contingent indeed, but still forming the ground of the
actual use of means for the attainment of certain
ends." Macintosh's description of his pragmatism
as the attempt to "universalize the procedure of the
experimental sciences," which is to represent reality
"sufficiently for all purposes which ought to be
27
recognized," Illustrates Macintosh's attempt to
base his monism on science. Macintosh's method,
however, is that of refusing to believe that "every
sort or degree of practical value can be taken as an
no
indication of truth. He distinguishes between
24. Macintosh, POK, 454.
25. Ibid., 409.
26. Kant, CPR, 462 (A824, B852).
27. Macintosh, POK, 449.
28. Ibid., 431.
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essential pragmatism, which "finds the criterion of
truth in its function," and the pragmatism which
"identifies truth with its function." Macintosh
is "critical" and rejects extreme forms of pragmatism.
He calls his own pragmatism representational; an
idea is true when it represents the immediate experience,
when it "will do practically as well at least as
further experience of the thing in stimulating and
30
controlling action in adjustment of that thing."
The idea serves as "a substitute for," but cannot exclude
immediate experience or perception which "can make good
its claims only if there can be and is direct
presentation." ^
However, the idea cannot be epistemologically
identical with the direct presentation. Representation,
like all mediation, is dualistic and therefore must lack
the certainty of immediate experience. The distinction
between the pragmatism which makes function a criterion
of truth and that which identifies it with truth is
based on Macintosh's idea of purpose.^ 2 The function
of the idea depends on the purpose of the judgment.
But purpose also is dualistic. It is not immediately
experienced; it is not epistemologically monistic in
present perception. The critical monist, however, even
29. Macintosh, POK, 422.
30. Ibid., 445.
31. Ibid., 439.
32. See supra, 78-79.
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distinguishes that purpose which ought to be considered
in making a judgment from the purposes which may be
considered.'
2
'5 Here again there is an epistemological
dualism, for Macintosh does not believe that that which
ought to be is completely identical with present
experience. If it were, there would not be representational
pragmatism; there could be neither representation nor
purpose. Although Macintosh’s value-knowledge may
appear to be a form of epistemological monism and
immediate certainty, the so-called experience of an
"ought -value? 1 is knowledge not because it is immediate
but because it is a value, because it is criticized
and related to purpose. The representational pragmatic
definition of truth illustrates each of these cases of
dualisms
What is taken as truth Is representation
(of subject by predicate, of reality by
idea) sufficient to mediate satisfactorily
the purpose with which the judgment is made .
But what is really true must be representation
sufficient to mediate satisfactorily whatever
purpose or purposes ought to be recognized
in making the judgment . 5^
In this representational pragmatism Macintosh truly
has "lost his monism and his birth certificate for
sure ob j ectivlty
•
rt 55 For the certainty of immediate
experience a critical practical certainty is substituted.
33. Macintosh, POK, 452.
34. Ibid., 444-445. Yet "a change in the ’ought'"
explains why truth is not merely relative,
Macintosh, Art. (1912), 181.
35. Bertocci, Art. (1943), 171.
-'
*
.
.
.
-
•
.
.
Representation makes immediate experience of
independent reality epistemologically distinct from
what is thought to be monistically present.
Macintosh’s idea of verification and his
representational pragmatism are important also in his
religious thought. His idea of revelation, for example,
illustrates how subjective certitude must be tested:
... while the merely subjective certitude
of faith or intuition may, if it happens to
be true, be conceded to be insight, it is the
objectively tested and validated certainty
that a reality which is divine in its
spiritual value and religious functioning
has been discovered and can presumably be
discovered in essentially the same way by
others, that is alone entitled to be called
revelation in the full sense of the term. t? 6
Macintosh rejects the idea that the entire content of
valid religious beliefs are scientifically verifiable.
What is desirable he says is a fusion and mutual
supplementation of pragmatism and mysticism:
If pragmatism is to be saved from an ignoble
utilitarianism, it must learn to appreciate
and use as a fundamental norm the values
experienced in vital personal religion.
And if mysticism is to be anything but a
form of spiritual dissipation it must
submit all its insights and values to the
tests of practical life.^7
He asserts that religious beliefs are composed of ”an
element of reasonable, practically defensible faith
and an element of speculative surmise . " as well as
"a nucleus of scientifically verified (or at least
36. Macintosh, Art. (1938)^, 458
37. Macintosh, Art. (1911), 146.
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38 He believes thatverifiable) religious knowledge >
"
most theological beliefs are based on ‘'more or less
assured intuition and faith, rather than fully verified
knowledge*" ^ Here again complete certainty of
>
immediate experience of independent reality is replaced
by practical certainty, which is dualistic in being
"sufficiently critical" and lacks immediate perception.
Macintosh does not seriously seek for absolute and
monistic certainty in his religious epistemology.
Practical certainty, which implies purpose and
epistemological dualism, takes the place of immediate
monistic certainty:
Most of the defensible interesting prooosit ions
of theology must remain, I readily admit, in
such form and with such certainty as they can
have in a normative theological science based
upon a critical philosophy of values, or in a
metaphysical theology integrated into a
general philosophical system. 41^
His departure from the certainty of epistemological
monism is also illustrated in his formula of his
positive pragmatic faith:
We have the moral right to believe as we
must in order to live as we ought --if we
can (logically and psychologically), and .
more p art i cul a rly , if we do . ^
The transcendent aspects of God (which are religiously
the most important) also illustrate Macintosh's departure
38. Macintosh in Ferm (ed.), CAT, I, 307.
39. Macintosh in Runes (ed.), TCP, 214.
40. Macintosh, Art. (1939) 2
,
393.
41. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 140.
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from monistic certainty in religious knowledge* This
is emphasized by the development of his argument against
epistemological dualism in religion. His statement of
the position of dualistic realism and the lack of
certainty in the dualism of the traditional arguments,
and the argument from value, either aesthetic (Balfour)
or moral (Kant, Hashdall, Sorley, Bailie), shows that
Macintosh believes that the logical consequences of
dualistic epistemology are religious agnosticism. He
blames a fundamental dualism for Msnsel ' s assertion
that the divine cannot be experienced, for Spencer’s
view that the Divine Personality can neither be affirmed
nor denied, 45 and for Schleiermacher * s anthropocentric
theology. The conclusion that these hypotheses “stand
in need of objective, empirical verification if they are
to be recognized as being, to any extent, in the full
sense of the world, religious knowledge “ 45 illustrates
the lack of certainty which Macintosh objects to in the
religious agnosticism of epistemological dualism.
Although he criticizes Croce for rejecting religion
because it “undertakes to deal with the transcendent
whereas all reality is immanent, 11 Macintosh believes
in both immanent and transcendent asoects of Cod. Actually
42. Macintosh, PRK, 231.
4,3. Ibid., 235.
44. Ibid., 239.
45. Ibid., 242.
46. Ibid., 157.
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Divine Reality is "very largely" transcendent for
47him. In religious perception there are divine
processes end a divine factor apart from religious
consciousness and appreciation which "exist without
being wholly dependent upon such consciousness and
appreciation for their reality." The critical
monistic realist does not assert the same certain and
immediate knowledge of these transcendent aspects, which
are at most only partly immanent, that he seeks to
maintain of the completely immanent aspects of divine
reality. Here, too, he sacrifices the kind of certainty
which he finds lacking In dualism.
Of these "persistently transcendent phases of
49divine reality" certain knowledge Is not possible,
for these objects can only be subjectively assured
and are no more than objectively reasonable matters
of faith and intuition. Neither the strength of the
conviction nor the adequacy of the critical certitude
of object is ever great enough to render them objectively
certain. In other words, the transcendent aspects of
God can never be treated with epistemologically monistic
.
certainty. At best, they are like the Divine of the
religious agnostics, which needs "objective, empirical
47. Macintosh, PRK, 229.
48. Ibid., 174.
49. Ibid., 357. Cf. also his statement that "for
the knowing of the transcendent, representative
ideas are required," Macintosh, Art.. (1913) 37.
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verification ... to be ... to any extent, in the full
sense of the word, religious knowledge . 11 50 Macintosh
recognizes that immediate certainty of these aspects
is impossible.
Thus Macintosh has a dualism of the part of divine
reality that is immediately experienced and that part
which is never present within immediate religious
experience . 51 This may not be the same as an epistemo-
logical dualism of idea and object, but it logically
implies one. Here, too, Macintosh has accepted less than
immediate certainty, and he has done it without actually
endangering his belief in the transcendent aspects of
divine reality. 52 This means epistemologically a
distinction in the certainty of those aspects of divine
reality which can be immediately experienced and that
of those which cannot. Now, if the lack of certainty, for
ex8jnple, is an essential objection to all epistemological
dualism, why is it not an equally valid objection to belief
in these transcendent asoects of divine reality? Are not
the criteria by which all interpretation has taken place
and the right religious adjustments been made just as
uncertain logically as these transcendent aspects of
divine reality? Is not Macintosh’s admission of this
point which lacks certainty another recognition that
50. Macintosh, PRK, 242. Cf. supra, 94 - 95
,
96 .
51. Ibid., 357.
52. Cf. ibid., 291.
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even for him life is not actually based on immediate
certainty but on reasonable probability (or practical
certainty)?
Macintosh's critical monistic realism, then, is
logically no more certain than epistemological dualism.
The monistic thinker implicitly sacrifices the certainty
he so strongly insists on as soon as he attempts to be
critical, and he explicitly sacrifices it in his
representational pragmatism and in the religious area,
in his idea of the transcendent aspects of divine reality.
The dualist neither demands nor claims immediate
certainty but attempts to maintain a coherent eoistemology
that makes religious knowledge as reasonable as any
other scientific knowledge. The dualist recognizes
that we do not live by the method of rigor and vigor,
of admitting nothing that can be doubted. ^3 With the
scientist, he admits that we are not guided by certainty
*'in nine-tenths of the most important affairsof daily
life." While epistemological dualism may lack the
immediate certainty which Macintosh demands, this kind
of certainty is both logically contradicted and explicitly
abandoned by the critical monist himself. The degree
and kind of practical certainty required by life is
actually amply orovided by the dualistic epistemology
53. See Bowne, THE, 17, and TTK, 371.
54. Huxley in Shapley and others, TOS, 20.
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of personalism 55
2. Is idealism subjective?
Another charge Macintosh makes against rival
systems of philosophy is that they are dogmatic. The
metaphysics of dualism is dogmatic, he believes, because
dualism lacks immediate certainty. Although he does
distinguish idealism from dualism, Macintosh’s criticism
of idealism raises a question related to dualism-- "Is
idealism subjective?" Macintosh’s criticism of dualism
rests on an affirmative answer to this question about
idealism. While all dualism may not require idealistic
metaphysics, Macintosh's interpretation of idealism as
necessarily subjective, as denying objectivity, is basic
for his criticism of dualism. If all idealism is
subjective, there can be no epistemological dualism.
Macintosh believes all idealism is subjective, and thus
his criticism of idealism is an essential part of his
attack on dualism.
If Macintosh did not hold that all idealism is
subjective, there might be reference to objective reality
and hence epistemological dualism. Macintosh's
interpretation of idealism as the denial of objectivity
is thus Important for his case against dualism and an
55 . See discussion of knowledge as certain or as
heuristic, Brightman, POR, 194. Cf . Caldecott's
view of personalism as an empirical method
aiming at practical certainty, PREA, 80-86.
Cf. also Brightman, Art. (1922), 25V.
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evaluation of Macintosh’s criticism of idealism is
imperative
.
Macintosh is basically an epistemological realist,
although he seeks to be a metaphysical realist in some
respects, his central assertion about the problem of
knowledge is that the objective world exists Independently
of the knower, that the knower does not create it but
finds it.' Since he considers all idealism to be
subjective, he accepts epistemological realism and
argues against all kinds of idealism. Much of his
thought may be understood as a search for the objectivity
which he believes idealism lacks.
In religious knowledge, for example, he attacks
psychological idealism, logical idealism, and what he
57
calls logical-psychological idealism, much as he
objects to the various forms of idealism in general
knowledge. 5*3 He sees each kind d idealism as inferior
to his own realism. His interpretation of the dilemma
of the empiricists, for exapmle, illustrates the problem
idealism raises for him*
If all the reality we can know 'is the
immediate content of our consciousness,
we are obviously shut up to a choice
between subjectivism 8Jid agnosticism. y
He is an epistemological realist who thinks all doctrines
56. Cf. supra, 58-59.
57. Macintosh, PRK, Part II.
58. See Chapter V, supra.
59. Macintosh, PFW, 46.
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which regard the objective world as dependent on or
of the nature of consciousness alone make knowledge
subjective, and thus are Impossible.
Macintosh is a realist who welcomes the idea of
the "Given 1 ' and "the personal realism and theistic
realism to which Mr. Brightman already subscribes
[and) . . . a realism of the physical universe, mechanical
and super-mechanical" as a possible "first step toward
his conversion ... from traditional personalism to
realism . " One of his statements about personalism
illustrates Macintosh's failure to consider arguments
for metaphysical idealism and his almost exclusive
concern with epistemological realism and epistemological
idealism:
Personalism maintains not only that persons,
divine and human, are real, but that nothing
else has metaphysical reality; and in order
to prove this, it has resorted to artificial
arguments. ^
These apollcations of his epistemological realism show
the importance of a critical examination of Macintosh's
objections to idealism and a csreful Investigation of
whether all idealism is subjective for an evaluation
of his criticism of dualism.
60. Macintosh, Art.(1932) 4
,
307. Note also
Macintosh's marginal notation in his copy
of Brightman, RV, 171, in which he replies
to the view of theistic personalism as "the
most comprehensive philosophy of religious
values" by adding "theism, not necessarily
theistic personalism, if personalism be defined
as on page 167."
61. Macintosh, PFW, 263.
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Macintosh's central objection to idealism is
illustrated by the "vitiating" initial error in "the
dogma of psychological idealism"--that "I know only
my own ideas." 62 Underlying this objection to all
forms of idealism is his interpretation of this position,
which he believes is the basic assumption of all
idealism, to mean that there is no objective reality.
The idealistic doctrine, which he sees danger of
accepting uncritically, is that "the object is, in toto ,
a creation of the thought activity of the subject." 63
Although he believes that Drake's escape from
epistemological dualism is only verbal, 64 he would
agree with Drake in charging that the subjectively-
minded thinker is "shut in, according to his theory,
to 'ideas,' 1 . e . to mental substitutes for outer
objects." Macintosh believes that the view that a
thinker knows only his own ideas means the denial of
all objectivity and that idealism is thus incompatible
with epistemological realism. Personalistic epistemological
dualism, however, requires that idealism is not thus
necessarily subjective, but that one's ideas may refer
to what is both epistemologically distinct from his
present awareness and metaphysically independent (in
quantity) and objective to consciousness.
62. Macintosh, POK, 129.
63. Macintosh, PFW, 142.
64. Macintosh, Art. (1927 )-*•, 132-133.
65. Drake in Drake and others, ECR, 3.
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Macintosh is so interested in maintaining
independent objective reality that any form of idealism
apoears dangerous to him. He thinks, for example, that
logical idealism rests on selecting what is universal
and necessary in psychological idealism and regarding
it as true.^ His objection to this form of idealism
is that it is an abstraction from the reality under
consideration and that it suffers, therefore, from the
original fallacy of psychological idealism, although
it tends to pass from logical idealism to logical
realism. ' Of all the forms of idealism, he prefers
logical idealism (although it is abstract), for he
believes that psychological and mystical idealism are
6ft
especially subjective. He sees Husserl as one who
fell "into the error of logical idealism . " and "abstracted
from the abstraction" placing himself 'at least on the
verge of logical realism as well." ^9 Hegel's assertion
that "no judgment can be really true" Macintosh believes
results from "taking mere identity of idea with reality
as the sole criterion and definition of truth ... with
the help of the idealistic interpretation of reality." 70
Macintosh is an epistemological realist who objects
to all the idealistic interpretations of reality because
66. See supra, 70.
67. Macintosh, POK, 89. See also supra, 74.
68. Macintosh, Art.(1914) 1
,
28.
69. Macintosh, POK, 20.3.
70. Ibid., 374.
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he believes that all idealism is subjective, that it
denies objectivity.
He believes that Bradley is an exception who
detected the logical fallacy of idealism and refused
to make the "subject-matter in any case a mere product
of thought." However, Macintosh thinks that even
Bradley remained in the clutches of subjective
idealism:
... he retained the idealistic doctrine of
the necessary lnternallty of ... all relations
... as established by and dependent upon the
process of human thought.
The only hope Macintosh see for the Absolute of both
Bradley and Bosanquet is in recognizing a reality of
which some Being could have an adequate experience.
Macintosh believes that this kind of self-consistent
philosophy, however, is unattainable "so long as the
fundamental dogma of idealism, that reality is idea or
experience, is retained." ^ Macintosh holds that this
same fallacy is the basis of the "provisional subjective
idealism" which led Royce to develop "a solipsism of the
Absolute Self, as the only logical escape from a
solipsism of the finite self."
Macintosh's defense of epistemological realism
against all forms of idealism shows his distrust of
any theory that regards reality as idea or experience,
71. Macintosh, POK, 576.
72. Ibid., 159.
73. Ibid., 386.
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whether or not it recognizes that reality is
independent of the individual's consciousness. His
epistemological interpretation of all idealism and
his failure to consider the metaphysical arguments for
idealism result in his treating idealism "rather
cavalierly" in many places and his making "short work"
of thinkers like Bradley and Royce without greatly
strengthening "the general argument" of some of his
writings
.
74
The comparison of his thought to various forms
of idealism leads Macintosh to discover epistemological
realism in the thought not only of contemporary
personalists but also of other idealists. Macintosh
sees, for example, a combination cf realism and
idealism in the thought of Eucken. The idea of "an
independent Spiritual Life" is realistic (epistemo-
logically), but the denial of independent physical
reality (of metaphysical realism) leads Macintosh to
conclude that Eucken' s philosophy is "still in some
sense idealistic," although the basic interest in
"spiritual realism" may not be "really so incompatible
76
with physical realism as Eucken seems to suppose."
Macintosh sees in Boodin's thought also an attempted
74. Macintosh, Art. (1926), 206.
75. Macintosh, Art. (1913)2, 515.
76. Macintosh, POK, 209.
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realism in the clutches of idealism, Boodin's realism
means "reference to an object existing beyond the
apperceptive unity of momentary individual conscious-
ness." ^ This is epistemological realism, although
one would have to overlook the epistemological dualism
of all reference to regard it as epistemological monism. 78
The interoret ation of all idealism to mean epistemological
idealism is an identification of metaphysics with
epistemology which Macintosh fails anywhere to justify.
Boodin’s empirical idealism creates a special problem
for Macintosh’s realistic view. Macintosh thinks Boodin
must mean in some of the olaces where he uses "objective"
a frank expression of subjectivism, unless he means
existent "independently of our own contexts of
significance." 79 But this is the meaning of epistemo-
logical realism, regardless of the metaphysical view of
the nature of reality. The assertion that the nature of
reality is idea has no necessary relation to its
existence independent of the knowing subject, especially
in the sense of denying the possibility of such existence.
Also the charge of social subjectivism 80 shows
Macintosh's identification of metaphysical with
epistemological idealism. But epistemological realism
is not altered by multidying the number of knowing
77. Macintosh, POK, 228.
78. Supra, 55-56.
79. Macintosh, POK, 229.
80. SuDra, 71-72*
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subjects, nor is it necessarily removed by positing
a supreme knower. The object, regardless of its
metaphysical quality, may be found, not made, by an
infinite number of knower s either human or divine,
without its existence being identical with any or all
the knowing subjects* Even an attempt to identify the
objective world with a form of divine or social
subjective epistemological monism does not remove the
epistemological dualism*
The necessary subjective residence of all knowledge,
indicated, for example, in the "completely human
subjectivity of all our knowledge” to which Macintosh
81
objects in the thought of Lotze, does not preclude
objectivity and thus logically mean solipsism. Actually
the experienced fact of resistence to his will leads
the idealist to believe that his ideas refer to objective
reality and to regard his idealism as objective instead
of merely subjective*
Furthermore it is no more logically necessary to
conclude that this subjectivity of knowledge denies
objective reality than it would be to say that experi-
enced sense-qualities are merely subjective because
they are the products of the sensing activity of a
conscious subject. However, Macintosh believes that
these sense-qualities, although oroduced subjectively.
81. Macintosh, POK, 47-48.
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exist objectively.
Logical-psychological idealism as the "introduction
of logical idealism into psychological idealism in
order to transform subjective idealism into an idealism
that shall do full justice to objectivity" 88 is an
illustration of Macintosh’s view of all (metaphysical)
idealism as solipsistic, as epistemological idealism
opposed to his own realism. Indeed, one must "always
be on his intellectual guard ... when he meets the
phrase ’nothing but.' 1 * 84 However, one needs to be
even more on his guard lest he interpret theological
ideas which are said to represent divine reality, for
example, 8s therefore "nothing but copies" of it. The
fact that they are ideas does not necessarily mean that
they are merely subjective and cannot refer to objective
reality.
This view that metaphysical idealism means
antirealism in epistemology is the basis of Macintosh’s
charge that logical-psychological idealism is a dogmatism
with the fallacies of both forms of the idealism which
it combines. 88 The subsequent interpretation of this
idealism to mean that "things cannot exist apart from
knowledge" and yet that the world of knowledge may
82. Macintosh, PFW, 213.
83. Macintosh, POK, 206.
84. Macintosh, Art. (1940)1, i5 g #
85. Macintosh, POK, 127. Cf. supra, 70.
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and tiaeexist apart from any actual knower" 86
assertion that one must ’'choose between ’my experience'
(subjectivism) and unexperienced ’experience’
(abstractionism)" 8 ^ also indicate that Macintosh
interprets all idealism as denying the existence of all
reality which is epistemologically independent of the
subject. The "reduct lo ad absurdum " of idealism reflect
his idea of idealism as necessarily subjective;
If we assume that the object is, through
and through, the construct of the subject,
either there is only one subject because
the objective world is only one, or else
there are many objective worlds, one for each
subject, because the subjects are many. 88
Macintosh's investigation of idealism as a form of
monism and as distinct from dualism in his two major
writings on epistemology also shows his idea that all
idealism is epistemological monism, although in The
Problem of Religious Knowledge Macintosh seems more
inclined to consider personalism as a form of dualism
than as epistemological idealism and fails to make
an extensive examination of absolute idealism in
religious knowledge.
The subjectivism of idealism has long been a
problem of philosophical speculation. Perry, for
example, says that subjectivism cannot be abolished
86. Macintosh, POK, 197.
87. Ibid., 208.
88. Macintosh, PFW, 142.
89. See Macintosh, PRK, Parts II and IV.
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but "must ... be retained as a 1 Durchgangst adium * on
the way to a complete idealism*" 99 Macintosh's
position is clear in his demand that idealists remember
that "the German idealistic movement from Kant to Hegel
is •*. a way of escape from the Humian sceptical
psychologism" and that idealism can never "disown its
subjectivistic ancestry." 93- But ancestry determines
neither value nor truth. Truth requires a critical
investigation of all the problems, both epistemological
"and metaphysical.
The various meanings of "subjective" adds to the
confusion. Macintosh regards the subjectivism of
idealism as indicative of its essential weakness, of
the "insecurity of its foundation." 9 ^ In his criticism
he charges that personal idealism is especially
objectionable because it is the "most subjective type
of psychological idealism." ^ However, all knowledge
must actually be subjective in belonging to a conscious
self. Macintosh's emphasis on experience 94 also shows
that he recognizes the importance of the subject. The
95dualistic epistemology of personalism indicates that
idealistic metaphysics needs not necessarily deny
90. Perry, PPT, 163.
91. Macintosh, POK, 128.
92. Macintosh, Art. (1913
)
2
,
311.
93. Macintosh, POK, 189.
94. See supra, 45-46.
95. See Chapter IV, supra.
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objectivity. "Subjective," meaning related to the
subject, must be distinguished from “subjective" as
a denial of metaphysical reality or as meaning
epistemological idealism.
Many thinkers have regarded idealism as objective.
Berkeley, for example, considered the problem and
concluded that idealism is not subjectivism in his
Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Phllonous • The
requirement of a conscious subject and the subjective
residence of all knowledge do not mean the denial of
objectivity; idealism does not require that knowledge
is not objective in its reference. Both objectivity
and the nature of the object can be determined only
by examining experience and attempting to formulate
the most adequate explanation of all consciousness,
of all truth claims. Bradley’s conclusion that it is
idle to repeat, "I want something," unless it can be
shown that "the nature of things demands it also"
reflects his recognition of this truth, even within
the limits of his logical system. In fact, he
distinguishes between appearance and reality by applying
the criterion of what is consistent and intelligible;
Anything the meaning of which Is inconsistent
and unintelligible is appearance, and not
reality.^
96. See Bradley, WOR, I, especially 442-485.
97. Bradley, AAR, 510.
98. Ibid., 76.
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An evaluation of Macintosh’s case against dualism
leads one to the conclusion that it is arbitrary to
consider idealism as necessarily subjective, as requiring
that all idealism is epistemologically monistic*
Metaphysical idealism need not deny the objectivity
of reality; in fact, in its personalist ic form
metaphysical idealism requires the objective reality
of the object. Metaphysical idealism is a theory of
the nature of reality which affirms its objectivity
and denies only nonmental reality. Epistemological
idealism, however, is a theory about the objectivity
of reality which identifies the existence of objective
reality with the idea of it. Epistemological idealism,
as Macintosh would agree, logically means some form of
subjectivism. Actually this is the kind of idealism
to which he is opposed, and in contrast to which his
thought may be regarded, in part, a search for objectivity.
If the existence of objective reality is identified
with the idea of it, indeed there can be no objective
reality. This is epistemological idealism. Metaphysical
Idealism only requires that the nature of the objective
reality is qualitatively like consciousness, not that
objects cease to exist when the thinker’s idea of them
no longer Is a part of present consciousness. Epistemo-
logical idealism does not necessarily require metaphysical
idealism; in fact, it makes metaphysical Idealism In
.'
.
'
f
.
.
.
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the personal istic form impossible. Epistemological
idealism says nothing about the metaohysical quality
of the object. Metaphysical idealism does not
require epistemological idealism either. Metaphysical
idealism is a theory about the quality of objective
reality, which, in fact, is made less acceptable by
combining epistemological with metaphysical idealism.
Metaohysical idealism is not necessarily subjective.
It does not preclude the possibility of epistemological
dualism.
However, all knowledge is subjective in the sense
cf its concrete relation to a knowing subject. Idealism
is not subjective as a theory of the existence of
objective reality, but all knowledge is subjective
in the sense of being related to a conscious subject.
3. Is dualism irrational?
The third question, "Is dualism irrational?"
raises two problems. One is the relation of dogmatism
and irrationalism to dualism. The other concerns
irrationalism in Macintosh's thought.
Although Macintosh’s charges of fundamental
dogmatism are directed toward various forms of idealism
and especially of realism, the impact of the whole
discussion and the organization of both The Problem
of Knowledge and The Problem of Religious Knowledge
.•
"T
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suggest that he thinks that dualism is also distinctly
irrational because of its agnosticism, because it
lacks immediate certainty and logical necessity* His
discussion of dualism in religious knowledge ends with
an examination of reactionary irrationalism, which
is rooted, he believes, in the subjective foundation
of man’s ’’feelings and appreciations.” 99 In addition,
Macintosh believes that this agnosticism shows the
irrationalism of dualism. He seeks to transcend this
difficulty by the certainty of his own critical
monistic realism.
The relation of agnosticism to dualism has
already been examined.^ 90 The absolute certainty
lacking in dualism was found to be replaced even in
Macintosh's thought by practical certainty. The
tendency toward irrationalism in the subjectivity of
idealism, which Macintosh regards as solipsistic, grows
out of a failure to distinguish precisely between
epistemological and metaphysical idealism, between
subjective as a denial of all objectivity and subjective
meaning related to a subject.
That dualism is inclined toward irrationalism in
another sense, however, is not denied. In asserting
that no immediate experience is, qua immediate experience
,
99. Macintosh, PRK, 326.
100. Supra, 84-100*
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rational knowledge the dualist leaves his philosophy
open to this charge of irrationalism. Dualism requires
that each hypothesis about the object be tested by
reason. In this respect dualism is neutral; it does
not provide immediately certain knowledge. It makes
all knowledge dependent on reason. Reason is not
abstract and separate from experience. Reason is a
part of experience in the sense that reason may be
experienced and in the sense that no experience may
be interpreted or adequately understood without being
related to reason.
Immediate experience gives only truth-claims, not
certain truth. In immediate experience there are only
value-claims , although each carries the claim to be a
true value. No truth is possible as truth until
immediate experience has been tested and evaluated,
until immediacy has been supplemented by mediation.
For the dualist all experience “always points beyond
itself" and its testimony "is always subject to tests
by further and more critical experience." This
explanation of experience may be, to an epistemological
monist, indicative of the irrationalism in dualism. But
for the dualist it means only that the nature of experi-
ence and reason require continual development; knowledge
is ever-increasing growth of both reason end experience.
101. Brlghtman, POR, 415
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The real question, then, is not whether dualism
is completely free from all irrationalism but whether
dualism is more or less irrational than monism*
This makes an examination of irrationalism in Macintosh’s
monism," for example, essential*
Macintosh's attempt to avoid irrational dogmatism
is shown in his treatments of epistemological problems.
He discovers that the realist Riehl assumed that
"something different from and independent of conscious-
ness exists," and that Montague's realistic
epistemological monism is "entirely a matter of faith,
"
of belte/ing what "there is sufficient reason for
disbelieving." x ^ Macintosh therefore rejects absolute
realism because of its "undue dogmatism" about the
extent that reality is independent of consciousness. ^04
He also finds as "unwarranted dogmatism" in
neo-realism; for example, the interpretation of conscious
ness by both English and American neo-realists he believe
is "a new dogmatism in opposition to the dogmatism of
idealism." This dogmatism of the neo-realist ic
position leads neo-realists to treat both ideas and
truth "in very cavalier fashion." Macintosh
believes that both neo-realism and the new mysticism
102. Quoted from Per ohilosophlsche Kritizlsmus
.
in Macintosh, POK, 31.
103. Macintosh, POK, 289.
104. Ibid., 309.
105. Macintosh, Art. (1913)
,
309.
106. Macintosh, POK, 395.
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are uncritical and "ultra-dogmatic."
He opooses the irrational dogmatism also in idealism.
Macintosh believes that "supposing that because the
mind is active in perception it must be supposed to
construct that which is oerceived" is an error as
1 08dogmatic as irrational dogmatism in realism. He
criticizes, for example, Bradley's metaphysics as both
dogmatic and logically untenable 109 and believes
that the first thesis of Hocking* s dialectical system
^ .»
110
"is an unnecessary dogma.
Macintosh's own critical realistic position results
from his attempt to avoid the dogmatic irrationalism of
both realism and idealism and also the irrational
agnosticism of dualism. He thinks that realistic
epistemological monism, for example, escapes "the dilemma
of absolute solipsism {resulting from epistemological
idealism] or absolute agnosticism Jresulting from
dualism]." Macintosh believes that his realistic
monism "is free" from the 'fallacies, the subjectivisms,
and abstractionisms of idealism in its various forms
and the fallacies and final agnosticism of dualism."
He regards his realism as a "critical synthesis df certain
107. Macintosh, Art
. (1913 ) 310.
108. Macintosh, Art. ( 1914 ) , 31.
109. Macintosh, POK, 151.
110. Ibid., 164-165. See also Macintosh, Art. (1914)1,
36.
111. Cf. Bertocci, Art. (1944), 52.
112. Macintosh, POK, 312.
113. Ibid., 310.
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mutually harmonious elements" of the naive realism and
114the modern school of critical realism. He seeks
also to avoid a morphological or structural dogmatism
of knowledge by critically recognizing the truth in
both conception and perception. 115
His "activistic empiricism 1 ' is an attempt to
recognize the activity of the mind in rationalism and
lift
yet be empirical and scientific. This is the basis
of Macintosh's doctrine of secondary and tertiary
qualities. 11^ Secondary qualities result from creative
sense-activities and tertiary qualities from creative
thought-activities. 113 This same idea also leads to his
doctrine of relations as internal or external relative
to "this or that purpose. " 11^
Another synthesis is illustrated by his idea of
representational pragmatism. At the heart of both
intellectualism and pragmatism Macintosh finds what
he calls representat ionalism. Thus he regards his
representational pragmatism as "a 'higher synthesis'
of intellectualism and pragmatic antl-intellectualism.
"
He believes that his position substitutes a soluble
problem for the 'insoluble, artificial problems of
114. Macintosh, Art.(1929) 1
,
229.
115. Macintosh, POK, 358.
116. Ibid., 365. See also Macintosh, Art. (1913) .
117. Gf. supra, 78^79.
118. Macintosh, POK, 365.
119. Ibid., 380.
120. Ibid., 443.
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current epistemological and intellectuallst logic,'* 1^1
and is a further synthesis of intuitionism and
12?
representational pragmatism#
I
Macintosh’s presentation of his own thought as a
synthesis of this kind leads to the question of his
eclecticism. At the close of The Problem of Knowledge
he expresses the fear that he may not "have been, in a
possible sense of the term, eclectic enough." He
has been praised for being in some of his writings:
•#• a philosophical eclectic, with quick
intellectual sympathy, and an uncommon ability
to appropriate, assimilate, and utilize the
best of some of* the systems which he rejects
as such. 1^4
The ability to see and accept the truth in the views
which one rejects is indeed commendable. Meclntosh
also does well in attempting to maintain "internal
consistency and fidelity to facts." However, there
is a central difference between mere consistency and
coherence. Macintosh strives for the first; his lack
of the second illustrates his somewhat limited, abstract
concepts of reason and coherence, a possible irrationalism
in his thought.
His own discussions of coherence suggest a part of
the reason why his thought lacks coherence. For example,
121. Macintosh, POK, 446.
122. Ibid., 453.
123. 496.
124. Macintosh, Art. (1926), 206.
125. Macintosh, POK, 496. Cf. his emphasis on "a
self-consistent system," In Runes (ed.), TCP,
218.
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he speaks of coherence as follows:
... correspondence simmers down to mere coherence,
the sticking together in some way of subject and
predipate, both being thought of as mere ideas,
and the cohesive substance being a compound of
His position as a realist may lead him to hold that
there is truth inaccessible to the realm of ideas, but
as soon as he has any idea of this truth or as soon as
his “objective reality" has any relation at all to any
idea (even to the idea of it as objective reality),
reason requires not merely a lack of contradiction
but also a positive uiity of thought and explanation
that is as inclusive as possible. Coherence adds
1 Pftto consistency the ideals of inclusiveness and
system. Personalistic epistemology is an attempt to
give a coherent explanation of knowledge.
Macintosh’s reference to "systems" also illustrates
his rejection of this ideal of coherence. He says, for
example, that Bradley's "splendid system" fails to solve
the problem of truth and reality,^ 29 without even
questioning whether it was the systematic nature of
126. Macintosh, Art* (1912), 169. Cf. also Macintosh,
POK, 373. See also the marginal note in his copy
of Brightman, RV, where reference is made to
coherence as "our ideal," "the Supreme Court of
Reason." Macintosh comments: "Not mere coherence
of hypothesis, but verification in agreement with
impersonal reality." (Brightman, RV, 23.)
127. See Brightman, POR, 126-129. Cf. also his class-
room discussion of coherence on October 28, 1941.
128. For discussion of the inclusiveness of the empirical
method of personalism see supra, 47-49.
129. Macintosh, POK, 381.
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Bradley's thought or the failure of Bradley's system to
"appreciate the theoretical value of practical
considerations, as well as the practical value of theory"
/
that made Bradley's idealism unsatisfactory. There is
nothing about systematic unity and coherence that
actually makes either of these, or any other, values
irrelevant. Coherence is the demand for en inclusive,
consistent system in explaining experience. Macintosh's
reference to "systems of conclusions" J also suggests
his idea of "system" as abstract, nonempirical, and not
inclusive of all experience. The lack of systematic
unity in his critical monism is a serious shortcoming
of Macintosh's thought. To the extent that life and
reason require coherence rather than mere consistency
Macintosh's monistic realism is inadequate and
irrational, although where he actually uses coherence
his thought is fruitful with many valuable suggestions.
His rejection of coherence is thus an internal as
well as an external criticism of Macintosh's thought.
In the epistemology of his monism the kind of immediate
certainty which is implicitly lost by his critical
position is explicitly denied of the transcendent
aspects of divine reality. This logical difficulty is
especially apoarent in his assertion of the "overlapDing"
of the transcendent and those other aspects of divine
130. Macintosh, POK, 468. Cf. "any system as a
whole," Macintosh in Runes (ed.), TCP, 203.

reality which, he believes, may be immediately
experienced:
/
There is, however, a partial identity
or over-laoping of the divine as
immediately exnerienced and the divine
as independently real. 1 *!
Overlapping and "harmonizat ion'* in religious
perception imoly a unity. But this unity is not given
by mere consistency and epistemological monism. Is the
"unitary divine reality," which is nartly transcendent
and partly immediately and certainly perceived, known
monistically? Has not the critical monistic realist
rather become dualist ic and had to turn to coherence
rather than mere consistency to meet the demands of
reason and of his faith?
1
The unity of divine reality cannot itself be a
datum of immediately certain monistic knowledge, if
some aspect of the reality cannot be immediately and
certainly known. Nor can the relation of the tran-
scendent and immediately experienceable aspects be
known immediately. Logically, the epistemological
monist, as long as he remains a monist, is in the
position one critic charged of Kant's idea o f the self:
... no sooner had Kant exorcized the ego as
a knowable soul from his system, and swept
and garnished the place which it had occupied,
than five other egos returned to the place
131. Macintosh, PRK, 178
132. Ibid., 170.
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left empty. For Kant tells us of the
empirical ego, bound by the chains of
causation; and of the ego as the tran-
scendental unity of apoerceotion, which
is neither cause nor effect, neither
substance nor attribute, but only a logical
point of reference; and of the ego as a
thing-in-it self
,
unknowable; and of the
ego as a transcendental ideal, the goal
of knowledge; and of the moral ego, which
posits its own freedom. This is a real
bedevilment of the situation. 135
The epistemological monist faces a similar confusion,
for example. If he, as a monist using only consistency
and not coherence, tries to unite the different aspects
of divine reality.
This lack of systematic unity in critical monism,
clearly expressed by Macintosh's doctrine of the
transcendent aspects of divine reality, reveals that
mere monism lacks coherence and therefore is more
Irrational than dualism. Consistency alone is not
enough. Only by applying coherence, and not mere
consistency, can there be the needed "synthesis of the
valuational and the existential in theology" which
Macintosh seeks, 134 for example, and religious and
general epistemology be brought together.
Reason’s demand for coherence is recognized, and
the failure to provide it indicates irrationalism in
in Macintosh's thought. The distinction between immediat
133. Lyman, Art. (1924), 128-129. Cited in
Knudson, POP, 73n.
134. Macintosh, Art
.
(1939) 3
,
24-25.
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certainty and the relation of the knower to the
transcendent: aspects of divine reality implies either
a breakdown of the sufficiency of monism or a change in
the nature of reason. Mere consistency and knowledge as
immediately certain in epistemological monism have
failed here. The need for one to be as reasonable as
possible -L '-° is an implicit recognition of coherence, of
83 much consistent system and inclusiveness as possible.
The charge that dualism is irrational, raised
especially by Macintosh’s discussion of religious
knowledge, has led to the discovery that in his own
treatment of dogmatism and in his interest in consistency
Macintosh has overlooked the other essential ideals of
coherence and that his thought is more irrational than
dualism.
Is the certainty lacking in dualism necessary? Is
idealism subjective? Is dualism irrational? This
examination of these questions involved in Macintosh's
case against dualism reveals that even Macintosh's
thought is not based on immediate certainty, which he
criticizes dualism for lacking, that it is arbitrary
to conclude that all idealism is subjectivism (is
epistemological idealism), snd that epistemological
dualism is less irrational than monism. Metaphysical
end religious Implications of Macintosh's criticism of
personalism are now the Important problems for investigation
155. Macintosh, PRK, 558.
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CHAPTER VII
THE IDEALISTIC METAPHYSICS OF PERSONALISM
Macintosh's criticism of personalism reveals not
only his monistic epistemological realism but also
certain implications of his epistemology and his realism
in metaphysics. j.he idealistic forms of personalism
are a special target for critical realists. Brief
statements of the idealistic metaphysics of the
personalism under consideration and of Macintosh's
objection to this position suffice to introduce the
problem. The answer empirical personalists make to
this objection, however, requires a more detailed
examination of Macintosh's metaphysics and reveals
more fully the implications of the idealistic metaphysics
of personalism.
1. The personalist ic denial of nonmnetal reality
The metaphysical position of personalism illustrates
the philosophy of the "lover of intellect and knowledge"
described by Plato in the Tlmaeus (46) as holding that
"the only being which can properly have mind is the
invisible soul." ^ Bowne also has described the
metaphysical position of personalism:
1. See Jowett (tr.), DOP, II, 27.
..
.
.
.
.
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Only the definite 8Jid only the active can be
viewed as ontologically real. ... Metaphysically
considered, being is self-centred activity. ...
Things exist only in their activities, and
have no being apart from them. 2
But when Bowne went ahead to state that things
are "concreted formulas of action"
5
and to define the
nature of a thing as "that law or principle which
determines the form or character of its activity," 4
Bowne became more rationalistic than empirical, for a
law is a construct of reason rather than a datum of
experience. He stated the idealistic metaphysics of
personalism, however, veiy precisely
:
It finally appeared that the world of things
can be defined and understood only as we give
up the notion of an extra-mental reality
altogether, and make the entire world a thought
world; that is, a world that exists only
through and in relation to intelligence. ...
It £this viewj is idealism, as denying all
extra-mental existence and making the world
of objective experience a thought world
which would have neither meaning hor
possibility apart from intelligence. 5
The personal i st ic denial of the extramental and
substantial reality of things is continued by Knudson,
for example. He holds that "the only satisfactory way
to escape the materialistic or atheistic conclusion"
is by denying the "realistic thesis that matter and
material things are metaphysically real »r 6 He
2. Bowne, MET, 17, 25, 31.
3. Ibid., 31.
4. Ibid., 39.
5. Ibid., 422-423.
6. Knudson, POP, 374.
... .
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believes that asserting the phenomenality of matter
is the best way to "keep the physical in its place and
prevent it from tyrannizing over life as a whole." 7
If one is to "let the realistic camel's nose into the
p
tent of faith," there is danger, he believes, that
faith may be destroyed.
As Macintosh recognizes, persona!! idealism is the
doctrine "that 'oersons only are real' ... and that
nothing impersonal exists." ^ The empirical meaning
of the fact that "the personalist recognizes no extramental
impersonal reality" may be seen in the hypothesis
that physical energy is "the active will of the cosmic
mind," ^ is qualitatively like what is experienced.
2. Macintosh's objection
While other representatives might be selected to
illustrate the Idealistic metaphysics of personalism,
these are sufficient to show the personal! st ic denial
of extramental reality. Macintosh objects to this denial.
For examole
,
he grants that religion must be personal
and met anhys leal, but cannot see why it heeds to be
"personalistic in the sense that there is no reality
except what is personal." -1- 2 Why, he asks, "should we
be asked to believe that is the last analysis there Is
7. Knudson, POP, 375.
8. Ibid., 376.
9. Macintosh, PFW, 145n.
10. Brightman, Art. (1932)^, 461.
11. Brightman, POR, 232.
12. Macintosh, Art. (1926)
,
320.
..
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.
The idee that lothingnothing real except persons?"
except persons has metaohysical realisty seems to him
to be supported only by artificial personalistic
arguments.^-4 He is repelled by "the seemingly
unnecessary and unprovable dogma that persons are the
15
only realities." He criticizes the idealistic
metaphysics of personalism because of its thesis that
nothing impersonal exists "except as ideas dependent
upon the thought activity of persons." 16
Macintosh's rejection of the idealistic metaphysics
of personalism is clear in this brief survey. A more
complete exolanation and comparison of his view with
personalistic metaphysics apoear in the answer of
empirical personalists to his objection.
5. The answer of empirical personalists
In comparing Macintosh's and the empirical
personalist ’ s raetaohysics questions about both methodology
and conclusions arise. Special problems about methodology
include the relations of theology to metaphysics, of the
subjective to objective factors in metaohysical knowledge,
and of reason to one's metaphysics.
Macintosh recognizes the imoortance of metaphysics
and regards it as one of the two main parts of all
philosophy; criticism or the philosophy of values is
13. Macintosh, Art. (1924), 1370.
14. See supra, 102.
15. Macintosh, Art. (1926)2, 316.
16. Macintosh, PFW, 145n.
ft
.
.
*
• /
.
130
1 7the other. In this respect, he agrees with the
personallstic demand for metaphysics— ‘'it is only a
metaphysically interpreted experience that can serve
1 ft
the purpose of theology."
Although early in his philosophical studies
Macintosh recognized the revolt against metaphysics
in theology, he does not seek to establish a theology
without metaphysics. In fact. In his dissertation, reality
Is explained as an object to which adjustment is made:
The moment . .
.
[onej can no longer regard
God as Object to which he adjusts himself,
that moment the God-idea ceases to exercise
its function in the religious life. 20
Macintosh also sneaks of entering "into a metaphysical
home of our own." 2^ In the revolt against metaphysics
in theology he sees a quest not for anti-metaphysical
or non-metaphysical theology but for greater certainty.
He believes that Augustine's reaction, for example,
was “In the interest of religious certainty." 22 In
the first part of his dissertation Macintosh concludes
that the desire to regain religious certainty has
"animated the movements antagonistic to traditional
metaphysics." 23
17. Macintosh, Art. (1919)^, 129. Note that Macintosh
holds also that “there can be no adequate
metaphysics without theology," Macintosh,
Art. (1913) , 316.
18. Knudson, DOG, 195.
19. See his dissertation, RMT; cf. his article in
Runes (ed.), TCP, 197-219.
20. Macintosh, RMT, 84.
21. Macintosh, PFW, 204.
22. Macintosh, RMT, 18.
23. Ibid., 56.
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The distinction between this practical certainty
and the kind of certainty lacking in dualism has already
been seen. The certainty with which empirical
metapfysios must be compatible is not immediate certainty
but practical certainty. Macintosh associates the
reasonableness of Christianity with this practical
certainty:
... if ... the theology referred to can enrich
the doctrinal content of empirical metaphysics
where it most needs to be supplemented, and
can add to its certainty by furnishing
progressive verification of some of its most
important theories in practical religious
experience, the argument for the reasonableness
of Christianity will be more than sufficient. 2^
The basis of Macintosh's metaphysics in common
experience is illustrated also by his realism. He
describes his (personal) realism, for example, as
"the doctrine of the ultimate, permanent reality of
persons, human and divine, [*whichj is really derived
. 26from common experience. He criticizes forms of
both mysticism and new realism because they are dogmatic
"and a fantastical departure from critical common-sense.
In fact, his idea of 'the real problem before the
philosopher" is to combine the ethical and religious
values of theistic personal idealism, the common sense
of realism, and certain insights of functional
24. See Chanter VI, supra.
25. Macintosh, ROC, 250-251.
26. Macintosh, PFW, 264.
27. Macintosh, Art.UOlSO 1
,
140.
> v
'
.
.
.
.
.
psychology contained in the best pragmatism. 28
Macintosh's eclectic attempt to bring together
these different emphases characterizes his metaphysics,
as well as his epistemology. 29 He describes his "new
metaphysics" as:
... a rational synthesis of the well-established
results of the recognized sciences, together
with such metaphysical inferences as may be
logically drawn from c ritically established
values, and such elements of empirical theology
as may have fulfilled the conditions of
scientific verification. u
He describes his metaphysical method as "a synthesis
of the general results of a scientific investigation of
reality with such inferences as can be logically drawn
31from critically validated values." In comparing
his thought with Coe's, for examnle, he expresses his
idea of the relation of metaphysics and values:
There may be, and I believe there is, a
place for drawing metaphysical inferences
from the validity of certain values, but
clearly all such inference should be brought
within strict logical limits, and in any
case it would be well to verify scientifically
whatever can be thus verified and to distinguish
carefully between fully verified judgments and
other elements of reasonable belief, such as
postulates on the basis of values. 52
Macintosh's attempt to emphasize both synthesis and
sense-experience is illustrated in his critical monism,
which he believes is a synthesis of the rational and
28. Macintosh, Art. (1910)5, 656.
29. See Chapter V, supra.
30. Macintosh, PFW, 272.
31. Ibid., 230.
32. Macintosh, Art.(1927) 5
,
206-207.
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empirical procedures "in a truly scientific method,
i . e . , a method related to the discoveries of religious
experience as the recognised physical and other
objective sciences are related to the discoveries of
rZ'Z
sense-experience*"
This explains further the relation of theology
and metaphysics. Instead of being either opposed or
ryA
separated, they "are meant for mutual assistance." °
Metaphysical theology he believes is:
... a reasonable synthesis of empirical
religious knowledge and religiously essential
faith with our pertinent knowledge and with
the implications of critically established
value s. 33
Theology as reasonable and spiritually necessary faith
is a part of metaphysics, of reasonable belief about
reality. Theology as verified religious information
must harmonize with the other scientific information
on which empirical metaphysics is based. This means
that the development of science does not exclude and
is not excluded by religion .
^
The Christian idea of
God and religious experience should help one "put into
practice and profit by the best scientific information." 37
Macintosh’s ideal of a real theocracy is illustrated
33. Macintosh, Art
.
(1919)^, 144-145.
34. Macintosh in Runes (ed.), TCP, 219.
35. Macintosh, Art.(1942) 3 , 447.
36. See Macintosh’s article, "Theology in a
Scientific Age," in Yale University, ECS,
135-162. See also Hocking, SIG, and my review
of it, Morgan, Art. (1945).
37. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 218.
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where this happens with full liberty of conscience,
Metaphysics as this kind of synthesis of all empirical
sciences he believes must work for peace and harmony
with the scientific theology based on critical evaluation,^
Macintosh’s view of both the importance of metaphysics
for theology and of the essential harmony between theology
and all other empirical sciences is similar to much in
the vie?; of empirical personalists, although his synthetic
concept of metaphysics is another illustration of his
«
interest in consistency, at least consistency with
scientific facts, instead of coherence. His synthesis
is consistent, but it lacks the inclusive, systematic
nature of coherence. This means that Macintosh's
consistency does not necessarily lead him "further from
the strait and narrow path of truth, " as he warns that
consistency and system may if one's ohilosophy happens
to be fundamentally unsound otherwise. However,
consistency alone does not carry one far along the
path to truth, although it may not lead him away from
the path to truth. Indeed, consistency is necessary
for there to be truth, but it is inadequate as the sole
criterion.
But just as Macintosh actually used more than
consistency in his constructive epistemology, so
38. See Macintosh in Krumbine (ed.), POR, especially
100-119.
39. Macintosh, ROC, 249.
40. Macintosh, Art. (1922) 2
,
96.
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consistency is likewise inadequate in his metaphysics.
His failure to recognize the need for supplementing
consistency with the other aspects of coherence results
in metaphysical difficulties, just as it causes
confusion for him in eoistemology
.
The answer of empirical personal! sts to Macintosh’s
objection to the idealistic metaphysics of personalism
also calls attention to another point in' Macintosh'
s
metaphysical methodology. The relation of subjective
to objective factors of knowledge is an important
problem throughout Macintosh’s thought. It has already
been examined in his epistemology. Revelation, as the
rtdiscovery of dependable reality," is metaphysically
based on both subjective and objective factors. The
subjective is necessary for the objective to be
apprehended; the objective has to be manifested to
the sub jective.^ 2 In divine revelation also there must
be both subjective and objective, both discovery and
revelat ion.^ In this respect, perception of divine
reality is similar to perception of reality in general.
In agreement with the subjective idealists, for example,
Macintosh admits that every perceived object must be
"related to the perceiving subject during perception."
41. See supra, 58. See also Macintosh in Ferm (ed.),
CAT, I, 306.
42. See Macintosh, Art
.
(1942) ^ 24.
43. Ibid., 30-31.
44. Macintosh, Art.(1913) 2
,
311.
.,
.
.
Revelation is a fact whether this relation is recognized
or not* However, Macintosh believes that the subjective
factor is limited; before one undertakes to share his
subjective convictions, one should consider what is
theoretically possible. Only what knowledge “does not
entitle us to say may not be" may be asserted.
Here Macintosh's loyalty to consistency appears
again; the epistemological character of his realism is
also shown in his opposition to romanticism. He believes
that the testing of subjective intuitions of faith by
philosophical and scientific tests of value and truth
should result in logically justified or justifiable
A fi
conclusions. In Eucken's thought Macintosh sees the
"realistic" revolt against rationalistic idealism and
47
materialism. However, when Macintosh makes a
distinction between ontologizing and psychologizing,
depending on whether the moment is one of faith and
action or one of doubt, the real influence of the
psychological factors in Macintosh's thought apoears.
Although he makes this distinction in his early writings,
the influence of psychological factors on his metaphysics
persists through his whole thought. Actually there is
nothing that can logically make the moment of faith and
action ontological and the moment of doubt necessarily
45. Macintosh in Wiemar. and others, ITG, 57.
46. Macintosh in Wieman and Meland, APR, 531-532.
47. Macintosh, Art. (1910) 6
,
64.
48. Macintosh, RMT, 84.
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merely psychological. Both are psychological in their
relation to the acting subject, and objective reality
may be discovered in either a moment of doubt or one
of faith. Doubt and faith both must be tested before
being acceptable either as revelation or discovery of
reality.
Macintosh's idea of the relation of action and
faith also confuses the problem. Action results from
doubt actually as well as from faith, although the
oatterns of action may be different. The source of an
idea in a moment of doubt does not necessarily mean that
the idea cannot refer to ontological reality and be
ontologically real. Nor does the origin of an idea in
a moment of faith and action guarantee the ontological
truth to any idea. No immediacy, but only mediation
—
critical testing and relation to all exnerience— can be
a safe guide to ontological reality. The answer of
empirical personalists to Macintosh's objection to their
idealistic metaphysics points out that the result of
basing objectivity on psychological conditions of
subjectivity is an insufficient methodology for arriving
at metaphysical truth. Macintosh only partially frees
his thought from these subjective and psychological
fetters.
Another Important point in Macintosh* metaphysical
methodology is the relation of reason to metaphysics.
-.
.
.
*
.
.
.
-
Macintosh revolts against the interpretations of the
essence of Christianity by both the Hegelians and the
Ritschlians. Neither, he believes, can be “wholly
satisfactory." 49 To defend Christianity by showing
the truth of its religious values is inadequate, he
believes. The defense of Christianity merely because
of its reasonableness also is not enough. Empirical
personalists agree with Macintosh’s objection to the
latter, for example, because that interpretation makes
Christianity lack relation to experience and values.
This is a valid criticism of much Hegelianism,
although not so clearly true of the thought of Hegel
himself, who had a more adequate view of res son. 51
Einpirical personalists agree with Macintosh in revolting
against a philosophy based on the assumption that "the
real must be perfectly rational." 52 This rationalistic
assumption tends to distort perspective and to produce
abstract conclusions. Like Hegel, empirical personalists
strive to be concrete. By considering all experience
and things in their actual, living relations they search
for the most adequate interpretation of experience
.
Empirical personalist ic thinkers do not assume, for
example, that "complete knowledge and perfect morality
49. Macintosh, ROC, 11.
50. Ibid., 10-11.
51. Note, for example, the view of reason illustrated
by the discussion in Hegel, VPG, 545-578.
52. See Macintosh, ROC, 264.
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constitute the only really existing world." The
explanation of metaphysical reality as idealistic and
the denial of nonnersonal reality may be the most
reasonable interpretation of all experience without
being an assertion that reality is completely rational.
But the acknowledgement that experience may
include nonrat ional factors does not excuse one from
seeking the most adequate explanation possible. There
may be characteristics of experience which the empirical
personalist cannot consistently explain as completely
rational, but the place of a reasoned self-defense in
54
religion, for example, illustrates the demand that
practical living makes that one attempt to find as
reasonable an explanation as possible for even these
kinds of experiences. One needs to seek, for example,
the most reasonable explanation of those events which
cannot be explained completely in terms of general laws
but which are "to some extent being creatively determined
at the time." 55 To give up the attempt to explain
any part of experience as reasonably as possible merely
because all experience is not completely rational is to
acknowledge ultimate defeat in the attempt to explain
any experience and to fix an impassable gulf between
immediately certain "knowledge" and religious faith,
for example, an abyss into which both scientific and
53. See Macintosh, Art. (1910) 2 , 321.
54. Macintosh, ROC, 1.
55. Ibid., 272.
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religious knowledge sooner or later disapoear. The
attempt to give a reasonable explanation of all the
facts of experience is a daring, bold adventure, 56
but it is the only hope for any knowledge.
This attemot empirical personalists make to formulate
as reasonable as exolanation of all experience as possible
brings one to an examination of Macintosh’s metaphysical
conclusions. The basis of Macintosh’s criticism of
idealistic personalism, in his view that the personalistic
denial of extramental reality means epistemological
idealism, has already been seen, 5^ Macintosh’s realism--
“there is a physical reality which is also independently
real, and not mere idea or content of consciousness for
some conscious subject” 5®— is a revolt against
epistemological idealism, but his realism is not merely
epistemological. Macintosh is a realist not only in
asserting that there is objective reality; his doctrine
of the nature of objective reality is also realistic.
However, Macintosh does not state his metaphysical
realism as clearly and as extensively as his epistemo-
logical realism. One recent critic of Macintosh’s
thought has concluded, in fact, that Macintosh’ c critical
monism “evidently gives no inkling of the nature of the
Object as a metaphysical agent.' 1 Although Macintosh
56. See Brightman, Art. (1937), 169. See also
Macintosh, PFW, 40.
57. See Chapter VI, supra.
58. Macintosh, Art. (1932)^, 305.
59. Bertocci, Art. (1944), 52.
..
.
.
.
.
.
does emphasize the moral and religious qualities of
objective reality and although he is “critically"
reserved in his rejection of materialistic and
immaterialist ic monism and of metaphysical dualism, 60
the statements of his critical epistemological realism
and his discussions of metanhysical problems reveal
metaphysical realism.
In stating his epistemological realism, for
example, he strives to keep the door open for metaphysical
realism:
... the experienced object and the independently
existing thing may be numerically identical ,
even if to some extent qualitatively different . 6^
This attempt to maintain a qualitative difference in
combination with a numerical identity confuses one
about what Macintosh believes is the metaphysical
nature of objective reality.
The qualitative difference between the experienced
object and the independently existing thing, even though
the amount of difference may be small, shows the influence
of epistemological realism on Macintosh 1 s metaphysical
realism. By his recognition of minds and of conscious
experience of value, for example, Macintosh rejects a
thoroughgoing metaphysical realism, but he does not free
himself completely from metaphysical realism. He has
60. Se9, for example, Macintosh, TES, 249-251.
61. Macintosh, POK, 56. See supra, 67.

been cited as an illustration of those trained minds
which "cling tenaciously to the extramental and
substantial reality of things* " 62 The qualitative
difference between the experienced object and the
independently existing thing can only mean that
Macintosh thinks that the object as experienced is
different, to some extent, from its nature as
independently existing (although numerically identical
with it). Since he asserts this qualitative difference,
the nature of independent reality must to some extent
be qualitatively different from the object as experienced.
Even if independent reality is described as essentially
mental, the assertion in Macintosh's general epistemology
that it is “to some extent" qualitatively different must
mean that there are two* different kinds of reality,
namely, consciousness and that which is to some extent
different from experience. This is a qualitative,
metaphysical dualism.
Macintosh's realism is also reflected in the
assertion that one's theory should make room for "an
experiential (spiritualistic) philosophy of reality
including but transcending all human experience. 11 6:5
In other words, since the nature of objective reality
is to some extent different from the experienced object,
this qualitative difference shows Macintosh's realistic
62. Knudson, POP, ,'574.
63. Macintosh, Art. (1910)^, 135.
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metaphysical dualism, although the dualism becomes
merely relative dualism in the light of Macintosh's
view of a "common denominator."
While epistemological realism may not require a
metaphysical realism, Macintosh's doctrine of primary,
secondary, and tertiary qualities illustrates his
metaphysical as well as his epistemological realism.
Any description of qualities which begins with conscious
experience (a purposive process which presuoposes the
objective validity of purpose and removes from it
the qualities resulting from purpose as tertiary and
the qualities derived from sense-experience as being
secondary leave primary qualities which are different
in nature from any mind at least that may be known. Whether
the metaphysical nature of these primary qualities is
more accurately described as mental or as material is a
separate question. Macintosh's concept of the nature of
primary qualities at least is realistic; he believes that
they are qualitatively different from any mind ever
experienced.
His rejection of the immaterialistic view of the
nature of reality and his attempt to formulate a more
critical monism indicate that he does not regard physical
64. See infra, 148.
65. See Brightman, Art. (1938), 139.
66. See Macintosh, Art. (1910)^, 653, and POK,
328. See also supra, 78-79.
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reality as completely of the nature of mind .®7 At the
same time, Macintosh’s emphasis on reality as morally
and religiously adequate must not be overlooked. The
reign of law, for example, in suite of events which
are "being creatively determined at the time,” is
adequate for man’s needs and to teach him the dependability
of God .®8 Whatever else Macintosh may believe about
objective reality, he believes that the world of physical
69
energy is God’s physical body, God's world, although
he does not believe that God is completely immanent.
Macintosh's idea of God will be considered further
in the following chapter. It is sufficient here to
remember that for Macintosh God is not matter, but mind,
a conscious personal Will. Macintosh believes that the
creativity of the evolving universe and the rational,
mathematical order of events are "complementary aspects
of one and the same divine Being." For him, physical
and religious realism at least belong together.
Although he believes that his initial realistic position
is similar to Hocking’ s, Macintosh insists on being
empirical and asserting that one may not know at the
beginning that Reality as a whole is Absolute Mind. 7 ^
67 • See especially Macintosh, ROC, Chapter XIII.
Cf. Calhoun's "obdurate environmental factor,"
in Macintosh (ed.), RR, 197.
68 . Macintosh, ROC, 272.
69. Macintosh, Art. (1942) 43.
70. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 65.
71. Macintosh, Art. (1914)1, 33 .
72. Ibid., 42.
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In fact, Macintosh's view of the nature of reality
shows in many respects, beyond his recognition of the
adequacy of nature for religious and moral living, little
direct relation to his great spiritual insights and
ideas of God and religion, for example. Metaphysics
might almost be described as specialized and abstract.
The attempt to be critical has led to a series of
statements which do not logically contradict each other
or the facts of science and which are consistent with
his religious insights. They also tend to reflect the
common-sense basis of his realism.
Macintosh's explanation of the physical universe
as the physical body of God likewise shows his realisms
God may be thought of as having formed the
physical universe as his body and the law-
abiding processes of nature as his bodily
habits (that is, as the persisting outcome
of past creative activity), somewhat as man,
on a smaller scale and to a more limited
extent, has gradually by his conscious
activity built up some at least of his
bodily habits. '
Although Macintosh seeks to keep his metaphysics consistent
with his idea of God, the description of laws of nature as
bodily habits reveals his attempt to find some concretion
of activity into a pattern no longer purposively dynamic
but almost physically automatic. Note his explanation
of habit and creative activity:
73. Macintosh, Art. (1932)^, 305.
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I am quite willing to consider the suggestion
that, as much of what we call "our own"
unconscious habitual activity was in an
earlier situation consciously originated,
so also cosmic habit may have been consciously
and even teleologically originated ''in the
beginning" and at various times since the
primordial beginning; but this does not
necessarily mean that each and every
subsequent instance of physical causation
involves conscious, personal creativity at
the time. 74
Macintosh believes that Butler's view "that many
processes in the cosmic organism are analogous to habits
consciously formed but unconsciously followed" is preferable,
for example, to Hartshorne’s panpsychism. 76 Although
the relation of mind to body is not treated as an
explicit "problem" by Macintosh, his views are suggested
by his ideas of habit and the relation of evolution to
creative activity. 76 He does suggest that "with a
non-material view of mind and an activistic interpretation
of sensation and perception" one should be able "to
accept interaction with less 'difficulty 1 than would
be involved in believing that all matter is psychical
and that all mind is physical and even material." 77
However, when he turns to a common denominator "less
than mind and more than matter" and suggests that
74. Macintosh, Art. (1940) 2
,
48-49.
75. Macintosh, Art. (1942) ?
,
448.
76. Macintosh's idea of the relation of creativity
to evolution is expressed in one of the numerous
illustrations in his still unpublished volume,
A Plain Man 1 3 Soliloquy .
77. Macintosh, Art
• (1927)1, 136.
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cosmic process partakes of a ’'certain primordial
rationality, or order" which develops "into actuality
our own potential rationality," the problems of
habit-formation and of the nature of responsibility
for cosmic habits bring up the problem of evil which is
considered later in this dissertation.
Macintosh’s reference to a cosmic body with an
indwelling mind 79 likewise is not only anthropomorphic
but also illustrates, like the common-sense realism of
Reid, for example, the importance of physical
terminology. Although the relation of the ideas of
centers and fields of force to a religiously significant
concept of God may not immediately be clear, Macintosh’s
appeal to the interpretation of energy as activity is
certainly not contradictory to the best insights of
modern physics, nor to personalism either.^ 2 Macintosh
does not hold a static, atomistic concept of matter. His
view is consistent with the most developed insights of
science. It is the concept, of matter in an activistic
form; Macintosh uses it to explain "the abiding effect
78. Macintosh, Art. (1940)^, 50.
79. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 66.
80. See Chapter II, supra. Cf. Macintosh, POK, 215-214.
Note, however, Macintosh replies to Bewkes’s article,
"Common Sense Realism," In Bixler and others, NRE,
that "so far as I can recall or discover, I have not
been Influenced by Thomas Reid, at least directly, at
a single point," Macintosh, Art. (1939) 2
,
386.
81. See, however, Melzer, ECM, 39n. Cf. Compton, Jeans,
Eddington, etc. Note that Macintosh says "our most
scientific view of matter" is that it Is "something
which affects other things," Macintosh, Art . (1913 )^-, 40.
82. See Bowne, MET, Part I.
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of the past work of God 11 as qualitatively different
from "his present creative work." 83 He expresses this
as the body and past works of God. It indicates his
dualistic realism in metaphysics.
His metaphysical realism is also revealed by his
further explanation of mind and matter. He wishes to
accept neither the dualistic affirmation of both mind
and matter nor a monistic metaphysics which reduces
either to the other. However, Macintosh's suggestion
that matter and psychical activity are forms of reality 84
has a striking similarity with the famous doctrine of
Spinoza in his Ethlca Ordine Geometrlco Demonstrata
that mind end matter, substantia cognltans and sub3t anti
a
extense
.
are two of the attributes of one and the seme
substance. 85 In fact, Macintosh himself asks if mind
and matter may not "both be reduced to a common denominator, " 86
which is "more than matter or physical energy on the one
hand, and yet something less than mind on the other." 87
The similarity to Spinoza's thought is illustrated
especially by the suggestion that the mental and the
material are "act ivlt ies--although differing activities"
of reality, or "activities and their products." 88
Macintosh, however, seeks to deny parallelism, because
83. Macintosh, Art.(1932) 4
,
305.
84. Macintosh, Art. (1919)1, 158.
85. See Spinoza, WOR, II, 86-87.
86. Macintosh, ROC, 254.
87. Macintosh, TES, 251.
88. Macintosh, ROC, 254-255.
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he believes that man is a free agent and consciousness
89
a causal factor in his bodily behavior.
Thus Macintosh's metaphysics is an activistic,
qualitatively dualistic realism. Both mind and matter
are active, but mind acts in certain ways and matter in
certain other ways . 90 His activistic explanation may
'‘soften down 1 * the contrast between mind and matter, but
the assertion of extramental reality makes his explanation
of mind and matter still a metaphysical dualism. This
kind of activistic, qualitatively dualistic realism,
indeed, may point toward the creative element in emergent
evolution 91 and toward man's responsibility in bringing
the world to its highest possibilities
,
92 but it fails to
establish more than a metaphysical dualism, and possible
parallelism, between the activities of mind and those of
matter.
Thus the dualism of mind and matter is removed only
to return as a dualism of the activities of mind end the
activities of matter. Macintosh seeks to state a
non-contradictory metaphysics, and his activistic concept
of all reality succeeds only in removing the dualism of
mind and matter one step farther. Indeed, Macintosh has
abolished the first dualism and still '‘remained upon
89. Macintosh, ROC, 258.
90. Macintosh, PFW, 240.
91. Macintosh, Art. (1929)1, 233 .
92. Macintosh, Art. (1942) 2
,
45.

essentially the same common-sense basis."
While this metaphysical activistic dualism may
apoear more religiously adequate than the old dualism
of mind and matter, it actually leaves the metaphysical
foundation of religion in the same dilemma. An active
nonmental reality means a qualitative metaphysical
dualism just as certainly as passive nonmental reality.
Either interpretation of extramental reality shows an
acceptance of some dogma regarding experience. If the
empirical method means an impartial examination of all
experience, both of reason in the activity of one’s will
and of the consciousness of the physical world (including
his own physical body), no empirical basis is discovered
for and no real advantage is gained by regarding reality
as "more than matter ... and ... less than mind." The
experience of mind is actually not adequately explained
by less than mind; referring it to something less than
mind as its cause makes it less than the mind that is
experienced at least. Also matter is not empirically
explained as an activity of something more than matter
and less than mind and to some extent qualitatively
different from experience.
Unless one departs from the only kind of reality he
ever experiences, he can never claim knowledge of
nonmental reality. A doctrine of extramental reality
93. Macintosh, Art. (1919)^, 150.
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may possibly be formulated as a set of logically
consistent statements, but it cannot be a concrete,
adequate, coherent interpretation of experience.
The attempt to defend a qualitative dualism
which supports extramental reality is less empirical
than the attempt to formulate a metaphysics which does
not assert that there is something qualitatively
different from all that one experiences. The assertion
that there is extramental reality is actually a leap
to what is qualitatively different from all experience.
The refuge of nonmental reality may be regarded as a
better explanation of experience then loyalty to the
only kind of reality which can be experienced, but
this refuge itself is not empirical. Empirical personalist
believe that one is both more empirical and more reasonable
if he refuse to resort in this refuge and if he seeks
to base his metaphysics on the kind of reality that he
does experience. While Macintosh seeks to be monistic
in his theory of knowledge and strives to develop his
general epistemology, at least, on the basis of immediate
certainty, empirical personalists point to the dualism
involved in all reference and deny epistemological
monism. While Macintosh admits a metaphysical dualism
and affirms extramental reality, empirical personalists
hold 8 qualitatively monistic metaphysics and believe
...
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that experience may be explained more adequately if
one does not take refuge in extramental reality*
This is the answer empirical personalists make
to Macintosh’s objection to the idealistic metaphysics
of personalism. Macintosh's idee pf God and his criticism
of the empirical personal! stic solution of the problem
of evil now remain to be considered. They emphasize
certain distinctive features of empirical personalism
in the concluding section of this dissertation on
Macintosh’s criticism of personalism.
..
'
.
CHAPTER VIII
THE IDEA OF GOD
The idea of God is important in Macintosh’s
criticism of personalism not because of his attack on
the personalistic idea of God but because of the relation
of his idea of God to the realistic monism in his
criticism of personalism. Macintosh’s view of the nature
of God actually is like the personalistic idea of God
in many respects. The discussion of Macintosh's idea of
a personal God in the first part of this chapter shows
this similarity. The second part of this chapter considers
problems raised by the relation of a personal God to
Macintosh’s epistemology and metaphysics, to his monism
and his realism.
1. Macintosh's idea of a personal God
Macintosh's idea of God shows his fundamental
empiricism. Any idea of God, personal or impersonal,
is dogmatic and arbitrary unless it is related to
experience. Although personalists may reject Macintosh's
monistic epistemology and his dualistic metaphysics,
empirical personalists agree with his assertion that
experience is not to be neglected in formulating one's
idea of God. Theology necessarily is the intellectual
-'
.
.
.
.
.
-
An
expression of experience, a product “of personal
appreciation of experienced religious value • “ ^
essential proposition of empirical personalism is that
truth about God, for example, can be found only by an
empirical encroach, in which reason and experience are
not separated and one or the other treated abstractly,
but in which “reason is a function of experience and
experience is a movement toward rational totality." ^
Macintosh and empirical personalists agree in starting
with religious experience and religious values, for
example. The similarity in their ideas of God shows
the effect of this empirical approach.
Macintosh’s idea of revelation also illustrates
his empirical method at work. A religious intuition
often emerges “as an effect of overt religious experi-
ence and the discovery of a divinely operating reality." ?
Macintosh would purge the old theological meanings from
the concept of revelation and blaze a new approach which
recognizes that those who are surest of God’s goodness
and most keenly aware of evils, for example, may and often
do consciously experience “a divine power lifting them
above these evils." ^ In his idea of revelation he
refuses to follow the path of Barth, for Macintosh
believes that revelation in both religion and
1. Macintosh, PFW, 178.
2. Brightmsn, Art. (1937), 155.
3. Macintosh, Art.(1942)2, 31.
4. Macintosh, Art. ( 1913 ) 2, 312.
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sense-experience "is not a different process from
5discovery. Revelation itself is an experience of
discovery, of discovering Divine Reality and Power.
For Macintosh the divine initiative already exists as
a condition. The important thing in revelation is
discovery. To the Christian, for example, the potential
revelation in Christ becomes a living reality only as
it is "discovered by us anew. "
6
The place of experience in relation to his idea of
God leads Macintosh to emphasize God as spiritually
experienced. The spiritually experienced God is the
God of which the religious person can "be more scientifically
certain " than one can be of "the cosmological God of
V
speculative surmise." Macintosh agrees with Mathews
that "a metaphysically exact definition of God is ...
8
‘less basic’ than 'personal relations with personality.'"
His emphasis on the relation of God to experience and
moral idealism has been criticized because it leads to
the "inevitable outcome" of leaving God out altogether.^
For Macintosh, however, it means that God as the power
that gives victory over sin when man fulfills certain
5. Macintosh in Wieraan and Meland, APR, 529.
6. Macintosh, Art. (1942)
,
57. Note that Macintosh
believes that the fate of Christianity "is not
bound up with the actuality of any one reputed
fact of history," Macintosh, Art
.
(1911,1912)
,
372.
7. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 257.
8. In Macintosh (ed.), RR, vi. See also Mathews,
GIG, passim.
9. Wieman in Wieman and others, ITG, 206.
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conditions is "an existent, accessible, and
scientifically knowable reality." His argument
for both the existence and the nature of God is based
on experiences of religious values. He considers both
the existence and the nature of God as empirical problems.
Macintosh defends his idea of God as being an idea
of the God who has actually operated in religion. Not
an abstract God supported by arguments but a realistic
view of God is "of crucial importance for religion." 11
He rejects the charge of wishful thinking and distinguishe
between "wishful" and "hopeful "thinking. He believes that
his belief in God is hopeful, because it is reasonable;
it is practical and theoretically permissible, possible
both logically and practically . When God is regarded
as adequate to justify moral optimism and the experience of
moral optimism is regarded as valid, Macintosh argues,
the metaphysical proposition that God exists is undeniable
Since such a belief is both logically and psychologically
possible and the experiences of religious values supoort
it, Macintosh believes that the Christian, for example,
has "the moral right to believe that the personal God
he needs, a God great enough and good enough for his
worship and trust, actually exists." ^
10. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 257.
11. Ibid., 294.
12. Ibid., 156.
15. Macintosh, PFW, 200.
14. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 181.
•.
Prom the existence of God Macintosh oroceeds to
his idea of the nature of God, although does not always
treat these two ideas, related as they are in his thought,
in the same order. In his idea of the nature of God
also experience is a vital factor for Macintosh. The God
that experience demands is not an abstract, argument-
suooorted God. Prom experience Macintosh gains his
definition of God as “that ... with reference to which
we are absolutely dependent." ^ The aim of his
Theology as an Empirical Science is to formulate a
scientific set of laws about the "dependable and
presumably universally accessible divine reality in and
through religious experience." rie believes that
religious experience at its best verifies his minimum
definition of God;
... a Dependable Factor which makes a desirable
difference In human experience on condition of
a certain religious attitude which may be
called "the right religious adjustment."
This concept of a discovered Dependable Factor is used
as a step in Macintosh’s attempt to state in scientifically
acceptable manner what God is by means of critically
examining and testing experience, especially religious
experience.
15. Macintosh In Newton(ed.), MIG, 139.
16. Macintosh in Perm (ed.), GAT, I, 306. Note also
his definition of God as “the Object of religious
dependence and Source of religious deliverance,"
in Wieman and others,
r
ITG, 295.
17. Macintosh, Art. (1926)^, 318.
.
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Experience is the means by which he also seeks to
describe the nature of God more fully. For example,
the God of experience is not infinite "in any sense
of the word that would involve self-contradiction."
The iraoortant thing for Macintosh is that God not be
finite “in any objectionable 1 ' way, that God be great
enough for religious experience, for absolute, trustful
dependence.
The relation of the world to God required by this
empirical approach to God’s nature is not necessarily
that suggested in Macintosh’s metaphysics. The implicat ions
of Macintosh's thought on this point are further seen in
19his views on the problem of evil. For experience,
however, the important requirement is that God's nature
be such that God is adequate:
... a God great enough and favourable enough
to our true well-being to meet all our
imperative religious needs. 20
God's power in the world must be such that God has
"adequate control in the interests of his relation to
men." 21 Beyond this, Macintosh seeks to keep his
statements free from logical contradictions. In relation
to God’s creative control in evolution, for examole, he
believes a vitalistic concent may be maintained as l^ng
18. Macintosh, PFW, 200.
19. See Chapter IX, infra.
20. Macintosh, PFW, 205.
21. Macintosh, TES, 195. Note how Macintosh hands
the problems “over- to metaphysics," ibid., 195-
204; cf. Chapter VII, supra.
'.
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as God's control is ''sufficient to guarantee the
ultimate emergence of beings with a capacity for
unending spiritual progress*" 22
Moral and religious experiences mean not only that
God is adequate in power and wisdom but also that his
character is dependable. The God of experience must
be moral. He is striving toward a definite moral end
C i *T
"favourable to the true well-being of humanity."
In the Christian religious tradition Macintosh believes
that this means the sufficiency of God's moral character
takes the form of "realization of the personal moral
ideal of Jesus," 24 who is an object of Christian faith
because "he was himself a subject of faith and hope and
love." 25
Macintosh believes that there are two kinds of
actual entities that offer possibilities when one seeks
to state the metaphysical nature of this God of experience.
They are minds and bodies. He believes that "God may be
and (for faith) must be Mind." 26 The God demanded by
experience, which logical may be and psychologically
and religiously must be, is not possible if God is merely
matter or body. The God empirically demanded and logically
consistent with scientific knowledge for Macintosh is
22. Macintosh, PFW, 251.
23. Ibid., 228.
24. Macintosh, Art. (1915), 197.
25. Macintosh, Art. ( 1930) 2
,
17.
26. Macintosh in Ferm (ed.), CAT, I, 318.
*.
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"an essentially personal God, adequate in wisdom,
goodness and power." 2^
Macintosh recognizes the implication of this
concept of a personal God in his first empirical
approach;
Indeed the essentials of personality in the
religious Object have been either clearly
implied or remotely indicated throughout
practically the whole of our theological
procedure, beginning with our first
collation of the empirical data. 28
In other words, for Macintosh a personal God is implicit
in the very empirical aporoach and attempt to describe
God. A personal God Is necessary to explain religious
experience
.
Macintosh believes that the humanistic interpretation
of the God-idea as an optional symbol for social values,
or even the natural and human factors which support such
values. Illustrates the result of a slight modification
of the "single all-inclusive conscious Experience" of
absolute idealism, of "naturalism still wearing the
halo of theism." 29 He seeks to avoid any positivistic
prejudice In interpreting experience and believes that
religious experience In particular cannot be explained
adequately apart from a personal God.
The central meaning of personality for Macintosh is
moral will. He describes religious experience not as
27. Macintosh in Wieman and others, ITG, 103.
28. Macintosh, TES, 189.
29. Macintosh in Wieman and Meland, APR, 327.
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emotions; it is:
... that moral conversion of the will which
is no mere "subjective state of consciousness"
but a principle of overt behavior, observable
in the changes it makes in the objective
human and natural world.
He .believes that personality is, "essentially, a being
which is conscious, self-conscious, snd consciously
self-directing." 51 The God demanded by practical
religion has these qualities. The way to discover
God’s will is;
... to find out through cultured aooreciation
the relative value of ends and through
scientific observation, supplemented where
necessary by experiment, the relative
effectiveness of the various available ways
and means.'^
Vihen practical religion becomes conscious of its relation
to a personal God, it "becomes less and less magical
'z rz
and more and more moral." A personal God and
moral religion in the modem critical world, he believes,
are logically the concave and convex sides of the
same curve; one implies the other, and one develops
as the other is expanded. Macintosh expresses this
relation as a conclusion about the nature of God--
"the verdict of practical experimental religion is
unambiguously for the essential personality of God."
30. Macintosh, Art
.
(1933) °, 531.
31. Macintosh in Newton (ed.), MIG, 151. See also
Macintosh, PFW, 257, and TES, 189-190.
32. Macintosh, Art. (1932)^, 165.
33. Macintosh, Art. (1914)^, 41.
34. Macintosh, HFW, 253.
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God as personal has a far-reaching meaning for
experience. Macintosh sees in the personality of God
that which enables one "to harmonize and hold together
*T C
the ultimate values of morality and religion." ' If
one recognizes human values and explains them in relation
to a God who is responsible for conserving them, God
must be personal; as Macintosh agrees, it is hardly
credible that "God should be a mere unconscious automaton." 36
Moral and religious experiences require a personal God
for their most adequate explanation. This "reconciliation
of religion and morality," 37 in turn becomes an "extra"
argument for the personality of God. The two go together.
Macintosh does not overlook the possibility that
God may be superpersonal. However, he admits that he
is "at a loss to make any further reasonable suggestion,"
when anyone attempts to go "beyond the concept of
personality," because it is impossible to have a positive
70
concept of a kind of reality higher than personality. 0
In this respect, he accepts the view of Lotze that only
God Is completely personal. *59 To those who point to the
purposive aims beyond the comorehension of human
intelligence as indicating that God is superpersonal
Macintosh replies by asking why it is necessary "to
,35. Macintosh in WIeman and others, ITG, 299.
36. Ibid., 170.
37. Macintosh in Newton (ed. ), MIG, 151.
38. Macintosh, ROC, 77.
39. Macintosh, TES, 189. See also Brightman,
POR, 368-369.
..
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characterize purposive aims, which we human beings
do not comprehend, as being superpersonal* 11 40 His
central objection to the concept is that it is
unintelligible; the meaning of '•superpersonal " is
not known. There is great danger that the attempt
to describe God as qualitatively superpersonal may
actually result in making God impersonal
*
41
His concept of God's truth further illustrates the
relation of his idea of a personal God to adequacy for
religious experience. Macintosh believes there is
"no manifestly valid religious reason” why God's truth
4 9
should no be essentially the same as man's. Religious
experience does not require a "timeless, changeless,
absolute complete representation.” If the content of
one "eternally-complete immediate experience” is an
"eternally-complete reality," representation is not
needed. Religious experience supports only the view
that God's truth is representation that is always
sufficient for satisfactorily mediating whatever purposes
God has in view. Macintosh believes that anything more
results from dogmatism, and both he and empirical
personalists seek to purge dogmatism from theology.
Eknpirical personalists make a special effort to purge
dogmatism from all knowledge.
40. Macintosh, Art. (1923), 654.
41. See Macintosh, PFW, 254. Cf. Brightman, POR,
236-237.
42. Macintosh, POK, 456.
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Macintosh gives his idea of a personal God religious
application in what he calls right religious adjustment,
Prayer, for example, instead of being merely a request
that God do more than he is doing, means;
. .. serious individual self-examination in
the presence of God, with a view to finding
out whether everything that should be done
by oneself is being done. 3
Macintosh sees religious adjustment as relating oneself
to a possible and reasonable interpretation of the facts
and values of human experience, to a God who is
"immanently ... a Higher Life, and socially ... an
44
ever present Perfect Friend.'
Macintosh's idea of God as personal removes from
his concept of right religious adjustment the mechanical
and impersonal connotation that has arisen around
"adjustment" in recent ohilosophy , 46 Notice the personal
"elements" or "phases" he emohasizes in a right religious
adjustment
:
Spiritual aspiration ... concentration ... of
attention and of religious adjustment toward
God ... surrender ... absolute dedication of
one’s self to the spiritual idea and to God
... appropriation ... the deliberate and
confident taking from God ... response ...
removal of inhibitions ... persistence. 46
43. Macintosh, PR, 168.
44. Macintosh, Art • (1926) 1 - , 471.
45. Macintosh describes prayer as right religious
adjustment in which God’s will may be done "not
only to us and about us, but in us and through
us," Macintosh, Art. (1930)
,
16.
46. Macintosh, PFW, 217-218. Gf. Macintosh’s
description of his own "right religious adjustment,
in Ferm (ed.), GAT, I, 282.
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This scientific description of his concept of right
religious adjustment in connection with his idea of a
personal God is indeed powerful dynamic for religious
living* His idea of religious adjustment makes religious
experience "an experience of moral and spiritual
inspiration* rt The observation that such experience is
not one "of primary religious knowledge" 47 points
out a weakness in Macintosh's epistemological monism
which enters into his religious epistemology. 4®
The aoplication of Macintosh's idea of a personal
God to right religious adjustment shows the empirical
nature of Macintosh's thought. This sketch of Macintosh'
idea of a personal God indicates various ways in which
his idea of God is like the personalistic concept of
God. Empirical personalists use a method very similar
to Macintosh's in explaining God in relation to experi-
ence, but the relation of Macintosh's idea of God to
his epistemological and his metaphysical conclusions
raises problems that empirical personalists solve by
seeking to be more coherently empirical. Some of these
problems now demand attention.
2. A personal God and Macintosh's philosophical views
The relation of Macintosh's epistemology and
metaphysics to his idea of a personal God is shown by
47. Bertocci, Art. (1944), 55. See also
Chapter IV, supra.
48. See Chapter VI, supra.
.«
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his ideas especially of revelation, the unity of God,
and worship and God’s Dhysical body.
Revelation is a broad concept for Macintosh. It
may or may not have direct religious significance. He
speaks, for example, of the general revelation of the
presence of "a functionally divine reality, working in
many ways toward a unitary and ideal end." In relation
to this general kind of revelation he observes reality
functioning " as if intelligently and with moral purpose.
In his discussion of various kinds of revelation, he
describes "general general" revelation as;
... the objective manifestation and subj'ective
apprehension of existence and meaning, reality
and value, without any reference to their
religious
involved. 5
In the more "special" kinds of revelation the distinctively
religious significance of revelation and its relation
51to a personal God becomes clear.
,
The influence of
his monistic epistemology on his idea of revelation
appears especially in his discussions of the relation
of experience to the ideas of various thinkers about
God.
Hocking’ s Idea of God, for example, an Absolute
Mind known by an idealistic interpretation of the
physical world, is for Macintosh "simply an idol, a
49. Macintosh In Wieman and Mel and, APR, 330.
50. Macintosh, Art. (1942) 2, 23.
51. See ibid., espeically 23-38.
significance being necessarily
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’concept without intuition,’ a fiction of human
thought," and not the true God known through criticel,
52
scientific religious experience. Macintosh recognizes
Hocking ’s argument only if It is an argument from values,
an argument that where there is the right idea of God
God may be known to exist, "because we cannot have the
right idea of God except as it is based upon and
legitimately derived from a genuine experience of God . ”
Macintosh’s reinterpretation of miracle also shows
the significance of his Idea of revelation. For Macintosh
miracle is special providence; it is sin event to which
one can point as the purposive act of God. Macintosh's
attempted monism, however, aooears in the assertion that
such events must "take place within our own experience,"
and are immediately known, are knowledge. Monism Is
replaced by epistemological dualism wherever immediate
experiences are related to or interpreted as "the
purposive acts of God," for anything can be known
immediately and monistically as the purpose of God
actually only if God's purpose is completely identified
with the individual's present experience. Macintosh's
52. Macintosh, Art
.
(1914) ' 80.
53. Ibid., 79.
54. Macintosh, Art. (1914)
,
554.
55. Note that Macintosh suggests that anyone who
has *k ’hunch' as to what God's will is" should
test "his subjective impression" by the criterion
given above, see supra, 161, Art. (1932)3, 165.
4.
.
.
‘
.
-
• t .
,
.
.
idea of a personal God permits neither subjective
sopilsism, however, nor a denial of the reality of
the experiencing self.
Yet Macintosh’s distinction between historical
knowledge and direct experience of God is very important.
No amount of historical information can be substituted
for experience of God. Religious faith withers and
dies when abstracted from experience. But no amount
of direct experience is knowledge, even if history is
used "as a stepping-stone toward, not as a substitute
for, direct knowledge of God." 56
"Direct knowledge" is a contradiction of terms .
^
Only experience may be direct or immediate. All knowledge,
including knowledge both of purpose and of God, must
be mediated. Macintosh’s idea of the nature of God as
personal is not epistemologically immediate. He begins
with immediate experience of values, but he cannot have
knowledge until there is mediation, until there is
interpretation and critical explanation. A deeper
experience of reality may be important in seeking God
and some of God’s aspects may be "accessible, under
co
certain conditions, to human experience , " but
whether or not these are the religiously important
aspects, they are never directly accessible to human
knowledge
.
56. Macintosh, Art. (1914)^, 548.
57. See Chapter IV, supra.
58. Macintosh in King (ed.), HAB, 71.
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Macintosh’s idea of a personal God is derived
from the relation of God to human experience, not from
his epistemological monism. God as personal, especially
the religious aspects of God, can never be immediately
known; .knowledge d pends on reference, which is not
epistemologically monistic. Macintosh’s idea of the
relation of a personal God to experience, however, will
not be soon outdated. Empirical personalists, for
example, agree with his assertion:
... there can be no ... valid theology
v/hich does not rest upon definite religious
experience, such as requires an active
adjustment to the religious Object,
rather then a mere recognition of the
existence, on grounds more or less
philosophical, of an independent
Spiritual Life.^ 9
The significant difference between Macintosh and
empirical personalists is in epistemology and metaphysics.
Macintosh’s idea of a personal God is not derived from
his epistemological monism, from direct knowledge, but
from direct and religious experience, which is interprebed.
his knowledge of God’s nature is based on interpretation,
not merely the fact of religious experience.
Macintosh defends his idea of God from humanistic
attempts to undermine it through showing that finding
a practical motivation or a plausible psychological
explanation for an idea does not mean that there is no
59. Macintosh, Art. (1913) 2
,
316.
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"objective reality to which the idea corresponds.”
His recognition of the possibility of both subjective
and objective bases of knowledge and his suggestion
that religion and the idea of God "may well be an
escape t^o reality” resemble the epistemological
dualism of personalism.^ But v;hen seeking to return
to his epistemological monism, Macintosh points out
that to conclude, because one's idea of God is a
projection, that God is a projection is to commit
"the same fallacy as underlies subjective idealism
in general .
”
A second major oroblem raised by the relation of
Macintosh's idea of a personal God to his realistic
monism concerns the unity of God. A personal God must
be a unity, and Macintosh casts the hypothesis that
there is more than one God or anything except unitary
divine reality aside as unnecessary for providing
sufficient reason for moral optimism.^ He believes
that it is at least a reasonable surmise that all the
instances of a Divine Factor are "in some very real
sense one and the same Divine Reality.
^
Macintosh believes that God as the Father in
Christianity is essentially identical, at least religiously,
60. Macintosh in King (ed. ), HAB, 60.
61. Macintosh, Art
.
(1930) 1
,
124.
62. See Chaoter IV, supra.
63. Macintosh in King (ed.), HAB, 61.
64. Macintosh, ROC, 77.
65. Macintosh, Art. (1929)
,
168.
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with the Divine Reality “so fully present in the historic
Jesus" an<j i s the Reality on which one depends in
religious experience. In other words, the God that
logically may be (God the Father), the God that must
be for moral optimism and Jesus's revelation to be
valid, and the God that is discovered in religious
67
experience are essentially identical. J ‘ Macintosh
concludes that "the presumption ... is that the Conserver
of Values, the God of moral optimism, is one and the
same Divine Being as the God of revelation, of religious
z2 Q
experience, of moral salvation."
This "presumption" is related to Macintosh's idea
of a personal God. The unity of divine reality, however,
fiQis not established by monistic epistemology. 17 Macintosh'
empirical method, rather than his monistic epistemology,
is the basis of this "presumption." In his epistemology
there are factors, such as his representational pragmatism
also which tend to support the unity of God, but these
70factors are not logically a part of monism.
Two other special problems arise in relation to
Macintosh's metaphysics and his idea of a personal God.
One concerns worship; the other is about Macintosh's
66. Macintosh, Art.(1914) 4
,
566.
67. See Macintosh in Wieraan and others, ITG, 297-298.
68. Macintosh in Newton (ed.), MIG, 154.
69. See discussions of God's transcendent aspects,
for example, in Chapter VI, supra.
70. See sunra, especially 81-82, 90-95,
for discussion of the epistemological dualism
of representational pragmatism.
•
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idea of the physical world as God's physical body.
The empirical aooroach through religious experience
emphasizes the importance of worship. Macintosh's
idea of the highest kind of worship is that which
recognizes God as intrinsic value, the worth of God for
his own sake. In fact, Macintosh's definition of worship
as contempation of God as end x suggests the ideal
Spinoza expressed in his Ethlca of the intellectual
7plove of God, amor del intellectualls . Macintosh's
empiricism is again illustrated in the recognition
that this act of worship tends toward an immediate
feeling of the reality and presence, as well as the
religious sufficiency, of God. Even in worship, however,
his empiricism does not actually mean epistemological
monism, for worship does not require that experience
be knowledge.
The relation of worship to Macintosh’s philosophical
position creates a further complication. Worship, as he
7 -z
recognizes, requires an object that is ideal. This
ideal and the moral and religious values come together
in a morally perfect Will. God as such a will is a
Person whose perfect will, his ideal,'’’is not yet fully
realized in man and in the world." ^ This means that
man must use his best scientific knowledge (in religidn
71. Macintosh, Art. (1930)^, 945.
72. See Spinoza, WOR, II, 263.
73. Macintosh In Wieman and others, ITG, 299-300.
74. Macintosh, PR, 179.
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he must unite evangelical faith and vitality with
rational self-control -75) to work "toward the end
set by the will of God* ” 76
Yet Macintosh’s epistemological and metaphysical
realism leads him to emphasize God as Absolute Reality
77
as well as Absolute Idesl . '
'
He says that religion
comes to itselfi
... in the recognition of and devotion
to an object that is supremely ideal snd
supremely real, an Ideal Reality, an object
at once of love and adoration and of
dependence and trust. 78
In fact, an overlapping of epistemological and metaphysical
realism appears in his object of worship. For example,
Macintosh believes that in worship the object of religious
trust must be real and regards normal worship as pointing
toward the union of ideality and reality in the idea of
God as the Ideal Reality. The divine subsists as an
ideal "in order that it may be made to exist as a
79progressively Immanent reality." One’s philosophy
of religion, he believes, must be an Idealistic realism
or realistic Idealism:
75. Macintosh in Krumbine (ed.), POR, 105.
76. Macintosh, SR, 130.
77. Macintosh, PFW, 255.
78. Macintosh, Art. (1933) 3
,
532. Note also the
description of the "true idea of God" which
Macintosh says "is derived from religious
experience at its best," Macintosh, GWW, 12.
79. Macintosh in Newton (ed.), MIG, 143. Cf
.
Macintosh, Art. (1931)^, 25, where the "good
essence" of Christianity is described as "as
objective and as universally valid as the
spiritual ideal, as truth snd the good-will
and the brotherhood of man.
"
V.
. .
.
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... rationally idealistic as to ideals and
as to what God must be believed to be, but
empirically realistic in its resolution to
get from experience with reality whatever
confirmation is possible as to the actual
existence of an adequate Reality for our
absolute devotion and trust. 80
But he hastens to add that it is not in the sense "in
which absolute idealism speaks of ’ideal reality' that
we are committed to the use of that term." ^
Worship as a religious experience supoorts Macintosh
idea of a personal God. When related to his epistemo-
logical and metaphysical thought, however, worship of
a personal God emphasizes some of the problems in
Macintosh’s search for objectivity.
A second complex problem in relation to Macintosh’s
metaphysics and his idea of worship and a personal God
is his activistic, dualistic description of the physical
world as the physical body of God. The metaphysical
difficulties were considered in the previous chapter.
The present problem is the relation of this metaphysical
view to the personality of God.
Macintosh’s empirical approach severs his idea of
the personality of God from any direct relation to
speculative metaphysics. His method here, as in relation
to the transcendent aspects of divine reality, is
described as he suggest s--by finding out from experience
80. Macintosh, Art. (1939) S 391-392. Cf. Macintosh,
Art. (1931
)
4
,
23-24.
81. Macintosh, PFW, 256.
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whatever one can, then seeking to determine "what can
be done toward thinking into unity these different
aspects of divine reality. " In his attempt to
follow this procedure Macintosh is more consistent than
coherent. He seeks to avoid contradictions in his
statements about the relation of the body to the
personality of God. But his activistic metaphysics is
without logical connection and coherent relation to his
idea of God's personality. Macintosh arrives at his
idea of a personal God empirically and not metaphysically.
His empirical method is important for what he calls his
"higher realism" or "personal realism and religious or
theistic realism, " the interpretation of human persons
and a personal God as ultimately real. From this
"higher" realism he moves to his metaphysics:
... there is nothing, so far as I can see,
which requires us to give up the lower realism,
namely physical realism, the view that the
physical universe is also thoroughly real. 85
All that he requires of metaphysics is consistency,
that the statements not contradict experience or each
other. He believes that God's body and his personality
may be explained together (although they have no necessary
relation)
:
The physical and vital factors constitute
the Body, of which in experimental religion
82. Macintosh in Perm (ed.), CAT, I, 514.
85. Macintosh, Art
.
(1958 175.
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at its best man is aware of coming into
contact with the immanent divine Spirit. 84
Macintosh’s idea of a personal God does not depend on
his metaphysics, on his view of God’s body as the
physical universe.
However, if one is to employ the empirical method,
as described in Chapter IV, supra, in his metaphysics
as well as in his idea of God, these two areas cannot
be separate so completely. Even if one claims to have
independent religious data, this data cannot be overlooked
in formulating his metaphysical views. On the other
hand, Macintosh would never deny the metaphysical reality
of the religious object. In fact, his thought is in
part, at least, a search for objectivity, an attempt to
defend the objectivity of the religious object, for
example, which he believes that idealism regards as
OC
merely subjective. If religious exoerience is
experience of objects which have metaohysical reality,
one's metaphysical views are not empirical if they
fail to consider this kind of experience and religious
experience itself is not adequately explained if
divorced from one's metaphysics. For Macintosh,
84. Macintosh, Art. (1919)^, 158.
85. Cf» especially his statement that objective
idealism "substitutes a false God, the
artifact of thought, for the true God
which positive experience claims to
discover as an Independent Reality, 11
Macintosh, Art. (1919)
,
139.

however, the idea of a personal God lacks coherent
relation to his activistic, dualistic metaphysics.
Further implications of the relation of God's
personality and his body appear in the discussion of
the problem of evil which brings this study of
Macintosh's criticism of personalism to its summary
and conclusions
'. ,
:
.
CHAPTER IX
THE PROBLEM OP EVIL
Evil is a persistent empirical fact. Sharp
contrasts between the views of different personalists
have resulted from their attempts to explain it
philosophically. Macintosh's explanation of the
problem of evil reveals the contrast between his
metaphysical realism and his empirical concept of a
personal God. The comparison of his and the emoirical
personalist 's views of the problem of evil shows the
relative lack of empiricism in Macintosh’s metaphysics
and the unique position of empirical personalists.
This investigation of the problem of evil thus
emphasizes certain characteristics which distinguish
empirical personalists from the more rationalistic
personalists. It also leads to certain dinst inct ions
between empirical personalists and Macintosh, which
are brought together in the following chapter of summary
and conclusions.
1. Personalist ic views of God and evil
The views of both Macintosh and personalists about
God make this chapter on the problem of evil a
..
continuation of the discussion of the idea of God in
the previous chapter of this dissertation. However,
the problem of evil is distinct, although the idea of
a personal God makes an explanation of the relation
between God and evil imperative. Since Macintosh
agrees with personalists in seeking to describe God as
personal, his thought about the problem of evil and a
comparison of his views of evil and the view empirical
personalists hold are especially significant in his
criticism of personalism.
The problem of evil has led to a sharp contrast
between different personalistic concepts of the power
of God. One view is that God’s power is infinite.
Bowne, for example, believed that God’s power was
infinite, although not arbitrary—that is, the infinity
of God’s power is not illustrated by any violation of
the principles of reason. He concluded a discussion of
the "metaphysical attributes of world- ground " with the
affirmation that "God is absolute will or absolute agent,
forever determining himself according to rational and
eternal principles." However, Bowne recognized that
the idea of God’s omnipotence was 8 special problem
concerning which great care must be exercised!
We shall need to move warily and with great
circumspection to escape falling a prey to
the swarms of abstractions in which this
realm abounds. 2
1. Bowne, POT, 170
2. Ibid., 160.
..
.
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The idea of a personal God infinite in power is
extensively developed by other outstanding personalist s
.
Knudson, for example, expresses it especially in his
two outstanding volumes on Christian theology. The Doctrine
of God and The Doctrine of Redemption . In the former, for
example, he says that of omnipotence, omnipresence, and
eternity, which are the three elements of metaphysical
absoluteness, "omnipotence is the most fundamental." 3
By omnipotence he does not mean power to do the nondoable
or to violate the principles of reason. Omnipotence
means merely that God’s power "expresses itself perfectly
and completely in and through his nature."
4
For Knudson,
omnipotence is essential to the moral and religious
personality of God, for "without omnipotence there can
be neither perfect unity nor perfect goodness." ^ For
him, the personality of God implies God’s omnipotence.
Knudson ’s thought also illustrates the view that
many personalist s hold of the relation of an infinite
God to evil. In agreement with Bowne, Knudson thinks
that divine reality is not passive substance but "a
unitary and indivisible agent." 6 This means that an
infinitely powerful God is responsible for all that is,
except the free choices of other selves. God cannot
be responsible of free choices without violating his
5. DOG, 264.
4. See ibid., 269-270.
5. Ibid., 274.
6. Bowne, MET, 94.
.'-
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moral character. Natural or surd evil and good alike,
however, can spring only from the will of the
Omnipotent Person.
The moral goodness of God, thus, imposes the task
of explaining the suffering that results from these
natural evils. Knudson refuses to remove the "rock of
offense contained in the fact of suffering" by rejecting
divine omnipotence, for he believes that would also
remove "all ground for any profound faith in the divine
providence." 7 He seeks to explain suffering as a
means to a higher end, by the suggestion that there
may be other than human ends and other than human
standards of right and wrong and of animal suffering,
by showing how pain warns against danger and contributes
to the moral and spiritual life, and by admitting ignorance
and pointing to the practical solution in faith. 8 While
other personalists who believe that God's power is infinite
add their suggestions to explain the relation of an
infinite God to evil, Knudson 's views are sufficient to
illustrate personalist ic thought about evil as related
to the idea of an infinite God.
The problem of evil has led to another personalistic
view of the relation of power to Divine Personality.
Brightman explains the problem of evil by the idea of
7. Knudson, DOG, 258.
8. Knudson, DOR, 215-221.
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a personal God limited in power. This idea of God's
power does not affect the moral perfection of God's
will. In this respect, the adequacy of God for religious
faith and worship is not altered.^ God's will is just
as real and just as good as if his power were infinite.
The element that limits God's power, however, is
within his experience. This idea of a finite God differs
from the Marcionitic dualism, and also from Macintosh's
idea of God, in regarding this element not as in some
way external to God but as a part of his experience.
In addition to Divine Will, God's experience contains
another element which is "Given," which the Divine Will
accepts and uses for accomplishing its purposes. This
element is not created by the will but is found; it is
"Given." Prom the "Given," not from God's perfect will,
natural and surd evils result. Divine Will controls
this other element of Divine Experience and is able to
use it in carrying out its ideals, although the "Given"
may not be perfectly suited for ideal purposes. The
"Given" thus operates as a limitation on God's power.
In this way evil is neither denied nor confused
with good. Natural evils result from God's struggle
with and use of the "Given," but God is not morally
responsible for these evils. His will is perfect.
9. Cf. worship and Macintosh's idea of God, surra.
Chapter VIII. Note, however, Knudson's view of
omnipotence and worship and goodness, DOG, 274;
DOR, 206-207.
'V.
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we is worthy of worship. He wills the best possible
and accents the "Given*’ as the best way available for
accomplishing his purposes, although it may mean that
these ideals will not be perfectly realized. There
is no "outside" cause, no cause other than God's
experience that explains the experienced fact of
evil.
The empirical quality of this explanation of evil
shows its relation to the empirical emphasis of Macintosh's
thought. When the empirical personalist seeks to
explain the problem of evil and the nature of God,
he considers experience, searching for a clue to an
explanation that will deny neither the experienced
fact of evil, including unexplained (surd) human
suffering, nor the experiences of religious values
and the hypothesis of Divine Personality which they
support. In one's own experience there is both will
and resistence to will. Whatever explanation is given
of experience and reality, these two elements are
present in every experience.
Although the idea of divinity has long established
a gulf between man and God, the empirical personalist
sees no reason for an absolute qualitative differentiation
if all experience may be explained more adequately
without it. Faith is an element of each experience
'.
.
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and not a religious insight which begins where knowledge
ceases to suffice. In every experience there is an
element of faith. Why must there be a qualitative
difference in one’s knowledge about God? The empirical
personalist can overlook neither the experience of evil
nor the experience of worship. He see the problem as
a problem of good- and- evil. In the personal object of
worship he finds no need for arbitrary ways of knowing
that transcend what can be personally experienced. The
experienced religious values, for example, are adequately
explained by a perfect will; divine omnipotence is
merely as additional concept that initially appears
theoretically possible and that certain historical
traditions tend to supoort. Religious experience is
explained, however, by a moral will, not by omnipotence.
To attribute to God ’’modes of knowing that we cannot
comprehend," for examole, is possible, but it lacks
any empirical basis.
The empirical personalist objects to the addition
of omnipotence, which is never experience, to a perfect
moral will, which is required by religion and is
empirically adequate, not only because omnipotence Is
unnecessary but also because it tends to distort thought
about the problem of evil. Much apoarent evil may be
explained as the rationalistic personalists seek to
10. Knudson, DOG, 319
..
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explain it, but unless one admits that evil may be an
actual fact logically he cannot affirm that good is a
fact. Empirically the problem confronted is the problem
of good-and-evil .H In the empirical personalist ’
s
attempt to explain this problem neither good nor evil
can be ignored nor reduced to the other. The attempt
to solve the entire problem brings the empirical
personalist to the idea of a personal God whose experience
is qualitatively similar to all experience he ever has
and knowledge of whom is structurally no different
from knowledge of objects in the physical world. Both
knowledge of God and knowledge of the physical world
contain an element of faith.
This concept of a personal God who experiences a
“Given “ which resists his will contradicts neither the
experience of good nor than of evil. Likewise it
provides an adequate explanation for the experience
of religious values without following an historical
will-o’-the-wisp which turns one aside from experience
and all that is empirically essential. A personal God
whose will accepts and controls the “Given” is the
empirical oersonalist ’ s solution of the problem of
evil.
11. This terminology is used in Brightman, POR,
Chapter VIII, for examole.
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2. Macintosh’s views of God and evil
The implications of the empirical personalist ’
s
solution become even clearer when one considers
Macintosh’s views about the problem of evil. Macintosh,
like empirical personalist s, uses the empirical method
and believes in a personal God.^ His empirical emphasis
on worship and right religious adjustment is essential
for his idea of a personal God. His concept of God as
adequate for worship is also empirical, and his interest
in the moral and religious character of God leads him
to emphasize God as adequate rather than as omnipotent.
In relation to right religious adjustment God is not
necessarily omnipotent. Macintosh’s empirical concept
of God is that of “a Being perfect in character and
supreme in power." ^ His empirical method causes him
to emphasize a personal God as adequate and supreme
rather than as omnipotent. So far he agrees with
empirical personalist s.
This empirical influence appears also in Macintosh’s
idea of evil:
... the world as we know it can be reasonably
interpreted ss the sphere of a divine purpose
and adequate providential control.
^
In fact, Macintosh’s acceptance of the world as adequately
12. See Chapter VIII, supra.
13. Macintosh, PH, 179. Cf. “absolutely adequate
in power," in Macintosh, TES, 229.
14. Macintosh, ROC, 263.
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controlled by divine will tends even to modify his
distinction between good end evil. Macintosh’s idea
of creation as "real in the sense of self-transcending
causality at the time, a becoming which is neither
completely necessitated beforehand nor emerging without
cause," 15 illustrated, for example, by our own
responsible free agency, may apr>ear to save his
explanation; but it actually results either in a
Marcionitic dualism or a confusion of the distinction
between good and evil and a resort in his metaphysical
monistic hypothesis of a "common denominator." He
observes, for example, that God produces various things
necessary "in order that the world may be the best
possible kind of world to be the scene of the first
stage of man’s existence." Macintosh thinks that
as far as God is concerned this present world is
reasonably explained as "the best possible kind of world
for the present stage of man’s development . " He
emphasizes a God who might have founded and might be
purposively at work in and constantly exercising adequat
providential control over the world as "great enough and
1 ft
good enough for man’s love and trust."
Macintosh’s religious interest in the problem of
15. Macintosh, Art. (1940)^, 154.
16. Macintosh, ROC, 118. Cf. Macintosh, GWW,
30-31.
17. Macintosh, ROC, 117.
18. Ibid., 93.
•.
.
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evil 19 if further illustrated by his emphasis on the
right religious attitude to reinforce the moral will
so that "the destruction of evil will be assured, " ^0
His view of God’s method of dealing with evil also
indicates that his interest in the problem of evil is
largely religious and moral. He believes that ’’the
’general providence' of the school of experience in
general and the ’special providence' of the experience
of saving grace” is a better method than "any substitute
that could be devised.”
The application of this thought to immortality,
by which he, like Paul, understands "the triumphant
entrance of the whole personality of the Christian into
the full measure of eternal life,” 22 also illustrates
his interest in evil as a religious and moral problem.
He believes that, if the essential values of individual
personality may be conserved in spite of bodily death,
the world in which physical death is -inevitable may be
"still the best possible kind of world in which to have
the individual pass the first stage of his development." 2 ^’
Macintbsh's belief in man means to him the faith that
"man's value, actual and potential, is such that his
existence ought to be continued indefinitely in spite
19. See Macintosh, TE5, 216-229.
20. Macintosh, Art. (1919)1, 160.
21. Macintosh, ROC, 114.
22. Macintosh, Art.(1910) 4
,
574-375.
23. Macintosh, TES, 225.
..
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He finds this faith strengthenedof physical death." 24
by the depths of moral and personal religion sounded,
for example, by Jesus’s assurance of God as a perfect
Father who "would not suffer the moral personality of
any of his human children to pass into nothingness." ^
Macintosh's moral and religious interest in the
oroblem of evil minimizes his concern with it as a
strictly philosophical problem. In relation to the
philosophical problem of evil Macintosh's idea of the
physical world as the physical body of God is again
significant. If God's physical body is an activity
(and its results) of a reality more than matter and
less than mind, 2° then that which undergoes transformations
as God’s active and potential energy "under the unifying
control and guidance of the Divine Will" 2^ must be
external to Divine Personality. Thus, Macintosh's
metaphysical view of the problem of evil illustrates
his relative metaphysical dualism. One of the
significant statements he makes about this problem
shows clearly this metaphysical dualism:
... it would seem that a considerable measure
of independence has been given to physical
24. Macintosh, Art. (1920), 570.
25. Macintosh, Art. (1915), 201. See also Macintosh
in Roberts and VanDusen (ed.), LT, 249-250. Cf.
his interpretation of Jesus as "the highest we
know," Macintosh, Art. (1907)^, 651.
26. See supra, 148-149.
27. Macintosh, ROC, 276.
..
reality as well as to the human will, so
that it would be unsafe to infer that all
that haopens to human individuals through the
ruthless operation of mechanical and chemical
law or through the activities of living
organisms is an intentional happening so
far as God is concerned. 28
The independence of physical reality and of human wills
reveals a qualitative metaphysical dualism that makes
the oroblem of evil a ohilosophical as well as a moral
and religious problem. The moral and religious problem
relative to the independence of human wills and to
right religious adjustment leaves untouched the real
philosophical problem of natural and surd evils.
Macintosh’s explanation of this problem involves his
realistic metaphysics, the independence which he gives
to physical reality. Since he also recognizes persons,
both human and divine, as real, his metaphysical position
is actually dualistic rather than a critical monistic
realism, which he seeks to retain in his metaphysics
as well as his epistemology . 29
3. Comparison of Macintosh’s and the empirical personalist
views
The metaphysical implications of this dualism,
which seems to be basic in relation to God but which is
relative in that the mental and the material are both .
activities of a common denominator more than matter and
28. Macintosh, Art. (1942)2, 43.
29. See supra, 147. Cf. Macintosh, TES, Appendix,
and ROC, Chapter XIII.
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less thar mind, have already been considered. 30 They
reaopear in the comparison of Macintosh’s and the
empirical personallst ’ s solutions of the problem of
evil. Macintosh's oninion that the idea of a personal
God with a perfect will limited by the "Given" is a
step from traditional personalism to realism also has
already been seen.^ His charge that the empirical
personalist "assumes" that when one recognizes the reality
both of God and of evil and the perfection of the divine
will "the only alternative left is to ascribe such
extra-human evil to something in the Spirit of God
himself" 32 reVeals Macintosh’s own realism. His view
ascribes evil to reality outside the nature of God, but
his empirical method does not support his realistic
metaphysics 33 nor account for the origin of this
external evil.
Macintosh criticizes the empirical personalist ic
solution of the problem of evil because he believes
this idea of a finite God is religiously inadequate--
"is this not destructive of the complete worshipfulness
and trustworthiness of Deity." ^ If this charge were
valid, it might reveal an empirical shortcoming of the
idea of a finite God. Religious values are not to be
30. See Chapter VII, supra.
31. See supra, 102.
32. Macintosh, Art.(1932) 4
,
304.
33. See Chapter VII, supra.
34. Macintosh, Art. (1932 ) 305.
».
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overlooked; any theory of the nature of Divine Reality
that arbitrarily rejects any kind of experience needs
careful re-examination.
The idea of a personal God with a perfect will
although limited by what it accepts and uses but does
not create, however, is not religiously inadequate. The
experiences of religious values require God’s good will,
but not his infinite power. Worship depends on God's
moral character, not on his omnipotence. The empirical
demands of both faith and reason do not even require
omnipotence; infinite power to do the conceivable is
called for only by a rationalistic concept of reason
and faith .
^
For the empirical personallst, the finite,
36
personal God has a perfectly good will. The Divine
Will which controls the "Given" is morally perfect,
although that which it accepts and employs to accomplish
its purposes may limit its power. Evils result from
the "Given," not from the Divine Will.
While God's experience contains various factors,
for example, his Will and the "Given," the moral quality
of God's will is not less perfect because it accepts and
uses what is "Given" as the best means available for
accomplishing its purposes. God is not "albeit a person,
35. See Knudson, DOG, 269-270.
36. Note that Macintosh also speaks of a God whose
will is perfectly good, although his "good will
is not yet fully recognized in msn and in the
world," in Macintosh (ed.), RR, 406.
.’
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a complex of God and devil in one," Since God’s
will is perfectly moral and a devil has an evil will,
this finite God cannot be a complex of both. God’s
good will is not made imperfect by his use of the best
means available, merely because they are imperfect.
In fact, Macintosh’s metaphysical solution of
the problem of evil makes God less adequate for religion
and worship than is the God of the empirical personalist.
If God is limited not by what he accepts as a part of
his own experience and uses to fulfill his purposes
adequately and as perfectly as possible but by what is
other than his experience and for which his will is
ultimately resoonsible, such a God is certainly less
worthy of worship than the God who is involuntarily
limited from within. The empirical personalist conserves
the religiously adequate, perfectly moral will of God;
Macintosh has sacrificed it.
Macintosh believes that the personalist faces the
following dilemmas
... everything that happens in addition to
the free acts of human agents is either the
direct conscious crest ion of God at the time,
or else the necessary outcome of the struggle
of a finite, thwarted God against eternal
ooposition in his own personal nature. 88
In his realism Macintosh seeks to relegate evil to
37. Macintosh, Art.(1932) 4
,
304. Cf. Ross, PPE, 38-51.
38. Ibid., 305.
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reality as God’s past creation and habits and thus to
minimize the Creator’s responsibility for his past
creation. He suggests that the reign of law be
understood as like established physical habit rather
than "the present consciously willed activity of the
ever-creat ive God." God's present creative activity,
he believes, is largely in the spiritual sphere.
However, placing creation in the remote past indeed
"does not alter the fact that creation creates." 40 The
omnipotent moral will is responsible for both the
immediate and the remote consequences of its creative
acts. If any of the consequences from the activity of
Divine Will alone are surd evils, there is no way that
this will can be morally perfect.
In Macintosh's idea of "independently real" physical
reality he no longer follows the empirical method which
leads to his idea of a personal God. In neither the
empirical method nor the idea of God as personal is
there any evidence for Macintosh’s metaphysical view
of the problem of evil, for example. Brightman observes
that Macintosh's solution leaves him with "two Givens."
Empirically the natural evils of the created cosmos are
«
eventually "Given" to Macintosh's personal God. This
"Given" results from his realistic metaphysical dualism.
39. Macintosh, Art.(1939) 5
,
34.
40. Brightman, Art. (1932)^, 462.
41. Ibid., 462.
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The idea of a personal God ultimately responsible
for his physical body (and habits) also means that
there must be a second "Given, " that within God which
is responsible for such a cosmos, unless one wishes
to invite a Marcionitic dualism into the framework
of Macintosh's ultimate metaphysical (qualitative)
monism of a "common denominator."
Macintosh's metaphysical view of evil, thus, merely
complicates the problem; if God is creative and personal,
his experience must explain everything. Although the
theoretical fault of emancipating God from time may
49be a source of revolt against the existence of evil,
time neither alters nor abolishes the responsibility of
the Divine Will for its creative acts. A personal God
is morally perfect and supported by the empirical method
completely apart from the idea of any "independently
real" physical reality. The relation of Macintosh's
idea of a personal God to his metaphysical view about
evil depends on his realism, which is less thoroughly
empirical than his idea of a personal God.
The empirical personalist ' s solution of the
problem of evil by the idea of a personal God limited
in power by a "Given," which the Divine Will accepts
and uses as the best means available for accomplishing
42. Alexander, STD, II, 420.
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its purposes, offers a religiously adequate explanation
of all experience without reducing evil to good or
good to evil.
The problem of good-and-evil leads to an empirical
view of God as a perfectly moral will accepting and
controlling what is also a part of Divine Experience
but what it does not create, which is "Given, " and
with which it adequately, although not perfectly,
strives to accomplish its purposes. This solution of
the problem of evil is empirical in its concepts of
personality, of purpose, of evil, and of religious
values
.
The empirical explanation of personality is as a
will striving against factors which it does not create,
but which are "Given" to it, in the attempt to realize
values. The metaphysical quality of the "Given" may be
explained in various ways; for the empirical personalist
it is most adequately understood as qualitatively like
mind and an organization of the Divine Consciousness.
Divine Personality is not qualitatively different from
human personality. 4 '^ The problem of good-and-evil
supports the belief that the "Given" is also a part of
Divine Experience which is accepted and used by the
Divine Will in seeking to accomplish its purposes and
43. See Brightman, Art. (1945).
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to experience values.
The empirical concept of purpose is illustrated
in the idea of a finite God who accepts and controls
the "Given" and strives toward ideals. Purpose is
empirically explained as an ideal toward which one
strives and which is realized as value. Purpose is
experienced as a value; it is sought as an ideal.
The empirical personalists understand God's purpose
as something toward which he also strives. One is
consciously aware of his ourposes as ideals; they
are realized as values only as he strives toward and
experiences them.
The empirical concept of evil is the experienced
fact that evil is evil. Empirically the distinction
between good and evil cannot be obscured by reducing
one to the other, or by seeking to explain either
completely as means to the other. The empirical
personalist believes that both good and evil are real
and that both result from Divine Experience. However,
the Divine Will is good; evil results from the necessity
that, if any values are to be realized, the Divine Will,
like the human will, must accept and use the "Given"
in accomplishing its purposes. Like good, evil is
an experience, and no experience can be discarded
or arbitrarily neglected in the attempt to explain
.'
•
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any end all experience.
The concept of a finite God who controls the
"Given" sufficiently for values to be experienced
is also emoirical in explaining the experiences of
religious values. Empirically values are realized
ideals or norms. They are realized and experienced
by persons, both human and divine. The experiences
of religious values, like all other experiences, must
be considered critically and explained as reasonably
as possible. For the reasonable explanation of
religious experience, the moral will of the finite God
is both necessary and adequate. The experience of
values is evidence that this Divine Will controls the
"Given" so that its purposes may be adequately, although
-not necessarily perfectly, realized. The empirical
personalist does not believe that this control is
absolute, that God is omnipotent, but only that it
is adequate to produce values.
The empirical method is illustrated in the idea
of a personal God accepted by both Macintosh and the
empirical personalist s . In their views of evil,
however, the more systematic use of the empirical
method by empirical personalist s throughout their
epistemology and metaohysics results in a more coherent
and more adequate interpretation of all experience
..
.
than characterizes Macintosh’s epistemological and
metaphysical views. In this way the implications
of the empirical personal! st ' s metaphysical views
and of Macintosh’s metaphysics are emphasized by
their solutions of the problem of evil*
Certain significant distinctions between Macintosh
thought and empirical personalism are brought together
in the following chapter as summary and conclusions of
this study of Macintosh’s criticism of personalism.
..
CHAPTER X
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Macintosh's criticism of personalism is a part
of his religious realism and shows certain points of
fundamental difference, as well as certain points of
agreement, between his thought and personalism. The
purpose of this dissertation has been to examine and
evaluate these points.
1 • Summary
Macintosh's interest in religious values and the
Christian faith results in a similarity between his
religious realism and the historical development of
the realism of universals (Chanter II). The relation
of his thought to common sense, his special interest
in science, and the influence of certain psychological
factors and his "realistic'' escape from them show also a
similarity between his realism and other forms of
anti-idealistic realism. Certain distinctive features
of his realism in religion (Chapter III) are illustrated
by his doctrine of values, his doctrine of the self,
and the influence of religion on his realism and of
realism on his religion. Through Macintosh's teaching
at Yale University and his extensive writing, his
..
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distinctive realism has had considerable influence on
both philosophy and theology.
The epistemology of the philosophical position
from which Macintosh criticizes personalism both resembles
and differs from personalistic epistemology. The
empirical method characterizes both Macintosh’s
epistemology and personalistic epistemology (Chapter IV).
Unlike personalists who accept dualism in epistemology,
however, Macintosh attempts to be critically monistic
in his epistemology and to avoid the agnosticism In
dualism, the subjectivity of the various forms of
idealism, and dogmatism in realism (Chapter V).
Special problems arise In his views of mediate and
immediate knowledge, of qualities and values, of the
relation of epistemology to metaphysics, and of monism
to critical pragmatism. An evaluation of Macintosh's
arguments sgainst dualism (Chapter VI) reveals that
his thought, like dualism, depends on practical certainty,
not immediate, monistic certainty. A critical investigation
reveals likewise that his interpretation of idealism as
necessarily subjective in the sense of denying objectivity
is arbitrary, because idealism may be metaphysical as yrell
as epistemological. Also his views about coherence and
his dependence on mere consistency show more irrationalism
in critical monism than there is in epistemological
dualism
..
•
The metaphysics of Macintosh’s thought also differ®
from personalism (Chapter VII). Personalists are
qualitatively monistic in their metaohysics; they deny
nonmental reality. Macintosh objects to this denial.
His own view, however, is that the relation between
metaphysics and theology is merely consistent, rather
than coherent. Also he is inclined to interpret certain
psychological factors as authoritative for metaphysics,
for example, his view of faith as ontological and
doubt as psychological. The criticism he makes of the
rationalistic view that regards reality as completely
rational shows how important is the metaphysical
methodology of emoirical personalism, which seeks the
most reasonable explanation of all experience.
Although Macintosh's epistemological realism leads him
to criticism of idealistic metaphysics, his statements
of epistemological monism shew an attempt to maintain
both the activity of consciousness snd metaphysical
realism, which he seeks to explain as the physical
body of God. Actually his metaphysical position is
an activistic, qualitative dualism in which mind end
matter are both activities, although differing activitie
of a common denominator, which is "less thsn mind and
more than matter."
Although Macintosh criticizes the epistemological
and metaphysical views of personalism, his and the
..
.
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personalist 1 s ideas of God are very similar (Chapter
VIII). Macintosh's empirical method is the avenue by
which he reaches his idee of a personal God, spiritually
experienced and spiritually and religiously adequate, a
"Higher Life" and a "Perfect Friend" to which the right
religious adjustment is made. However, Macintosh's
empirical method and his idea of a personal God are
organically related neither to his epistemological monism
nor to his relative metaohysical dualism. One never
has "direct knowledge" even of the God of experience.
A unity of a personal God also is no conclusion of
epistemological monism. Macintosh's idea of a personal
God is independent also of his metaphysical interpretation
of the physical universe as God's physical body.
Differences among personalistic solutions of the
problem of evil show the differences between empirical
personalism and a more rationalistic form of personalism.
Macintosh's emphasis on God as religiously adequate and
his view of empirical method both reveal similarity
between his idea of God and the empirical personalistic
position, although Macintosh's interest in evil as a
moral and religious problem and the relation of his
metaphysical views to the problem of evil minimize the
philosophical problem of evil for him and modify his
empirical method. A critical comparison of Macintosh's
ideas sbout evil end of the empirical personalist '
s
..
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view of the problem of evil (Chapter IX) reveals that
an internally limited personal God is more religiously
adequate than a personal God externally limited. This
comparison also reveals that Macintosh is more
personalistic than monistically realistic in his
empirical method and his idea of a personal God.
2. Conclusions
The conclusions of this investigation of Macintosh's
criticism of personalism may be stated as distinctive
characteristics of empirical personalism. Empirical
personalism differs both from Macintosh's thought and
from the more rationalistic forms of personalism. The
differences between empirical personalism and Macintosh's
thought are both epistemological and metaphysical.
An important epistemological distinction is the
difference between the epistemological dualism of
personalism and Macintosh's attempted epistemological
monism. Personalists rest their epistemological dualism
on faith in reason to interpret all experience. Macintosh
seeks to establish knowledge by immediate experience.
However, immediate experience cannot actually be
knowledge until there is mediation; mediated knowledge
depends on immediate experience plus mediation, not on
immediate knowledge. Hence a concealed dualism lurks
in Macintosh's reasoning.
•*
,
•
*
•
.
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Personal! stic dualists seek to be as reasonable
as possible; Macintosh claims immediate certainty.
Macintosh’s immediate certainty, however, is critical
and is replaced in his thought by practical certainty.
Macintosh’s ideas of verification and representational
pragmatism in both general and religious knowledge, for
example, show not immediate, monistic certainty but
practical certainty, which requires purpose and is
epistemologically dualist ic. Thus his thought implies
the inadequacy of epistemological monism and the need
for epistemological dualism. Especially Macintosh’s
knowledge (or faith) of the transcendent aspects of
God is neither monistic nor immediately certain.
The dualistic epistemology of personalism differs
from Macintosh's thought also in recognizing that idealism
may be objective. For Macintosh, idealism is a denial
of objective reality. He believes that idealism is
subjectivism; much of his thought may be understood as
a search for objectivity. His descriptions of personal
idealism as merely a stage in the disintegration of
logical-psychological idealism into mere psychological
idealism, and of logical idealism as abstracting from
the abstraction of psychological idealism illustrate
his interpretation of all idealism as epistemological
idealism. Personalistic epistemology does not require
that idealism mean subjectivism; idealism as a theory
f
..
.
.
.
of the nature of reality implies, rather then denies,
the reasonableness of objectivity of reality. For the
personalist, the subjective residence of knowledge
does not deny its objective reference and validity.
The epistemology of empirical personalism is the
attempt to give as reasonable an explanation of all
experience as possible.
Personal i stic epistemology also differs from
Macintosh’s epistemological thought in the recognition
of the coherence criterion of truth. The eclecticism
of Macintosh's thought illustrates his interest in
consistency. His hostility to coherence and "system”
show why he attempts to be consistent rather than
coherent. However, epistemological monism and mere
consistency are inadequate to explain the unity of
divine reality, for example. Here even Macintosh’s
criticism of personalism implies the ideals of
inclusiveness and system as well as consistency.
Metaphysical differences between Macintosh's
thought and personalism are related to Macintosh’s
objection to the personalistic denial of nonmental
reality. His metaphysical methodology is based on
consistency between metaphysics and theology, the
acceptance of certain psychological conditions as
objective and others as subjective, and his interpretation
of emphasis on reasonableness to mean that only the
..
*
.
.
:
'
comDletely rational is real. The metaphysical
methodology of personalism requires, however, a
coherent relation between metaphysics and theology
(andof all knowledge), a critical evaluation of all
psychological conditions of each experience, and an
attempt to give the most reasonable explanation of all
factors of experience, both rational and nonrational.
Macintosh's metaphysical conclusion is a relative
qualitative dualism of objective reality and the object
as experienced, a relative dualism of matter (God’s
physical body) and mind, which are "differing activities
and their products," activities of "a common denominator"
which is more than matter and less than mind. Personalist
believe that mind must be actually less than mind and
matter more than mere matter if both are activities of
a common denominator "less than the one and more than
the other. " They also believe that the most reasonable
way to explain all experience is not to give up reason
but to consider experience and not lean to something
qualitatively different from mind.
Their ideas of a personal God show the influence
of the empirical method in the thought of both Macintosh
and personalist s. However, Macintosh does not have
"direct knowledge" of a personal God; his epistemological
monism does not give him the unity of a personal God;
and worship of a personal God does not require that the
..
.
'
physical world be God's physical body. In fact,
Macintosh's idea of God is more per sonalist ic than
monistically realistic.
The emoirical method in Macintosh's thought also
makes it important to distinguish between empirical and
more rationalistic forms of personalism. One sees the
distinctive features of empirical personalism especially’
in relation to God and the problem of evil. Rationalistic
personalists believe in an omnipotent God and emphasize
the disciplinary value of evil, leaving unsolved the
philosophical oroblem of natural and surd evils. Macintosh
also deals with evil as a moral and religious problem,
although he does emphasize a personal God as adequate
rather than as infinitely powerful. For empirical
personalists God is personal and has an absolutely
good will. Thus God is religiously adequate, although
limited in power by the acceptance and use of that which
is also a oart of his experience, but which is ’’Given"
not created by him, in the accomplishment of his purposes.
Since God, like human persons, accepts and uses what
is "Given," ideals are not perfectly realized as values;
and evils result.
God's will, however, is not responsible for evil;
thus a personal God internally limited by his acceptance
and use of the "Given" is more religiously adequate
than the ' inf inite God of more rationalistic personalists.
.—
-
-
'
.
.
If God’s power is Infinite, he must be responsible for
all that is, except the free choices of other selves
for which he may not be responsible without sacrificing
his moral character. A personal God internally limited
Is also more religiously adequate then Macintosh’s Idea
of a God whose physical body is the ohysical universe,
for if God is thus externally limited and his Will Is
ultimately responsible for his body and habits, this
God is less adequate religiously than a personal God
whose will is morally perfect but limited involuntarily
by another factor within his experience.
The empirical method by which Macintosh arrives
at the Idea of a personal God is used by empirical
personelists to explain not only the nature of God
but also the relation of God to evil and to formulate
their personalis tic epistemological and met aohysical
views. Thus, a more thorough application of the
empirical method Is made by empirical personalists
than Macintosh makes in his thought and in his criticism
of personalism
..
.
.
.
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ABSTRACT
This dissertation deals with the criticism Douglas
Clyde Macintosh, a religious realist, makes of personalism.
His religious realism is related to both the medieval
realism of universals snd more recent anti-idealistic
realism. Its distinctive contribution, however, is the
view of the empirical method and its combination of
religion and realism.
Although Macintosh criticizes personalism, his
thought agrees with personalism on empirical method
and belief in a personal God. For Macintosh, unlike
many other realists and empiricists, the empirical
method is inclusive of experiences of all values.
In this respect, his empirical method is like the
emnirical method of personalism (Chapter IV). For
both Macintosh and empirical personalists the word
•‘empirical" denotes an apoeal to experience as
distinguished from abstract logic. One must be
"vitally experiential" to keep his thought from
becoming rationalistic. Empirical for both also means
an appeal to all kinds of experience, an impartial
examination of experiences of all values as well as
of sense data. Experiences of religious values, for
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example, ere as empirical as the sense experiences on
which physical sciences are based.
A second point of agreement between Macintosh and
empirical personalists results from this similarity
between their views of empirical method. Both believe
in a personal God (Chapter VIII). For both, God must
be related to experience; an abstract, absolute.
Impersonal God has no logical place in the thought of
either. God is spiritually experienced. Both his
existence and his nature are interpreted on the basis
of empirical data. For Macintosh and empirical personalist
experiences of religious values require a personal,
religiously adequate God. In seeking to explain all
experience a personal God is necessary.
Despite these agreements, Macintosh criticizes
personalism extensively. He believes personalism, like
all other forms of epistemological dualism, lacks
certainty (Chapters V and VI). He holds that since
epistemological dualism makes immediate experience of
independent reality impossible, epistemological dualism
is necessarily agnostic. Whether or not dualists
recognize their agnosticism, Macintosh believes it a
necessary defect of all epistemological dualism.
Macintosh also criticizes all forms of idealism.
Including personal idealism (Chapter V). In fact,
personal idealism, he believes. Is just a stage in the
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disintegration of logical-psychological idealism into
mere psychological idealism. To him '‘idealism 1 ’ means
denial of objective reality (i. e., denial of objects
which do not belong to subjects); hence all forms of
idealism are dogmatic. However, he recognizes in logical
idealism (Platonism) a tendency of idealism to become
realism, Platonic Ideas being a discovery rather than
a construct of human thought*
Macintosh believes that the dualistic epistemology
of personalism lacks certainty and that the idealism of
personalism is dogmatic. Thus personalism is irrational
(Chapter VI)* He believes other indications of
irrationalism in personalism are its coherence (an
artificial "sticking together" of subject and predicate)
and "system," which he understands as abstract, nonempirical
,
and not inclusive.
Examination of his criticism of personalistic
epistemology reveals that the certainty which actually
characterizes Macintosh's thought is practical certainty,
not the immediate certainty of epistemological monism
(Chapter VI). He requires that subjective certitude be
"sufficiently critical." Criticism implies reference,
and reference implies epistemological dualism. Especially
his idea of representational pragmatism and his knowledge
of the transcendent aspects of God illustrate practical
certainty, not immediate monistic certainty.
..
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But actually no immediate experience may be knowledge
until mediated, until criticized and evaluated (Chapter IV)
Verification, relation, and criticism involve processes of
purposive reference beyond any single present experience.
Only present experience is immediate. All knowledge
requires mediation. Any situation criticized is no
longer “Situation Experienced" but "Situation Believed-in.
"
Actually epistemological dualism is compatible with
empirical knowledge of the objective world, the world
"discovered, not created." Scientists do not maintain
that empirical knowledge requires absolute logical
necessity.
Macintosh* s criticism of idealism reveals that
he regards idealism a development of epistemology
rather than a metaphysical view. However, holding
knowledge to be subjective (as idealists do) does not
necessarily deny its objective reference (Chapter VI).
Epistemological realism is a theory that there is
objective reality; metaphysical realism and metaphysical
Idealism are theories about the nature of objective
reality. In fact, both metaphysical realism and
metaphysical idealism imply epistemological realism,
imply objective reality, a reality other than the
oresent exoerience of the knowing subject, unless one
accepts solipsism or denies his own consciousness.
Metaphysical idealists do not deny objectivity of
-.
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reality by describing it as qualitatively like
consciousness. Much of Macintosh's theological
metaphysics is itself idealistic. His God is like
human consciousness in many respects. It is arbitrary
to regard all idealism as subjectivism, all idealism
as a subjective theory denying the existence of
objective reality, merely because all knowledge must
be subjective in being present to a conscious subject
(Chaoter VI).
Macintosh's objection to the personalist lc denial
of nonmental reality Illustrates his failure to
distinguish metaohyslcal from epistemological idealism.
Personalists do not deny that there is objective reality;
they merely assert that there is no nonmental reality,
that all reality is qualitatively like consciousness
(Chapter VII).
Macintosh's view of the relation between theology
and metaphysics illustrates his attempt to avoid
inconsistency. Mere consistency and epistemological
monism, however, provide no basis for unity of divine
reality, for example (Chanter VI). Rational thought
requires not merely consistency but coherence, which is
more adequate because it presupooses consistency end add3
inclusiveness and system. Macintosh's loyalty to mere
consistency, without regard to coherence, results in
metaphysical as well as epistemological difficulties
..
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(Chapter VII). This Is the source of much of Macintosh's
objection to personalism. The ideal of coherence means
seeking the most adequate explanation of all factors of
experience (both rational and nonrat ional )
.
The empirical personalist ic view of the problem of
evil is based on such a search for the most adequate
(most coherent) explanation of experience. It emphasizes
the difference between Macintosh's metaphysics and the
more thorough application of empirical method In the
metaphysics of empirical personalism (Chapter VII)
.
The experience of evil is a fact which no philosophical
explanation of experience can overlook. Although
Macintosh considers evil principally as a moral and
religious problem, his emphasis on a religiously adequate
God (Chapter VIII) shows the relation of his empirical
method to the empirical personalist ic solution of the
problem of evil.
Experience always contains will and that which resists
will (Chanter IX) . Empirical personal! sts believe these
two elements characterize both human and divine experience
and attempt to take empirical method seriously in the
realm of good and evil. Since experiences of evil cannot
result from Divine Will (for God's will is good; it Is both
religiously and rationally adequate), empirical personalist
believe that they come from unwilled elements of Divine
Experience (not from indenendently real, nonmental reality
'.
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or (rod’s habits). God, like human persons, experiences
that which is "Given" and resists his will. He accepts
and uses the "Given, 1 * which he does not create but finds
w'ithin his own experience, as the best means available
for accomplishing his purposes. Experiences of value
indicate God’s control of the "Given," although this
control is not absolute, for the "Given" which God accept
and uses limits his power to accomplish his purposes.
Evils result. God’s will, however, is not responsible
for these evils. They result from his acceptance and
use of a "Given" not perfectly suited for the realization
of values.
Thus the empirical personalistic explanation of
evil does not impair God's religious adequacy. His will
is perfectly good. In fact, a personal God internally
limited by that for which his will is not responsible,
but which he accepts and uses as best he can to
accomplish his purposes, is more worthy of worship than
a God limited by that for which his will is responsible
either immediately or at some past time, since such a God
would be a doer of evil, even if long ago. Macintosh’s
view of the physical world ss God’s physical body makes
God ultimately responsible for evil, although creation
be relegated to the remote past (Chapter IX) . Actually
neither his empirical method nor his idea of a personal
God has any necessary logical relation to Macintosh's
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view of "independently real" physical reality and his
activistic, duallstic metaphysical realism (Chapter X)
•
This study of Macintosh’s criticism of personalism
reveals how the empirical method used by empirical
personalists in treating epistemological and metaphysical
as well as religious problems is like Macintosh’s method.
Macintosh is empirical in his idea of a personal God and
in most of his religious thought. Empirical personalists
seek to be empirical, regarding reason as coherence instead
of mere consistency, throughout their epistemological,
metaphysical, and religious thought. Thus they carry
out certain of Macintosh's presupoosit ions more completely
than he does.
The chief contributions of this dissertation on
Macintosh’s criticism of personalism are:
1. The proof of the importance of Macintosh's
empirical method and the similarity between his method
in arriving at an idea of a personal God and the method
of empirical personalism.
2. The use of the distinction between experience
and knowledge in comparing the empirical method in
epistemology and metaphysics with Macintosh’s monistic
epistemology and activistic, dualistic metaphysical
realism.
3. The distinction between empirical and more
rationalistic forms of personalism and the illustration
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of the empirical method in the empirical person© li stic
solution of the problem of evil.
4. The apolication of empirical personalism to
the idea of a personal God internally limited by the
"Given" and the proof of the religious adequacy of a
God who voluntarily accepts and uses the "Given" for
which his will is not voluntarily responsible in
contrast to Macintosh’s idea of a God whose physical
body and habits are the physical universe.
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